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POPULATION TRENDS AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECAFE REGION

This is the first of a series of studies on "Population Growth and Economic Development" prepared by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, in close collaboration with the Bureau of Social Affairs at United Nations Headquarters.

The study has been carried out pursuant to ECAFE project 02-03, "Population growth and economic development"¹ and the recommendation of the Population Commission on regional population studies.²

The present text is a revision of a preliminary report (document ECAFE/28) which was issued on 28 February, 1958.

A preprint of the study, circulated for consideration by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East at its fifteenth session in March 1959, is further revised in the present text, mainly in respect of statistical data.

¹ *Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Annual Report: Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Twenty-sixth session, Supplement No. 2, p. 45 (document E/3102) (see also earlier Annual Reports, from 1954 on).*

² *Population Commission, Report of the Ninth Session: Economic and Social Council, Official Records, Twenty-third session, Supplement No. 4, paragraphs 84-87 (document E/2957/Rev.1).*

INTRODUCTION

The rate of population growth in Asia and the Far East has greatly accelerated in recent years because mortality has rapidly declined while fertility, on the contrary, has generally remained constant. This acceleration has caused great concern to those ECAFE countries which are already densely settled and which are trying to achieve speedy economic development. It is not that a larger population, in itself, is necessarily regarded as undesirable; the opposite may sometimes be the prevailing view. But experience is beginning to hammer home the lesson that countries may have difficulty in meeting the challenge of a rapid population increase if they have a low level of income and—as frequently follows—low rates of saving and capital formation and comparatively inefficient techniques and methods. To put the same point differently, the rate of capital formation needed with a rapid population increase may be more than they can achieve without undue strain.

The present paper reviews the existing and prospective population trends and analyses the retarding effect which, on various assumed conditions, rapid population growth can be expected to have on the economic development of countries with a low income and limited cultivable land or other natural resources. Reference is made, in particular, to the effect on food supply, capital requirements and the supply of savings. A generalization is valid for all but a few sparsely populated countries, and unfortunately applies with special force to those with a relatively dense population: it is that, other things being equal, a country with a higher rate of population growth must make a larger development effort (which includes investing more and abstaining more from consumption) in order to obtain a given rate of increase in *per capita* income. There is even a danger that the development effort will not be large enough to offset the effect of a rapid population growth and that *per capita* income will decrease.

In the West, the demographic transition from a balance of high death and birth rates to a new balance of low death and birth rates was a slow and gradual process, in step with a similarly slow and gradual improvement in economic and social conditions. *Per capita* income, nutrition, housing and sanitation improved, the death rate gradually fell, and, after a time lag, the birth rate also fell. But in Asia and the Far East, the recent decline in mortality has been rapid, because it has resulted primarily from the introduction of advances in medicine and in epidemic control methods which had been developed elsewhere. In most of the countries, therefore, mortality has fallen before any major improvement in social and economic conditions has occurred. If it be true that only after such a major improvement will the birth rate fall, a very long time may well elapse before the levels of living in the ECAFE countries are high enough to produce a new balance of low death and birth rates. In such circumstances the

rapid rate of population growth which would occur in the interval would probably act as a brake on the economic development of most of the countries, and have a very important retarding effect in some cases. This is all the more true since the emigration outlet, which provided substantial relief to population pressure in Europe during its demographic transition, is not available to Asian countries to any significant extent.

However, past correlations between rising *per capita* income and declining fertility are not enough to establish an inevitable relationship between the two. Undoubtedly, in the West, there was a mutual influence, the birth rate falling in response to improved conditions of living and education, and *per capita* income rising faster because of the retardation of population growth. It would seem entirely possible that the present rapid decline in mortality in Asia and the Far East would itself help to produce the incentive, at both the family and the national level, for an eventual decline in fertility; and, like the decline in mortality, this decline in fertility might thus be partly independent of revolutionary changes in the level of living. There is, in any case, no doubt that the determination to accelerate the rise in *per capita* incomes from a low level has been largely responsible for the adoption of family planning programmes by some ECAFE countries.

The present rate of population growth in the ECAFE region is 1.7 per cent a year. Assuming a continuing decline in mortality but no decline in fertility, projections show that the rate of increase in the region will have risen to 2.3 per cent in twenty years' time. In a number of the countries the rate of increase will be above 3 per cent. In about thirty years, the projected population of the region, on these assumptions, will have doubled and will be equal to the whole population of the world today.

The birth rate has an important impact upon population growth. Assuming that the present high level of fertility continues until 1975 but then gradually declines (according to "medium assumption" outlined in part II, section 1 below), the population in the year 2000 will be 9 per cent lower, other things being equal, than if fertility is not reduced at all. Moreover, had fertility begun to decline in 1950, the projected population of the region would be 7 per cent smaller in 1975 and 30 per cent smaller in 2000 than in the absence of any decline in fertility.

The high fertility rates in Asia and the Far East have resulted in a population with a smaller percentage of people in the most productive age groups than in the industrial countries. If the fertility rate remains constant and the mortality rate continues to decline, this percentage will go on decreasing. This means that, on the average, each person working for income will have

to support an increasing number of dependents. The fall in the percentage of people in the most productive age groups will also continue, though not so sharply, if fertility falls only moderately, from the present time on. Only if there should be a rapid fall in fertility, might the percentage increase.

A fast growing population with a decreasing percentage of the population in the most productive age groups will need to spend a rising proportion of the national income on food and other daily necessities, and will have a declining proportion left for capital formation and other developmental expenditures, including the investment in education. The rate of economic development will thus tend to be slowed down. The existing shortage of capital is one of the main factors hampering economic development. For example, lack of capital is largely responsible for the fact that, even among the male population in the most productive age groups, unemployment and underemployment tend to be considerably greater than in the West. Already, according to estimates (based on various government development plans) of the amount of capital required per worker, the present rate of saving in most of the countries is not sufficient to provide enough jobs for the growing labour force.

All this does not mean that rapid economic development is not possible. The rate of development depends on the vigour of the efforts to keep income rising fast enough to accommodate the increasing population. Such efforts include institutional and organizational improvements; progress in health, education, training and technology, and the economic policies. But countries with heavy population pressure, surplus labour, and a rapid rate of population growth, will have to formulate their development plans accordingly. The distribution of their investment (both in physical assets and in social services such as health and education), the techniques of production, the equipment, the phasing of the projects, are all likely to be different from what is appropriate to countries where population pressure and surplus labour are smaller and the population growth rate is less.

One well-known method adopted by certain governments, which may help to give an initial boost to economic development if well planned and organized, is the fuller utilization of surplus labour in labour-intensive projects to create capital or produce consumption goods or services. Another possible measure is the redistribution of population within a country by moving people from densely settled areas to places where the land resources are not being fully used. But, although resettlement schemes can help to solve the food problem, they are expensive. Moreover, not all countries have suitable unused land available. At best, the evidence appears to show that resettlement can only afford a small relief to population pressure. For example, in Indonesia, the considerable effort which has been made to move families from overcrowded Java to Sumatra and other islands has achieved a rate of 25,000 to 30,000 persons annually (1950-54), but the present rate of population increase in Java is one million a year.

In addition to the steps they are taking to boost the aggregate rate of economic growth, a number of countries are also tackling the problem from the population side, through family planning. Whether family planning is undertaken in order to improve health, contribute to social welfare or accelerate economic development, the result if it is effective, will be a lowering of the birth rate, the rate of population growth and the number of persons supported by each income earner. As the Chairman of the thirteenth session of the Commission suggested, a programme of planned parenthood would help the countries to help themselves in attaining a steady improvement in the standard of living of the Asian people (document ECAFE 11/453, p. 310).

Three of the most populous countries of the region—mainland China, India and Japan—have already made family planning a major article of policy. The main measures taken have been the dissemination by government or semi-government agencies of information on contraception. For example, this was begun in India under the first five-year plan and is being intensified under the second plan. In addition, sterilization is practiced in all three countries, although it is of limited importance so far. In mainland China and Japan abortion also has been legalized.

Up to the present, family planning has had marked effects upon fertility only in industrialized and urbanized Japan, where the birth rate has been reduced by one-half in the last ten years. This spectacular decrease cannot, of course, be used as a basis for population forecasts in other ECAFE countries. It is nevertheless worth noting that family planning has significantly reduced the Japanese fertility rate in the absence of a sharp rise in *per capita* income. Average income, although higher than in almost all other countries of the region, is still low compared with other industrialized countries.

In other countries, the family planning programmes have not had any measurable effect upon the birth rate as yet. But only a few years have passed, and in many countries these programmes have for the most part been limited to pilot projects designed to provide the basis for more comprehensive schemes. Difficulties have arisen, especially because the predominantly rural population is not easily approached and informed about methods of family planning. In most countries, therefore, an early decline in fertility can hardly be expected. On the other hand, a number of studies, especially in India, show that there is a considerable desire in many groups of the population to limit family size.

Many governments in Asia and the Far East have thus started to tackle the problem of raising *per capita* incomes from both sides—they have tried to speed up the rate of aggregate economic growth and they have tried to reduce the rate of population growth. Some population measures, like some economic growth measures, are still in the experimental stage, or are only being executed on a very small scale. But, for most countries of the region, measures of both types can make an important contribution to a faster rate of development and higher levels of living.

I. THE PRESENT DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION

1. Total population

The ECAFE region contains more than half of the present population of the world and covers only one-sixth of the world's land area. In 1956, the population of the region was estimated at approximately 1,462 million, or 53.4 per cent of the world's population; the share of Europe (excluding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)¹ was 15.1 per cent, and the share of north and south America together only 13.7 per cent (see table 1).

Table 1
ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATION OF THE WORLD AND
MAJOR REGIONS, 1920-1956^a

Region	Year				
	1920	1930	1940	1950	1956
Mid-year estimates (in millions)					
World total	1,810	2,013	2,246	2,495 ^b	2,737
ECAFE region ^c	934	1,037	1,173	1,332	1,462
South West Asia	33	36	40	47	54
Africa	140	155	172	199	220
North America	117	135	146	168	186
Latin America	91	109	131	163	188
Europe ^d	328	355	380	393	412
Oceania	9	10	11	13	15
USSR	158	176	192	...	200 ^e
Percentage distribution					
World total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0 ^b	100.0
ECAFE region ^c	51.6	51.6	52.3	53.4	53.4
South West Asia	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0
Africa	7.8	7.7	7.7	8.0	8.0
North America	6.5	6.7	6.5	6.7	6.8
Latin America	5.0	5.4	5.8	6.5	6.9
Europe ^d	18.1	17.6	16.9	15.8	15.1
Oceania	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
USSR	8.7	8.7	8.5	...	7.3

^a The source is generally the United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1957*, table 2, p.123. Allowance has been made, wherever possible, for under- or over-enumeration at the various censuses. The estimates of the world population are subject to a possible error of about 5 per cent.

^b Allowance has been made in this instance for the population of the Soviet Union.

^c Including Iran which became a member of the ECAFE in 1958. (For a list of ECAFE countries see document E/CN.11/29/Rev.9).

^d Excluding the Soviet Union which is shown separately.

^e For 1 April 1956.

The population of the ECAFE region has increased in relative importance from 51.6 per cent of the world population in 1920 to 53.4 per cent in 1956. North and south America have also increased their share from 11.5 per cent in 1920 to 13.7 per cent in 1956 owing to the rapid population growth of the Latin American countries. These increases have taken place almost exclusively at the expense of Europe, whose share in the same period has declined by 3 per cent.

The two most populous nations in the world are both in the ECAFE region: China (mainland and Taiwan), with a population of around 630 million or almost one-quarter of the world total; and India, with 390

¹ For statistical convenience, Europe is taken as indicating (unless otherwise stated) the continent less the Soviet Union.

million inhabitants (table 2). Almost seventy per cent of the total population of the ECAFE region lives in these two countries alone. Indonesia, Japan and Pakistan have about 80-90 million people each and have larger populations than any country outside the region except the Soviet Union and the United States.

The remaining countries and territories in the ECAFE region have substantially smaller populations. Burma, Korea,² the Philippines, Thailand and Viet-Nam³ had populations of about 20-30 million in 1956; the populations of Afghanistan, Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya and Nepal range from 6 to 13 million; British Borneo,⁴ Cambodia, Hong Kong, Laos and Singapore are each inhabited by 1-4 million people.

Table 2
ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATION OF ECAFE COUNTRIES
IN 1956^a

Country	Mid-year estimates	
	In millions	Percentage distribution
ECAFE region	1,462.5	100.0
Afghanistan	13.0	0.9
British Borneo	1.1	0.1
Burma	19.9	1.4
Cambodia	4.4	0.3
Ceylon	8.9	0.6
China: Mainland	621.2	42.5
Taiwan	9.2	0.6
Federation of Malaya	6.2	0.4
Hong Kong	2.4	0.2
India	387.3	26.5
Indonesia	84.0	5.7
Iran	18.9	1.3
Japan	90.0	6.2
Korea ^b	31.4	2.1
Korea, southern	21.8	1.5
Laos	1.4	0.1
Nepal	8.7	0.6
Pakistan	83.6	5.7
Philippines	22.3	1.5
Singapore	1.3	0.1
Thailand	20.7	1.4
Viet-Nam ^c	26.6	1.8

^a Source: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1957*, table 1, p.106 ff.

^b Southern and northern Korea.

^c Southern and northern Viet-Nam.

2. Population density

With the exception of Europe, the ECAFE region is the most densely populated region in the world. Its average population density in 1956 was 69 persons per square kilometre, or more than three times the world average of 20 persons per square kilometre. There is, however, a great variation in density between individual countries in the region (table 3).

² Unless otherwise indicated, by Korea is meant the southern and northern parts of the country throughout this report.

³ Unless otherwise indicated, by Viet-Nam is meant the southern and northern parts of the country throughout this report.

⁴ Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak.

Table 3

ESTIMATED POPULATION DENSITY IN 1956^a

Region or country	Persons per square kilometre of		Rural population ^d per square kilometre of arable land
	Total area ^b	Arable land ^c	
World total	20	198	156
ECAFE region	69	375	325
South West Asia	14	146	114
Africa	7	95	86
North America	9	81	47
Latin America	9	185	141
Europe	84	273	177
Oceania	2	60	32
USSR	9	91	63
<i>ECAFE region</i>			
Afghanistan	20	144	138
Burma	29	232	209
Cambodia	25	220	...
Ceylon	136	586	519
China: Mainland	64	568	504
Taiwan	257	1,055	950
Federation of Malaya	48	282	233
India	118	245	216
Indonesia	56	475	384
Iran	12	113	89
Japan	243	1,783	1,032
Korea, southern	225	1,093	891
Laos	6	142	...
Nepal	62	280	268
Pakistan	88	343	316
Philippines	74	347	303
Thailand	40	265	245
Viet-Nam	81	591	544

^a Source: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1957*; FAO *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics 1957*; and United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation*, New York, 1957.

^b Total area refers to the total land area and inland water.

^c Arable land includes land planted with crops, land temporarily fallow, temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, garden land, and areas under fruit trees, vines, fruit-bearing shrubs, and rubber plantations. Within this definition, wide variations occur from country to country. In several countries data on arable land cover only crop area and, frequently, only that of major crops. For modifications of the definition of arable land in the various countries, see FAO *op.cit.*

^d Population living in localities of less than 20,000 inhabitants. See table 16, where urban areas are defined as localities of 20,000 or more inhabitants.

China (Taiwan), Japan and southern Korea are the most densely populated areas, with more than 225 persons per square kilometre; Laos, the most sparsely populated country, has only 6; Iran 12, and Afghanistan, Burma and Cambodia 20-29.

The over-all population density of the various countries is only of limited interest since the density of different regions in the same country varies as much, or more, as that of different countries. In mainland China, for example, the Kiangsu province has 41 million inhabitants and has a population density of 431 persons per square kilometre, while western China,⁵ which covers about 42 per cent of the entire land area has a population density of only 3 persons per square kilometre. Contrasts almost as great are found in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Low population density is often associated with a low proportion of cultivated land in relation to the total amount of land. In order to gauge the difference

⁵ Sikang, Chinghai and Sinkiang provinces, and Tibet and Chanhi areas.

between population and available resources population density can be measured by the number of persons per unit of arable land. This is shown in table 3.

The average world density per square kilometre of arable land is 198; in the ECAFE region it is 375—the highest regional density in the world. (Europe comes second with 273 persons per square kilometre of arable land.) Within the ECAFE region, the average population density per square kilometre of arable land is highest in Japan (1,783 persons), China (Taiwan) and southern Korea (over 1,000 persons each).

Another measure of population density is the relation of rural population to units of arable land (the last column of table 3). Again, the ECAFE region has the highest density with more than double the world average. Ceylon, China (mainland and Taiwan), Indonesia, Japan, southern Korea and Viet-Nam have densities higher than the regional average.

But the measurement of population density by rural population per unit of arable land is not completely accurate. National definitions of arable land differ (which may explain why the density of the rural population in India appears to be comparatively low), and the statistics do not take unused arable land into account. In some countries, population is concentrated on the land already cultivated, although it could be much more widely dispersed.

In general, the measurement of population density gives only limited information on the relation between population and resources. The productive capacity of land is determined not merely by its size but also by other relevant characteristics such as type of soil, climate, topography and location. The choice of crops and production techniques are also important factors. In addition, non-agricultural resources such as mineral deposits and potentialities for trade and industrialization may be of great importance in relation to population pressure.

3. Fertility

THE PRESENT LEVEL OF FERTILITY

The simplest and most common measure of fertility is the crude birth rate, i.e. the annual number of births per 1,000 population. Table 4 shows that the crude birth rate for the majority of the countries in the ECAFE region in the period 1954-1956 was about 40-50 per 1,000 population. The rate in selected Latin American countries was similar, but the rate in the industrialized countries in the West was only one-half, or less, of the ECAFE level. (Even before the Industrial Revolution, most western European countries did not have a birth rate as high as 40-50 per 1,000.)

Some differences in the levels of fertility occur in the ECAFE region. British Borneo, Cambodia, China (Taiwan), Laos, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand have a birth rate of about 45-50 per 1,000. Burma, Ceylon, mainland China, the Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong, India and Indonesia have less than 45 per 1,000, in most cases close to 40 per 1,000. These differences, if they reflect the true situation, are due more to institutional factors than to different levels of economic development. In Japan, however, the birth rate is below 20 per 1,000.

Table 4
CRUDE BIRTH RATES, 1954-56^a

Country	Estimated or reasonably accurate registered rates
<i>ECAFE region</i>	
British Borneo	46
Burma	44
Cambodia	47
Ceylon	42 ^b
China: Mainland	37 ^c
Taiwan	45
Federation of Malaya	44.1 ^b
Hong Kong	38.3 ^b
India	40 - 43 ^d
Indonesia	43
Japan	19.2 ^b
Laos	46
Pakistan	50 ^d
Philippines	49
Singapore	48.2 ^b
Thailand	47
Viet-Nam	43
<i>Latin America</i>	
Brazil	45 ^d
Chile	40 ^d
Mexico	46.5 ^b
Venezuela	46.9 ^b
<i>Economically developed countries</i>	
Australia	22.5 ^b
France	18.6 ^b
United Kingdom	15.7 ^b
United States	24.8 ^b

^a Unless otherwise stated in the footnotes below, the birth rates presented are derived from estimates in United Nations, *The Population of South-East Asia, including Ceylon and China (Taiwan), 1950-1980* (to be published).

^b Registered rates, 1954-56. For Ceylon, adjustment has been made for under-registration.

^c The rate is officially reported on the basis of a survey of more than 30 million people in 1953.

^d For India, estimated by two different methods for the intercensal period 1941-50 (see text). The method of estimating the birth rate from a model stable population (i.e. matching the fairly constant age composition with the most similar model stable population) indicates a birth rate of about 40 per 1,000 in the period 1950-55. This method was used for estimating the rates for Pakistan, Brazil and Chile.

In order to make accurate international comparison of fertility, differentials in the structure of the population, in particular the age composition, must be taken into consideration. Some limited allowance for differentials in the age structure can be made by using the ratio of children aged 0-4 to women in the reproductive ages as a simple index of fertility. Such child-woman ratios, computed from the most recent census data in the various countries and territories, seem to confirm, in general, the differences in fertility indicated by the crude birth rate. Thus, in the Philippines (1948), China (Taiwan) (1956) and Thailand (1947), the child-woman ratio is above 600, but in Ceylon (1946), the Federation of Malaya (1947) and India (1951) it is only about 550. These ratios are, however, affected by under-enumeration of young children, and national variations in infant and early childhood mortality.⁶


⁶ The child-woman ratios for Ceylon, the Philippines and Thailand are also affected by the lower level of fertility which probably existed during the war years in most of these countries.

TRENDS IN FERTILITY

An important feature of the demography of the less developed ECAFE countries is the stability of their fertility. Calculations based on the birth rate for countries where the birth registration is reasonably accurate, and on the child-woman ratios of other countries, do not indicate any decline in the fertility level since the 1930's. Only in the Philippines and Thailand is the ratio lower in the postwar census (1948 and 1947 respectively) than in the latest prewar census, and this may only reflect the temporary effects of the war.⁷ Graph I shows the trend in the registered birth rate of selected ECAFE countries with reasonably accurate birth statistics for the period 1947-1956.

Graph I

REGISTERED CRUDE BIRTH AND DEATH RATES IN SELECTED ECAFE COUNTRIES, 1947-56



In some instances, there may even have been a slight increase in the birth rate recently. In Ceylon, the average registered birth rate was 36.8 per 1,000 in 1930-39, but 39.0 and 39.2 in the periods 1945-49 and 1950-54 respectively. This is borne out by birth rates corrected for under-enumeration and by the trend in the child-woman ratio and other measures of fertility.⁸ In the Federation of Malaya the registered birth rates were about 38.6 per 1,000 in 1930-39, 40.6 in 1946-49 and 43.5 in 1950-54.

⁷ The under-enumeration of infants and young children may also have been higher in the postwar censuses which in these countries were taken before political and social conditions had returned to normal.

⁸ Sarkar, N.K., *The Demography of Ceylon*, Colombo, 1957, pp. 95-102. Part of this increase may merely be due to an increase in marriages, as registration data indicate, or to an increase in marital fertility, possibly as an effect of improved health of the women.

The recent trend of the birth rate in the two most populous countries of the region—mainland China and India—is of special interest. Unfortunately, available data are not very complete. On the basis of various local surveys, the prewar (about 1930)⁹ birth rate in mainland China has been estimated at 38 per 1,000 and the early postwar birth rate at 36 per 1,000.¹⁰ Sample surveys undertaken in 1951-54 in 16 *hsien* (counties) in different parts of the country covering a total population of 1.8 million people indicated birth rates in local areas of 26 to 53 per 1,000 population.¹¹ A proper weighting of these local rates gives an average birth rate of 37 per 1,000.¹² This also happens to be the official birth rate reported in 1953.

The decennial censuses in pre-partition India do not indicate any marked decline in the birth rate. For the period 1911-20 and the three preceding intercensal periods, the birth rate is estimated at around 48 and for the decade 1921-30 at 46 per 1,000 population.¹³ For the period 1941-50, the Census Actuary of India has estimated it at 39.9 per 1,000 population,¹⁴ indicating a decline. However, an estimate by the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, prepared by methods more similar to those used in the earlier decennial estimates, gives a birth rate of 43.1 per 1,000 which suggests little change in fertility.¹⁵ This conclusion is supported by the similarity in the age structure at the 1931 and 1951 censuses and by recent sample surveys on fertility. In fact, the National Sample Survey, based upon information collected in 1951-52 (second and fourth rounds), indicates that there has been a real increase in the average size of families of couples married after 1930, as compared with couples married before 1930.¹⁶

In Japan, the situation is very different. After the brief "baby-boom" which occurred at the end of the Second World War, the birth rate has declined rapidly and continuously (see Graph I). During the period 1945-49, it was 30 per 1,000 population; in 1950-54, it was 24 per 1,000; and in 1956, only 18.5 per 1,000 population—the same level as France and below that of Canada, Australia and the United States. This decline has been more rapid than that in most western industrialized countries, perhaps because an early decline in Japanese fertility was prevented by the Imperial Government's policy of encouraging a high birth rate, while in the postwar period the Government has actively encouraged family planning and has legalized abortion.

⁹ Chen, T., "Population in modern China", *The American Journal of Sociology*, July 1946, No.1, Part II, p.38.

¹⁰ Chen, T., "New China's population census of 1953 and its relation to national reconstruction and demographic research"; Thirtieth session, International Statistical Institute, Stockholm, 1957, p.15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.14.

¹² On the basis of these local rates, Chen states (*ibid.*) that the average birth rate is 42 per 1,000. The age distribution of the entire 1953 census population presented in the same paper is not consistent with any of these rates.

¹³ Davis, K., *The Population of India and Pakistan*, Princeton, 1951, p.69.

¹⁴ India, Census Commissioner, *Census of India 1951*, Vol. I, Part I, B., Appendix II.

¹⁵ Coale, A., and Hoover, E.M., *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries* (Princeton University Press, 1958).

¹⁶ India, National Sample Survey No. 7, *Couple Fertility* by Das Gupta *et. al.*, Calcutta, 1955, p.36.

The present low birth rate in Japan is all the more remarkable because the proportion of the population which is now in the reproductive ages is relatively large. In order to take into account the effects of differences in the age structure, it is convenient to use the so-called gross reproduction rate.¹⁷ These rates are shown in table 5. Measured in these terms, Japan's level of fertility is considerably below even that of France and the United Kingdom.

Table 5
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES,
1930, 1940, 1950 AND 1956

Country	Year			
	1930	1940	1950	1956
Japan	2.30	2.12 ^a	1.76	1.08
Australia	1.25	1.10	1.49	1.61
France	1.11	0.97	1.43	1.30
United Kingdom (England and Wales)	0.95	0.85	1.06	1.14
United States	1.25	1.12	1.51	1.79

^a 1937.

FACTORS AFFECTING FERTILITY

The high level of fertility found in the ECAFE region is of course largely due to the general absence of the practice of family limitation. Other contributory causes are the almost universality of marriage and the low average age at marriage.

(a) The marriage rate

Table 6 shows the proportion of women ever married in selected age groups. Available data indicate that at the end of the reproductive period, 45-49 years of age, almost all women (97-99 per cent) in the ECAFE countries, are, or have been married; only in Singapore and the Philippines is the proportion as low as 93 per cent. In developed countries, the proportion varies from 85 to 92 per cent.

Table 6
PERCENTAGE OF EVER MARRIED WOMAN AT
SPECIFIED AGES

Country	Year	Age		
		15-19	20-24	45-49
<i>ECAFE region</i>				
Ceylon	1946	24.7	70.7	96.6
China: Taiwan	1940	29.5	84.4	99.4
Federation of Malaya	1947	42.3	86.7	97.5
India	1951	82.5 ^a		98.8 ^b
Japan	1950	3.4	44.7	98.5
Pakistan	1951	72.7	90.9	98.9
Philippines	1948	15.7	60.1	93.2
Singapore	1947	28.4	49.5	92.9
Thailand	1947	19.4	70.0	97.1
<i>Economically developed countries</i>				
Australia	1947	5.7	48.7	87.4
France	1954	3.9	42.9	89.9
United Kingdom (England and Wales)	1951	4.4	48.2	84.8
United States	1950	17.4	67.6	92.1

^a Age 15-24.

^b Age 45-54.

¹⁷ The gross reproduction rate is used here as a method of age standardization; it is the sum of unweighted female age-specific fertility rates for women, observed during a given period. In other words, it indicates the average number of daughters borne by each woman during the reproductive period at prevailing age-specific fertility rates.

(b) *Age at marriage*

In most ECAFE countries, more than 20 per cent of the women aged 15-19 are married (table 6). In India and Pakistan, the proportion married at this age is extra-ordinarily high, several times higher than in some other countries in the region.¹⁸ For the age-group 20-24 years of age, however, the proportion of married women in China (Taiwan) and the Federation of Malaya is nearly as high as in India and Pakistan. Only Japan, the Philippines and Singapore have apparently adopted the practice of relatively late marriage which is common to economically developed countries.

(c) *Economic and cultural factors*

A thorough study might identify other important demographic, economic and cultural factors which explain differences in national levels of fertility. The following paragraphs are confined to a study of the causes of the high birth rate in China (Taiwan) and of the comparatively more moderate level in India.

It is well known that the Chinese attach a high social value to the family. The family unit is frequently the unit of economic production and employment; relatives are found jobs in the family enterprise whether their services are needed or not, and large families are an insurance against sickness, unemployment and old age. The Government's policy which until recently opposed the dissemination of contraceptives may also have been a factor in the maintenance of high fertility levels.¹⁹

Since the same general conditions favouring high fertility prevail also in India, it may be surprising to find that the Indian birth rate is comparatively low. The Indian family also places a high value on children; indeed the desire for sons is even more pronounced than among the Chinese and, because the economy is predominantly agricultural, older children have a rather important role as producers. Also, the almost universal prevalence of early marriage should raise the level of fertility. But other factors keep the level of fertility down. The most important perhaps is the Hindu custom of forbidding widows to remarry. (Widowhood is fairly widespread in India because of the high level of mortality among males.) The poor health of women also reduces the number of live births, and recent studies have shown sex practices which tend to depress the level of fertility. For example the custom that a wife returns to her own family for the birth of a child, particularly the first-born,

¹⁸ Early marriage is a widespread tradition in these countries. The National Sample Survey (fourth round) shows that for marriages contracted during the period 1946-51, the average age at marriage among women in India is only 14.6 years in rural areas and 16.4 years in urban areas (adjusted for the effect of different probabilities of survival of women marrying at various ages). Age at marriage appears to have changed only slightly in recent decades. The women who married during the decade 1910-1919 were, on the average, only 1.6 years younger in rural areas and 2.4 years younger in urban areas. The Sarda Act of 1930, prohibiting marriage of minors, appears to have had little effect among Hindu women in rural areas who married since 1930. Five per cent were less than 6 years old at marriage and almost 30 per cent were less than 12 years old. India, National Sample Survey No. 7, *Couple Fertility*, op.cit., chapter V. The Mysore Population Study (see below) showed a slow but steady increase in age at marriage among females in the course of the 20th century.

¹⁹ Chinese immigrants overseas have a similar pattern of high fertility. In the Federation of Malaya, for example, the Chinese population has a gross reproduction rate of 3.15 as compared with 2.67 for the Malays; Smith, T.E., "The population of the Federation of Malaya", presented at the United Nations Seminar on Population, Bandung, 1955, p.4.

results in abstinence from sexual intercourse for a period of at least six months after the birth of the child. Another factor is the prolonged period of lactation which delays menstruation after a confinement.

(d) *The effect of urbanization*

A fuller understanding of national fertility trends and some indication of future developments could be obtained from a study of fertility levels of major social and economic groups of the population. This, however, would require very comprehensive and complex studies. The following discussion is confined to some of the better known facts about differences in fertility between rural and urban populations.

It is known that, in the industrialized countries of the West, fertility is generally lower among the urban than among the rural population. The long-term decline in fertility in these countries actually began in the cities and spread gradually to the countryside as rural families adopted the attitudes and values of the townspeople. It would be of considerable interest to estimate whether, in spite of the differences in economic and social conditions, this will also happen in the ECAFE region. The following examples of child-woman ratios in selected areas give some indication of present rural-urban differentials in fertility in ECAFE countries.²⁰

In the largest cities of both Ceylon (1946) and Japan (1950), the child-woman ratios were about 15 per cent below the national level²¹ (the differentials between the two countries were the same although Japan is much more highly urbanized than Ceylon). A study of the child-woman ratios in a number of urban areas in Malaya also indicated that fertility in those areas was significantly below the average for the country as a whole or for the neighbouring rural areas.²²

The Indian census of 1951 indicated that the child-woman ratio in Bombay, the largest city in the country, was about 18 per cent below the average²³ for the whole country. However, a more general analysis of the census and the National Sample Survey (second and fourth rounds) failed to show any significant rural-urban differentials in fertility.²⁴ An apparently lower average family size in rural areas in marriages of incomplete fertility seems to be caused by the large number of women in rural areas who had married before adolescence.²⁴ In the Mysore Population Study undertaken jointly by the Government of India and the United Nations, the crude birth rate was found to be substantially lower in the city of Bangalore than in rural areas. But data on the average family size showed that ever married women in Bangalore city and the towns had a higher average number of children than those in the rural areas. The absence of rural-urban differentials

²⁰ The child-woman ratio rather than the crude birth rate has been used, because the crude birth rate in urban areas, in particular, is likely to give a misleading picture of the level of fertility owing to the relatively high frequency of births of non-residents and the usual concentration of urban population in the lower adult age groups.

²¹ An analysis of a sample from the 1953 census in Ceylon indicated that the average family size among women beyond the reproductive ages was about one-fifth lower in urban than in rural areas. Ceylon, Department of Census and Statistics, *Fertility Trends in Ceylon*, 1953 Census, Monograph No.8, Colombo 1956, p.22.

²² Smith, T.E., *Population Growth in Malaya*, London, 1952, pp. 48-51.

²³ India, *Census of India*, Vol. I, Part I, A, pp.81-88.

²⁴ India National Sample Survey No. 7, *Couple Fertility...*, op.cit., p.38.

in fertility among women who had married once, and remained married until the end of the reproductive age, suggests that the larger average family size in the city as compared with the rural areas was due to the higher incidence and earlier occurrence of widowhood in rural areas than in the city.²⁵ A field study in Poona district did not indicate any rural-urban differential in fertility.²⁶

4. Mortality

THE CRUDE DEATH RATE

Table 7
CRUDE DEATH AND INFANT MORTALITY RATES, 1954-56^a

Country	Estimated or reasonably accurate registered rates	
	Crude Death Rate	Infant Mortality Rate
<i>ECAFE region</i>		
British Borneo	29	253 ^b
Burma	29	221
Cambodia	23	179
Ceylon	14 ^c	128
China: Mainland	17 ^d	...
Taiwan	10	78
Federation of Malaya	11.7 ^e	78.8 ^e
Hong Kong	8.2 ^e	...
India	27-31 ^e	200 ^e
Indonesia	24	192
Japan	8.0 ^e	41.7 ^e
Laos	28	221
Pakistan	30 ^e	200 ^e
Philippines	21	166
Singapore	9.0 ^e	49.4 ^e
Thailand	23	179
Viet-Nam	22	...
<i>Latin America</i>		
Brazil	20 ^e	150 ^e
Chile	12.5 ^e	119.4 ^e
Mexico	13.0 ^e	125 ^e
Venezuela	20 ^e	150 ^e
<i>Economically developed countries</i>		
Australia	9 ^e	22.1 ^e
France	12.2 ^e	38.5 ^e
United Kingdom	11.6 ^e	25.6 ^e
United States	9.3 ^e	26.3 ^e

^a Unless otherwise stated in footnotes below, the rates presented are derived from estimates in United Nations, *The Population of South-East Asia, including Ceylon and China (Taiwan), 1950-1980* (to be published).

^b Indigenous population only.

^c Registered rates, 1954-56. For Ceylon, adjustment has been made for under-registration.

^d The rate is officially reported on the basis of a survey of more than 30 million people in 1953.

^e Crude death rate: For India, estimated by two different methods at 27.4 and 30.9 per 1,000 population, respectively for the intercensal period 1941-1950 (see section 3 above on estimates of the crude birth rate in India). For Pakistan, Brazil and Venezuela the 1950-55 death rate was estimated by projecting the estimated death rate for a recent intercensal period assuming a normal pattern by mortality decline; United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation, op.cit.*, p.15.

Infant mortality rate: For India, the rate for around 1951 has been estimated at 200-250 per 1,000 live births by Coale and Hoover, *op.cit.* The Census Actuary of India, however, estimates an infant mortality rate of only 183 for an earlier period (1941-50); India, Census Commissioner, *op.cit.* The present rate is obtained by combining estimated birth and death rates and taking into account the correlation existing between the levels of infant mortality and the crude death rate. See United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation, op.cit.*, pp.17-18. This method was also used for estimating the rates for Pakistan, Brazil and Venezuela.

²⁵ It is possible that completed fertility in unbroken marriages would prove to be higher in rural areas than in the city if biases caused by differentials in mortality and migration and reporting errors could have been eliminated. Government of India and the United Nations, *The Mysore Population Study* (to be published).

²⁶ Dandekar, V.M. and Dandekar, K., *Survey of Fertility and Mortality in Poona District*, Poona, 1953.

The death rates in different ECAFE countries vary considerably. Table 7 shows that the crude death rates (i.e. the annual number of deaths per 1,000 population) for 1954-1956 in British Borneo, Burma, India, Laos and Pakistan were 28-30 per 1,000; in Cambodia, mainland China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet-Nam they were 17-24 per 1,000; but in China (Taiwan), Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore they were only 8-15 per 1,000 which compares favourably with the rates registered in economically developed countries. It is important to note that this low death rate has been achieved not only in industrialized Japan but also in a number of ECAFE countries whose economic development is no higher than the regional average.

PAST TRENDS IN THE CRUDE DEATH RATE

A decline in the death rate has taken place recently in all countries of the region. This decline has been most pronounced during the last ten years, but seems to have begun on a moderate scale even before the Second World War.²⁷ In India, for example, the crude death rate for the three decades preceding the First World War is estimated at around 43 per 1,000. During the period 1911-20, it rose to 47 per 1,000, mainly as a result of the serious epidemics which occurred during the latter part of this period. But in the intercensal period 1921-30, the estimated level fell to 36 per 1,000 and in 1931-40 to 31 per 1,000.²⁸ For the period 1941-50, the Census Actuary of India estimated a crude death rate of 27.4, but the Office of the Population Research, Princeton University puts it at 30.9 per 1,000.

The slow decline in the death rate was probably stopped in many countries during the Second World War and the early postwar years. There is evidence of this in Ceylon and Thailand as well as India. Since the Second World War, a rapid decline has clearly occurred in almost all areas of the region. In China (Taiwan), for example, the registered death rate, which was around 20 per 1,000 before the war, declined to 11 in 1950, and to only 8 per 1,000 in 1956.²⁹ In Ceylon, the death rate in the late 1930's was around 25 per 1,000, but only 13 in 1950, and 10 in 1956. The scattered information available from mainland China indicates a similar development. One author has estimated the death rate at about 33 per 1,000 on the basis of various local sample surveys,³⁰ and another at about 27 per 1,000 around 1930.³¹ Recent sample surveys carried out in 16 different *hsien* (counties) of mainland China show an average death rate of 21 per 1,000 with extremes ranging from 13 in one *hsien* to 24 in another.³² The rate officially reported for mainland China in 1953 is 17 per 1,000.

²⁷ It is reasonable to assume that the completeness of death registration generally has improved rather than deteriorated in most countries. The moderate decline found in the registered rates during the prewar period indicates a decline in mortality even for countries with unreliable death registration.

²⁸ Davis, K., *The Population of India...*, *op.cit.*, p.36.

²⁹ However, it is possible that the death registration may not have been quite as complete in the postwar years as it was before the war.

³⁰ Chen, T., *Population in Modern China*, Chicago, 1944, p.38.

³¹ Buck, J.L., *Land Utilization in China*, Shanghai, 1937.

³² Chen, T., "New China's population census....", *op.cit.*, p.14.

The postwar trend in the crude death rate of selected countries which have fairly reliable statistics is illustrated in Graph I. The decline is fairly uniform, and has been much more sudden than the declines which took place in the industrialized countries of the West in the nineteenth century. The rapid decline in mortality in ECAFE countries is largely due to control of epidemics and famines.

Differences in the current death rates of countries in the region may to some extent be due to differences in recent efforts to combat disease and hunger. The drastic postwar decline in mortality in Ceylon, for example, was in large measure the result of a vigorous anti-malaria campaign; improvements in curative and preventive medicine, and in the economic situation, probably also contributed.³³ In India, where the death rate is still high, the anti-malaria campaign was initiated somewhat later and, owing to the large area involved, still only affects about one-third of the population. Provisions for adequate curative medicine and improved sanitation have, furthermore, been of rather limited scope. A more pronounced decline in the death rate may have taken place since 1951, but little statistical evidence is available as yet.³⁴

LIFE EXPECTANCY

Table 7 shows that the crude death rate in a number of ECAFE countries is as low as that in industrialized countries. One of the reasons for this is that the populations in the ECAFE countries are comparatively young. In these countries, the mortality rate at successive ages may be considerably higher than in the West, even though the crude death rate in some countries is the same.³⁵ A more accurate picture of differences among the countries in mortality is obtained by measuring the level of life expectancy at birth.³⁶ This is shown in table 8. The people of British Borneo, Burma, India, Laos, and Pakistan have a very short life expectancy, but the level of life expectancy in China (Taiwan), Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, Japan and Singapore appears to be substantially better than in the selected Latin American countries shown in the table and it approaches the level of the industrialized Western countries.

³³ Sarkar, N.K., *The Demography of Ceylon*, op.cit., pp.122-125.

³⁴ Chandrasekaran, C., "India's population problem"—paper presented at the inaugural conference of the Regional Demographic Training and Research Centre, Bombay, November 1957.

³⁵ The following examples of two countries which have been subject to little change in fertility and mortality over a long period of time (stable population) will serve as an illustration. Countries A and B have approximately the same crude death rate, around 15 per 1,000 population, but country A has a high fertility—gross reproduction rate of 3.0 (birth rate 34 per 1,000)—while country B has a low fertility—a gross reproduction rate of 1.0 (birth rate of 13 per 1,000). The elimination of the effects of differences in the age structure of the two populations caused by differences in fertility reveals differences in the true levels of mortality. In country A, the life expectancy at birth (standardization for differences in the age structure, see below) is only 50 years, but in country B it is 70 years.

³⁶ Life expectancy at birth indicates the average number of years which a group of persons born at the same time will live if they are subject to the mortality at successive ages experienced during a given period.

Table 8
EXPECTANCY OF LIFE AT BIRTH FOR BOTH
SEXES, AROUND 1955^a

Country	Life expectancy in years
<i>ECAFE region</i>	
British Borneo ^b	around 29
Burma	around 34
Cambodia	around 40
Ceylon	around 54
China: Taiwan	around 55
Federation of Malaya	around 59
India	around 35
Indonesia	around 39
Japan	around 66
Laos	around 34
Pakistan	around 35
Philippines	around 44
Singapore	around 63
Thailand	around 40
<i>Latin America</i>	
Brazil	around 45
Chile	around 52
Mexico	around 50
Venezuela	around 45
<i>Economically developed countries</i>	
Australia	around 71
France	around 68
United Kingdom	around 71
United States	around 71

^a Life expectancy at birth for some countries is derived from estimates in United Nations, *The Population of South-East Asia, including Ceylon and China (Taiwan), 1950-1980* (to be published). For those with unreliable vital statistics, the estimates of life expectancy at birth have been calculated from the estimated birth, death and infant mortality rates. For all others, estimates for the period 1950-55 have been made on the basis of two recent available values on life expectancy and the trend in infant mortality assuming a relationship between life expectancy and infant mortality as indicated by model life tables; United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation op.cit.*, pp.19-20.

^b Indigenous population only.

PAST TRENDS IN LIFE EXPECTANCY

Only in a few countries are data available for a study of trends in mortality measured in terms of life expectancy. In India, life expectancy at birth has been estimated at 20 years in 1911-20, 27 in 1921-30 and 33 in 1941-50. In Ceylon, the increase in life expectancy from 1910-12 to 1945-47 was rather similar in absolute terms: it is estimated to have increased from 36 to 48 years during this period. In Japan, the expectation of life at birth has increased from 42 years for males and 43 years for females in 1921-25 to 64 and 68 years respectively in 1955.

INFANT MORTALITY

The increase in life expectancy has been largely due to a rapid decline in infant mortality. In table 7, the infant mortality rate (i.e. the number of deaths under one year of age per 1,000 live births) is presented for a number of countries in the region in 1954-56. As the registration of infant mortality is even more unreliable than the registration of the total number of deaths, the estimates submitted are mostly calculated from stable population models.

The level of infant mortality is still very high in British Borneo, Burma, India, Laos and Pakistan, where 200 or more live born children per 1,000 die before the age of one. It is these same countries which have the highest crude death rates. A further decline in the death rate will depend largely on the trend in infant mortality. This is likely to fall more sharply in the future than in the recent past.

5. The rate of population growth

Table 9 shows the annual rate of population growth in the major regions of the world during the period 1920-56. In the ECAFE region, and in the world as a whole, the increase remained fairly constant at about one per cent per annum during the period 1920-1950. But, during 1950-1956, the population in the ECAFE region increased, on the average, by approximately 1.5 per cent each year, and the world population by 1.6 per cent. The rate of growth in Latin America and Oceania is more than 50 per cent above that of the ECAFE region. But the rate in Europe is only half the ECAFE rate.

Table 9

RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH BY REGIONS, 1920-56^a
(Per cent)

Region	Years			
	1920-30	1930-40	1940-50	1950-56
World total	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.6
ECAFE region	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.5
South West Asia	0.9	1.1	1.6	2.3
Africa	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.7
North America	1.4	0.8	1.4	1.7
Latin America	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.5
Europe	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.8
Oceania	1.1	1.0	1.7	2.3
USSR	1.1	0.9

^a Allowance has been made for under- or over-enumeration. The estimates of the world population are subject to a possible error of about 5 per cent. See United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook 1957*, table 2.

Table 10 shows the annual growth rate during the period 1954-56 in ECAFE countries and selected countries in other regions. For most countries, two rates of growth have been presented. One is based upon the official annual estimates of total population, the other on the natural increase, i.e., the excess of births over deaths. The official estimates are often not very accurate, particularly in cases where no recent, reliable census data are available. Since immigration and emigration only play a minor role in most areas in the ECAFE region, it would seem preferable to compute the rate of population growth on the basis of natural increase. But birth and death statistics are not always reliable either. The rates of natural increase presented in table 10 are based on the birth and death rates presented in tables 4 and 7 above.

The existence of considerable differences in the rate of population growth within the region is clearly demonstrated. China (Taiwan), the Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong and Singapore have a rate of growth of at least 3 per cent which is among the highest recorded anywhere in the world. In Cambodia, Ceylon, mainland China, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet-Nam, the rate of increase lies between 2 and 3 per cent; in British Borneo, Burma, India, Indonesia, Japan and Laos, it is below 2 per cent. The main reason for variations

in the rate of growth is to be found in the different levels of mortality which were discussed in section 4 above.

Table 10

RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH, 1954-56^a
(Per cent)

Country	Based on estimates of total population	Excess of birth rate over death rate
<i>ECAFE region</i>		
British Borneo	1.7
Burma	1.6	1.5
Cambodia	3.6	2.4
Ceylon	2.3	2.8
China: Mainland	2.2	2.0
Taiwan	3.5	3.5
Federation of Malaya	3.0	3.2
Hong Kong	3.5	3.0
India	1.3	1.2-1.3
Indonesia	1.8	1.9
Japan	1.1	1.1
Laos	3.2	1.8
Pakistan	1.4	2.0
Philippines	1.9	2.8
Singapore	4.0	3.9
Thailand	1.9	2.4
Viet-Nam	1.1	2.1
<i>Latin America</i>		
Brazil	2.4	2.5
Chile	2.6	2.8
Mexico	2.8	3.3
Venezuela	3.0	2.7
<i>Economically developed countries</i>		
Australia	2.4	2.4
France	0.8	0.6
United Kingdom	0.4	0.4
United States	1.7	1.6

^a Sources: Official estimates of total population: United Nations *Demographic Yearbook 1957*, table 3; excess of birth rate over death rate: tables 4 and 7 above.

6. Sex and age structure of the population

THE SEX RATIO

In table 11, the number of men per 1,000 women (the sex ratio) in a number of countries is presented. The ratio of men to women is remarkably high in most of the ECAFE countries as compared with the selected countries in other regions. In Ceylon, the Federation

of Malaya and Pakistan, the number of men exceeds the number of women by 10-13 per cent, and in heavily urbanized Singapore by 22 per cent. This is partly the result of a high rate of predominantly male immigration during the recent past. The surplus of men, however, is also substantial in mainland China and India, which suggests that other factors than selective immigration may affect the sex ratio. Some of these factors may be statistical, since, in countries where women are not considered to be equal to men, women and girls may have been ignored to some extent in the census taking. In mainland China, however, the high sex ratio found in a number of local censuses for certain *hsien* was also partly due to an excess in female mortality resulting from infanticide and the discriminatory treatment of girls. These practices are on the decline, but they may still have some impact upon the sex ratio of the total population.

Table 11
NUMBER OF MEN PER 1,000 WOMEN

Country	Year	Number of men per 1,000 women	
		All ages	15 years and over
<i>ECAFE region</i>			
Burma	1951	1,044	1,069
Ceylon	1955	1,106	1,150
China: Mainland	1953	1,077	...
Taiwan	1956	1,044	1,035
Federation of Malaya	1947	1,122	1,175
India	1951	1,056	1,068
Japan	1956	966	933
Korea, southern	1953	976	932
Nepal	1954	1,006	...
Pakistan	1951	1,127	1,162 ^a
Philippines	1956	999	952
Singapore	1947	1,218	1,315
Thailand	1947	1,000	987
<i>Latin America</i>			
Brazil	1950	993	974
Chile	1952	964	934
Mexico	1950	970	927
Venezuela	1950	1,028	1,007
<i>Economically developed countries</i>			
Australia	1956	1,027	1,020
France	1956	933	901
United Kingdom	1956	929	897
United States	1957	982	958

^a Age 10 and over.

Available statistics indicate that the excess of males over females is more pronounced for the adult population than for the total population in many countries in the ECAFE region (table 11). In selected Latin American and industrialized countries, on the contrary, the sex ratio is lower for the population of 15 years old and over than for the population as a whole.

AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION

Information about the age structure of the population is usually based on census data on age. These data are often seriously inaccurate and require thorough examination and various adjustments before they can be used for analyses. In the present report, the age structure will be mainly described in broad age groups. However, the age pyramids of four ECAFE countries for which information is available and two industrialized countries outside the region are shown in Graph II as illustrative examples. In these ECAFE countries, the age pyramid has a very wide base because of the large child population, but it tapers off at a rapid and regular rate. In the industrialized countries, however, the pyramid has a narrower base and tapers off much more gradually. The United Kingdom is a typical example. In the United States, the recent rise in fertility has caused the base to widen.

Table 12
AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION^a

Country	Year	Age (percentage distribution)			
		All ages	Under 15	15-59	60 and over
<i>ECAFE region</i>					
Burma	1951	100	37.4	57.5	5.1
Ceylon	1955	100	40.7	55.8	3.5
China: Mainland ^b	1953	100	35.9	59.7 ^c	4.4 ^c
Taiwan	1956	100	43.9	52.1	4.0
Federation of Malaya	1947	100	39.9	55.0	5.1
India	1951	100	37.4	56.9	5.7
Japan	1956	100	32.8	59.0	8.2
Korea, southern	1955	100	41.2	53.2	5.6
Philippines	1956	100	44.1	51.3	4.6
Singapore	1947	100	36.0	60.4	3.6
Thailand	1947	100	42.3	53.5	4.2
<i>Latin America</i>					
Brazil	1950	100	41.8	53.9	4.3
Chile	1952	100	37.3	56.1	6.6
Mexico	1950	100	41.7	52.7	5.6
Venezuela	1950	100	41.9	53.5	4.6
<i>Economically developed countries</i>					
Australia	1956	100	29.3	58.3	12.4
France	1956	100	24.4	58.7	16.9
United Kingdom	1956	100	23.1	60.5	16.3
United States	1957	100	30.4	56.9	12.7

^a Some of the data are based upon official estimates of the age structure; for other ECAFE countries census data have been used; United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*.

^b Computed by T. Chen from data given in 1953 census (only data on the population under 18 years of age and that over 80 years have been officially released); Chen, T. "New China's Population Census. . . .", *op.cit.*, p.23. An estimate by S.K. Tai gives 36.7 per cent of the population under 15 years of age; Tai, S.K., "1953 Population Census in China", paper presented at the Indian Statistical Institute's 25th Anniversary Celebrations, 20 December 1956.

^c Age groups 15-64 and 65 and over.

Graph II

AGE DISTRIBUTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES




Table 12 shows the age distribution of the population in ECAFE countries for which information is available, and for selected countries in other regions, in three broad age groups: under 15, 15-59 and over 60.³⁷ Children constitute a high proportion of the total population of these ECAFE countries. On the average, two-fifths of the population is under 15 years of age. The selected Latin American countries have a similar distribution, but in France and the United Kingdom the percentage of children is not much more than half the ECAFE average. In Australia and the United States, both economically developed countries with relatively high birth rates, children constitute about 30 per cent of the total.

The age group 15-59 years constitutes 51-57 per cent of the population in the ECAFE countries with the exception of Japan and Singapore and 57-60 per cent in the selected industrialized countries. The proportion above the age of 60 is only 4-6 per cent in most ECAFE countries while in the selected developed countries it is two or three times as high.

Although there is not much difference between some of the countries in the ECAFE region and the selected industrialized countries with regard to the percentage of the population in the most productive age group (15-59 years of age), the distribution within the group is quite different in the two sets of countries. The relatively low average age of the population in the ECAFE region is reflected in the fact that the age group 20-39 years constitutes on the average about 54 per cent of the total in the 15-59 age group, compared with about 47 per cent in the four industrialized countries included in table 12. From the point of view of the productivity of the labour force, such an age structure would seem more favourable than one with a heavier concentration in the older age groups, but this may be compensated for by the heavy dependency burden resulting from the high proportion of children.

THE DEPENDENCY BURDEN

Table 13 illustrates the numerical relation between persons below the age of 15 and above the age of 60, who are usually dependent, and the rest of the population. In general, the ratios are considerably higher in the ECAFE countries than in the selected industrialized countries. In most ECAFE countries there are three or more persons in the dependent age groups to every four persons in the most productive age group. In China (Taiwan) and the Philippines, there are almost as many persons in the dependent groups as there are in the

other ones. In most of the industrialized countries in western Europe, the typical ratio is two dependents to three workers. The United States, however, like many ECAFE countries, has a ratio of three to four; this is the result of the recent high level of fertility combined with a progressively ageing population.

Table 13

NUMBER OF PERSONS IN DEPENDENT AGE GROUPS PER 100 PERSONS OF WORKING AGE^a

Country	Year	Persons in dependent age groups per 100 persons 15-59 years of age		
		Under 15 and 60 and over	Under 15	60 and over
<i>ECAFE region</i>				
Burma	1951	73.9	65.1	8.8
Ceylon	1955	79.1	72.8	6.3
China: Taiwan . . .	1956	92.0	84.3	7.7
Federation of Malaya .	1947	81.6	72.5	9.1
India	1951	75.7	65.8	9.9
Japan	1956	69.4	55.5	13.9
Korea, southern . . .	1953	74.9	64.9	10.0
Philippines	1956	94.9	85.9	9.0
Singapore	1947	65.4	59.5	5.9
Thailand	1947	86.9	79.1	7.8
<i>Latin America</i>				
Brazil	1950	85.6	77.7	7.9
Chile	1952	78.0	66.5	11.5
Mexico	1950	89.8	79.3	10.5
Venezuela	1950	86.8	78.4	8.4
<i>Economically developed countries</i>				
Australia	1956	71.6	50.3	21.3
France	1956	70.3	41.5	28.8
United Kingdom . . .	1956	65.3	38.3	27.0
United States	1957	75.7	53.5	22.2

^a For sources see footnote^a, table 12.

The great majority of the dependents in the less developed countries in the ECAFE region are children, and this is also the case in the selected countries of Latin America. In the developed Western countries, child dependency is relatively less important because the population is ageing.


THE RELATION OF AGE STRUCTURE TO FERTILITY AND MORTALITY RATES

The age structure in a population where emigration and immigration are of little importance is determined by trends in fertility and, to a lesser extent, in mortality. The smallness of the influence of changes in mortality is illustrated by the continued stability of the age structure in the under-developed ECAFE countries in spite of the recent rapid decline in mortality. It can also be shown by comparing the age structure of two model populations with the same level of fertility but different levels of mortality. In a population with a life expectancy at birth of 30 years and a gross reproduction rate of 3.0, the proportion of the population in the 0-15 years group will be 41.3 per cent; in the 15-59 group, 54.5 per cent; and in the 60 and over group, 4.1 per cent. In another population with the same level of fertility but a life expectancy twice as high, the age distribution in the three groups will be 46.0, 49.6 and 4.4 per cent respectively. Thus, a decline in mortality slightly increases the dependency burden by increasing

³⁷ The officially enumerated or estimated population has been used, even if various corrections could be made to improve the data. In the case of India, for example, it should be realized that persons under age 15 were under-enumerated. This is revealed by the findings of the National Sample Survey (third, fourth, sixth and seventh rounds) and *The Mysore Population Study*. These studies seem to indicate that the proportion of the population aged 0-14 years is not 37.4 per cent but around 40-41 per cent of the total population.

Graph III

PERCENTAGE OF SPECIFIED AGE GROUPS IN VARIOUS STABLE POPULATIONS



the proportion of children. A major reduction in the ratio of dependents to productive population can therefore only occur as a result of a decline in fertility.³⁸

RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENTIALS

In most ECAFE countries, it is mostly males who migrate to the cities, since it is usually against custom for women to leave their family and seek employment outside the home. In the economically developed countries, on the other hand, women predominate in migration to the cities.

Consequently, most countries in the ECAFE region differ from the industrialized countries in the West by having a predominance of men in urban areas. Thus, in the urban areas of Ceylon and Pakistan, the number of men exceeds the number of women by as much as 25 per cent; and, in India, the Federation of Malaya and Thailand, by 8-12 per cent. In the urban areas of the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other hand, there are 11-12 per cent more women, and in Australia 21 per cent more, than in rural areas.

³⁸ The effect of different levels of mortality and fertility upon the age structure of the population is shown in graph III. The curves illustrate the extent to which the proportion of the population under 15 years of age will increase, and the proportion aged 15-59 years decrease, with rising life expectancy at birth at a given level of fertility. It appears that for any given level of fertility (measured by the gross reproduction rate), a change in life expectancy at birth tends to have little effect upon the age structure, as the curves are fairly horizontal. The relative dispersion of the curves shows, on the other hand, that fertility has a decisive influence upon age structure. At a given level of life expectancy at birth, a change from one gross reproduction rate to another generally shows a marked effect on the age structure as compared with the modest effect of changes in mortality at any given level of fertility.

Urban populations generally have a smaller proportion of children than rural populations, and therefore a higher proportion of persons in the most productive ages. On the other hand, a higher percentage of youngsters, old people and women, are economically active in rural areas.³⁹ Furthermore, the dependency burden of the city population is likely to be underestimated if it is calculated from the age composition of the urban population alone, since workers living in cities frequently support dependents in the rural areas.

7. Economically active population

The data in section 6 showed that in the countries of the ECAFE region, as compared with the industrialized countries, a relatively small proportion of the population belongs to the most productive age group (15-59 years), and in consequence ECAFE countries carry a heavy dependency burden which hampers their economic development. However, this is only a crude indication of available manpower resources. Not all persons in the most productive age group are engaged in economic activities, and, as against this, a number of individuals below and above these ages do, in fact, work. A more detailed study of the economically active population⁴⁰ is therefore necessary to evaluate manpower resources.

³⁹ See, for example, the 1951 census of India and several sample surveys undertaken in that country, and also the Philippine Statistical Survey of Households.

⁴⁰ This is the term used in international recommendations; other terms are "the working population", "labour force" and "manpower". (See United Nations, *Application of International Standards to Census Data on the Economically Active Population*, Population Studies, No.9, New York 1951, pp.3-4).

Table 14

ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION: PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL POPULATION, MALES AND FEMALES

Country	Year	Both sexes	Males	Females
<i>ECAFE region</i>				
Ceylon	1946	39.2	57.8	18.2
China: Taiwan	1940	38.1	53.7	22.3
Federation of Malaya	1947	39.0	56.7	19.2
India	1951	39.5	54.3	23.7
Japan	1950	43.7	54.8	33.0
Korea, southern	1949	39.5	50.3	28.4
Pakistan	1951	30.7	54.6	3.8
Philippines	1948	38.6	46.0	31.0
Thailand	1947	51.6	53.7	49.4
<i>Latin America</i>				
Brazil	1950	33.0	56.4	9.6
Chile	1952	36.9	56.4	18.1
Mexico	1950	32.4	56.8	8.7
Venezuela	1950	33.9	55.0	12.2
<i>Economically developed countries</i>				
Australia	1947	42.2	65.3	19.0
France	1946	51.5	67.1	37.4
United Kingdom	1951	46.3	66.7	27.4
United States	1950	39.8	58.2	21.7

Table 14 shows the percentage of economically active males and females in the total population in various countries. It is based on recent censuses.⁴¹ In general, the ratio of the economically active to the total population is lower in the ECAFE countries than in the industrialized countries of the West. In all non-industrialized countries of the ECAFE region, except Thailand, the labour force amounts to less than 40 per cent of the total population; in most of the economically developed countries in other regions, and in industrialized Japan, it is 40-50 per cent.

A number of difficulties arise in the interpretation of these data. One problem is the large number of unpaid family workers in the ECAFE countries⁴² which makes it

⁴¹ In table 14 and subsequent tables, the census data on the economically active population have been adjusted to bring them more into line with international definitions when this could be done easily by recombining groups given in the tabulations. For example, women engaged in their own home housework and as such included in the active population in the census tables as a separate group were not, for the present purposes, included in the economically active population. Likewise, if the unemployed, or the unemployed who had not previously worked, were considered as inactive in the census tabulations, they were added to the active totals whenever the size of the group was known. For countries like Ceylon, however, where unpaid family workers and first job seekers are not included in the active population and no separate count of their numbers is given, no adjustment was made.

⁴² Unpaid female family workers constitute 60.4, 55.1 and 52.2 per cent respectively of all active females in Japan, the Philippines and India according to recent census statistics and, in the case of India, the National Sample Survey [Indian Statistical Institute, *Some Characteristics of the Economically Active Population*, National Sample Survey No.14, Calcutta, 1956 (Draft), p.65]. According to international recommendations, family workers who do not receive specific pay for their work should be enumerated as economically active if their contribution equals at least one-third of normal work period such as a week, month, etc.; see United Nations, *Application of International Standards to Census Data on the Economically Active Population*, op.cit., and the draft recommendations for the World Population Census around 1960, United Nations document "General Principles for a Population Census", ST/STAT/P/L.1/Rev.1. Only a few countries have as yet adopted this definition in view of the practical difficulties involved in applying it in a population census.

necessary to treat in particular statistics on the economic activities of women with great care. For example, only 4 per cent of the total female population in Pakistan are classified as economically active, while in Thailand the proportion is 49 per cent. Some real differentials may exist between the activity rates of women in these two countries owing to differences in social customs and religion, but they could hardly explain the size of the gap between the two rates; probably it is due to the incomparability of the data.⁴³ If the unpaid family workers are included in the economically active population, the total female activity rate is more than doubled in several countries of the region; statistics on economic activities generally ignore work performed by women engaged in house-keeping in their own homes and in bringing up their children, although this is work of economic value. Because of these complications, further comments in this report on the economically active population will be limited to males.⁴⁴

In all the ECAFE countries for which data are available, except the Philippines, 50-59 per cent of the males are economically active (table 14). In selected Latin American countries, the activity rates are around 55-57 per cent. The activity rates are considerably higher in the selected industrialized countries—65-67 per cent in Australia, France and the United Kingdom, and 58 per cent in the United States.

The proportion of the population which falls into the most productive age group is, as was mentioned above, determined by fertility and mortality. But the proportion which actually engages in productive work is governed, to a great extent, by the level of economic and social development. In a predominantly agricultural economy, a large number of young and old persons are absorbed in the production process, but, as industrial development and urbanization increase, the employment of such persons tends to become less important. The level of the educational system also affects the activity rates.

In table 15, the percentage of economically active males is given by age groups for the small number of countries where such information is available. About 95-97 per cent of the males of 25-54 years are active in both the less developed countries and the industrialized countries. But there are important differences in the activity rates at both younger and older ages.

Among males of 10-14 years, only a small fraction takes part in economic activities in industrialized countries—in Australia and the United States about 3 per cent and in Japan 5 per cent. But in the less developed countries the rate is much higher. In Ceylon, China

⁴³ In Pakistan, only 0.4 per cent of the total labour force is included in the category 'unpaid family workers', against 55.5 per cent in Thailand. The census tabulations in these two countries give no breakdowns which provide a basis for adjustment.

⁴⁴ The problem concerning the enumeration of unpaid family workers is less important as regards males, but it exists, especially in the case of boys helping the head of the household in agriculture and commerce.

Table 15
PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE MALES BY AGE

Country	Year	All ages ^a	Age in years							
			10 - 14	15 - 19	20 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 44	45 - 54	55 - 64	65 and over
<i>ECAFE region</i>										
Ceylon	1946	57.8	14.1	59.2	83.3	96.9	98.6	95.3	89.7	77.6
China: Taiwan	1940	53.7	23.1 ^b	86.9	96.6	97.6	97.4	93.6	78.2	47.2
India ^c	1953/54	58.5	40.6 ^b	75.6	94.5	97.8	97.3	—90.4—		53.2
Japan	1950	54.7	5.2 ^d	59.0	90.5	96.2	97.2	95.6	86.4	54.5
Philippines ^e	1956	48.2	20.6	69.0	89.1	95.7	96.1	94.1	93.0	47.4
<i>Latin America</i>										
Brazil	1950	56.4	31.0	80.6	93.4	96.7	97.1	94.8	88.4	65.7
Chile	1952	56.4	9.0 ^f	72.2	93.3	97.1	97.2	93.7	88.2	70.2
Venezuela	1950	55.5	21.3	82.9	94.7	96.7	96.8	95.9	91.6	73.4
<i>Economically developed countries</i>										
Australia	1947	65.3	3.3	81.1	93.8	97.4	97.9	95.6	86.2	33.9
France	1946	67.1	8.5 ^d	75.6	91.2	96.5	97.3	95.0	81.1	54.4
United Kingdom	1951	66.7	—	83.8	94.9	97.9	98.6	97.8	91.6	31.1
United States	1950	58.1	2.5	44.6	81.9	92.1	94.5	92.0	83.4	41.5

^a The economically active population as a percentage of the total population of all ages.

^b Data were tabulated for the age group under 15 years without subdivision, i.e. the entire group was assumed to be 10-14 years of age. Hence, the percentages shown may be over-stated.

^c Indian Statistical Institute, *National Sample Survey* (sixth and seventh rounds), *op.cit.*, p.63.

^d Data on the number of children aged 14 years who were economically active have been related to the population 10-14 years of age in order to obtain the percentage shown. The figures may therefore possibly be under-stated.

^e October 1956 round of the Philippine Statistical Survey of Households.

^f Data on the number of children aged 12-14 who were economically active have been related to the population 10-14 years of age.

(Taiwan) and the Philippines 14-23 per cent of males 10-14 years old are in the labour force, and in India perhaps as many as 40 per cent.⁴⁵

The activity rates in the 15-19 age group are nearly the same in the less developed countries and the industrialized countries. This may be due to institutional factors, but also to under-enumeration of young men who are only partially employed or unemployed. In the industrialized countries, and especially in the United States, school attendance tends to keep the activity rate down.

Males of over 65 years in the ECAFE countries also have relatively high activity rates varying from 47 to 78 per cent. This is about the same as the rate in the selected Latin American countries, but is much higher than in the selected industrialized countries which, with the exception of France, have only 31 to 42 per cent of their population of this age economically active.

A strong association between the level of economic development with the activity rates among young and old people is found not merely as between different countries, but also as between areas on various levels of development in the same country. In the population

study undertaken in Mysore State referred to above, for example, only about 20 per cent of the male urban population in the 10-14 age group and 60 per cent of the 15-19 age group were found to be economically active. But in the rural areas about 50 and 80 per cent, respectively, were active. Similar urban-rural differentials were found among males aged 55 and over.

8. Migratory movements and spatial distribution of the population

INTERCONTINENTAL MIGRATION

This is now of minor importance for the demography of the ECAFE region. Although in the nineteenth century rather large numbers of emigrants left the region for Africa, America and Oceania, their numbers were not sufficient to have more than a negligible impact on the rate of population growth in their countries of origin. In the twentieth century, intercontinental migration to and from Asia has almost ceased.

INTRAREGIONAL MIGRATION

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, intra-regional migration, though more important in absolute terms than the intercontinental migration, has also been relatively small considering the large populations of the countries of emigration. It has therefore had little effect on the rate of population change, although the social and economic repercussions have in some cases been substantial.

⁴⁵ The activity rate for India may be slightly too high (see footnote to table 15). However, the population study undertaken jointly by the Government of India and the United Nations in Mysore State also indicates very high activity rates among young males; the percentage of economically active males 10-14 years old was 41-57 per cent in different rural areas. The large difference in the activity rates between India and Ceylon is probably due in part to differences in the definition and enumeration of economically active persons.

China, India, Japan and Korea have been the most important countries of emigration. Their emigrants went mainly to Burma, Ceylon, China, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and Viet-Nam. In the decades preceding the Second World War, the chief population movements were from China to Malaya, Thailand and Viet-Nam; from India to Malaya, Burma and Ceylon; and from Korea and Japan to China.⁴⁶ However, a large number of these migrants were merely looking for temporary employment, and later returned to their home country.

In recent decades, increasingly severe legal restrictions on immigration and emigration have been introduced in most countries of the region. Consequently, international migration since the Second World War has virtually been brought to an end. Exceptions are the major migratory movements which were caused by political developments, such as the partition of India and Pakistan, and northern and southern Viet-Nam, and repatriation of Japanese after the Second World War.

Although, in most countries, aliens form only a very small proportion of the total population, immigrants and their immediate descendants are of numerical as well as economic and social importance in Singapore, the Federation of Malaya and Ceylon.⁴⁷ In Singapore, almost 90 per cent of the population is Chinese or Indian; in the Federation of Malaya, the corresponding percentage is 38. In Ceylon, almost half of the present Tamil population, which constitutes about one-eighth of the total population, are first-generation immigrants from India.

RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION

From the point of view of the demographer as well as of the economist, internal population movements have been more important in most ECAFE countries than either emigration or immigration. Of these movements, rural-urban migration is the most important, judging by the census data on changes in local population and the demographic characteristics of urban areas.

The study of population trends in urban and rural localities is complicated by problems of adequate definition. Frequently, it is impossible to distinguish clearly between an urban and a rural area.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ "International migration in the Far East during recent times" in *United Nations Population Bulletin*, Nos. 1 and 2, New York, 1952 and 1953.

⁴⁷ The total number of nationals living in other countries of the region than their own before Second World War has been estimated at between 10 and 20 million people (United Nations, document E/806, New York, 1948).

⁴⁸ There are no objective criteria for distinguishing between small towns and large villages and between a city proper and a suburban area. Census classification of localities varies greatly from country to country and sometimes even from one census to the next within a country. In some countries, localities are classified by the size of the population in civil divisions, but in other countries by population density, economic characteristics, the existence or absence of certain facilities associated with cities, etc., or by a combination of several of these criteria. The dividing line between 'urban' and 'rural' localities also varies from country to country. While in Korea localities with at least 40,000 inhabitants are considered to be urban, in mainland China and the Federation of Malaya towns and villages of 1,000 inhabitants may be considered as urban. For a detailed discussion see United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation*, 1957, Chapter VII, and United Nations, Population Branch, "Demographic Aspects of Urbanization in the ECAFE Region", in UNESCO, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, pp.96-127.

Table 16

ESTIMATED POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS (LOCALITIES OF 20,000 OR MORE INHABITANTS) AROUND 1950

Country	Percentage of total population in urban areas	Percentage of urban population in areas of 100,000 or more
World total ^a	21	62
ECAFE region	13	64
South West Asia	22	45
Africa	9	51
North America	42	69
Latin America	24	66
Europe	35	60
Oceania	47	87
USSR	31	58
<i>ECAFE region</i>		
Afghanistan	4.5	37.7
Burma	10.0	50.0
Ceylon	11.4	47.3
China: Mainland ^b	11.2	...
Taiwan	10.0	70.0
Federation of Malaya	17.3	43.9
Hong Kong	94.0	100.0
India	12.0	55.0
Indonesia	9.1	76.9
Iran	21.0	...
Japan	42.1	...
Korea, northern	20.2	48.5
Korea, southern	18.5	79.4
Nepal	4.4	68.1
Pakistan	7.8	61.5
Philippines	12.7	40.1
Singapore	72.5	100.0
Thailand	7.6	88.1
Viet-Nam	8.0	81.2

^a World and regional figures from Davis, K., and Hertz, H., "The World Distribution of Urbanization", *Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute*, Vol. XXXIII, part IV, pp.227-242.

^b The definition of urban areas is not necessarily consistent with that of other countries.

Table 16 shows the percentage of the total urban population in the major regions in the world and various ECAFE countries. It appears that the ECAFE region is less urbanized than any other region of the world, except Africa. Only Japan has an urban population comparable to that of Europe and North America. The least urbanized countries in the region are Afghanistan, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand

and Viet-Nam⁴⁹ where less than 10 per cent of the population lives in cities. The most urbanized countries are Japan, with an urban population amounting to 42 per cent of the total, and Korea and Iran with around 20 per cent.

The present level of urbanization is high in relation to the degree of economic development in the ECAFE region. When the major industrialized countries of Europe and north America were at a comparable level of urbanization they were far more developed, as is shown by the fact that approximately 55 per cent of their labour force was engaged in non-agricultural occupations,⁵⁰ as against the present figure for the ECAFE region of 30 per cent.

One of the reasons for this is that in many countries the recent heavy rural-urban migration has been only partly caused by industrialization. Political and civil disturbances, religious conflicts, partitions of entire countries, and the like, have uprooted large numbers of people who have sought refuge in cities. Unemployment and under-employment in rural areas, reinforced by the unusually high rate of population increase, have also encouraged migration from the countryside to cities. Thus the rapid urbanization in many ECAFE countries is to a great extent the result of population shifts from one not very productive employment (agriculture) to another (handicrafts, domestic service and the like).⁵¹ The consequence is low productivity, unemployment, under-employment, housing shortages and over-crowding in the cities. This seems to indicate a need to direct some of the internal migratory movements towards non-urban areas in order to harness the available manpower to the best advantage for economic development.

Examples of a recent high rate of urbanization, which is not a consequence of economic growth alone, are found in several countries. In southern Korea, economic development in the 1940's was slowed down by the war and by postwar conditions, but a great influx of refugees almost doubled the urban population. In the Federation of Malaya, the percentage of the population in urban areas has increased steadily in recent decades, but the economies of the cities are still dominated by the transport and export of raw materials; secondary industries which could absorb some of the heavy influx of people have not developed. In China (Taiwan), the urban population has also increased very rapidly in recent years, partly because of the combination of a high rate of natural population growth with a relatively slow expansion of economic opportunities in rural areas and partly because of the large migration of Chinese from the mainland. In India, the Second World War and the subsequent partition brought a heavy stream of refugees to the cities. As a result, the urban population grew in the 1940's by about 45 per cent.

⁴⁹ An estimate based on the total population of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam indicated that 8 per cent of the combined population of the three countries is urban.

⁵⁰ UNESCO, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East*, *op.cit.*, pp.96-127.

⁵¹ United Nations, ECAFE secretariat, "Economic causes and implications of urbanization in the recent experience of countries in Asia and the Far East", in UNESCO, *ibid.*, pp.128-162.

In Ceylon, on the other hand, migration from the countryside to the cities has apparently slowed down in recent years, so that the percentage of people living in urban areas with a population of 20,000 or more declined from over 11 per cent in 1946 to less than 10 per cent in 1953. In mainland China, the urban population increased by 7.8 per cent annually in the early 1950's, but migration to the towns has now almost ceased owing to a government campaign against it. As a result, in 1955 the urban population only increased by about one and a half per cent, or less than the rate of natural increase for the population as a whole. The level of urbanization is estimated to have increased from about 11 to 13 per cent during the period 1950-1953, and from 13 to 14 per cent from 1953 to 1956.⁵²

The process of urbanization, which is likely to continue, may take the form of a concentration of the population in a small number of big cities or an increase of the population in a number of smaller cities. Table 16 shows the percentage of the urban population (i.e. inhabitants of localities of 20,000 or more) which lives in cities of 100,000 and more inhabitants. It appears that the distribution of the urban population in the ECAFE region is fairly similar to that of regions with a higher level of urbanization. Because of the relatively small number of cities of all sizes, the ratio of the urban population in large cities is actually even higher than that found in Europe and the Soviet Union.

OTHER INTERNAL MIGRATION

In addition to rural-urban migration, there are other internal migratory movements. In several countries, a considerable number of people move every year from one region to another, seeking employment. However, except for the migration of Chinese from the densely populated lowlands to Manchuria, numbers involved are small in comparison with population movements in many western countries. In India, for example, it appears that, even if the absolute number of people involved in such migratory movements may have been large, the resultant percentage of population redistribution was small; this is shown by the low percentage (3.6 in 1931) of the population living outside the province or state where they were born. In the United States, the corresponding figure was 23 per cent in 1940. Frequently internal migration may also be migration towards urban areas. In India, an estimated 45 per cent of all migration between districts and an even larger percentage of all migration between provinces is rural-urban migration.⁵³ The main interregional population movements in India have been the migration of male from the northwest to the northeast and, to a smaller extent, from the south to the north as a consequence of the economic development of Bengal and the surrounding areas. For women, the Hindu custom of taking a bride from outside the village also results in a numerically important migration.

⁵² Tung Chi Kung Tso, 14 June 1957.

⁵³ Davis, K., *op.cit.*, pp.107-114.

II. FUTURE POPULATION TRENDS

In the first chapter of this report, past population trends in ECAFE countries were summarized and analyzed, and trends in the region as a whole were compared with trends in selected areas elsewhere. However, it is of the greatest importance for all economic and social planning not merely to know the trends and characteristics of the present population but also to have reasonable estimates of its future growth and composition.

Two sets of future population estimates are given below. One set consists of estimates of the world population and its distribution over major geographic regions in selected years during the period 1955-2000. These estimates are derived from population projections of the total population, country by country, on the basis of mortality and fertility rates observed in a few selected areas representative of the region. Another more detailed set of estimates, giving the population by sex and age for the period 1955-1980, has been prepared for some of the countries in the region; these are based upon a thorough examination of the present demographic trends.

1. Future population estimates for the world and its major regions

The regional forecasts for the period 1955-2000 were prepared by the United Nations¹ and are based, with only minor modifications, on the countries' own official estimates of population in 1950 and 1955. The regions were classified according to various population patterns of expected population growth based on past trends, both in the regions themselves and similar areas elsewhere.

For most of the population projections a future decline in mortality has been assumed, but various assumptions were made as to fertility.

For the ECAFE region, except Japan, the following assumptions were made:

Mortality: Expectation of life at birth rises at a rate of half a year annually until the expectation of life at birth attains 55 years. After this, life expectancy rises at changing rates which are empirically determined in a sequence of model life tables. Beyond 65 and in particular after 70 years the expectation of life is rising at a progressively slower rate.

Fertility: Three alternative assumptions were made: (1) constant, high fertility ("high" assumption); (2) constant, high fertility until 1975, and from then on a gradual decline, corresponding to a reduction in the gross reproduction rate from 3 to 2½ over 25 years ("medium" assumption); (3) declining fertility beginning in 1950 corresponding to a reduction of the gross reproduction rate from 3 to 2½ by 1975, and to 1½ in the year 2000 ("low" assumption).

In table 17 population forecasts are shown for the world as a whole and for selected areas. For the ECAFE region and the world total, the estimates are given according to all three assumptions, but for other areas only according to the medium assumption. It can be seen in the table that the ECAFE region's share of the total world population will tend to increase.

Table 17
ESTIMATES OF FUTURE POPULATION OF THE WORLD AND MAJOR REGIONS, 1955-2000
(Millions)

Region	Assumption ^a	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	2000
World total	M	2,690	2,910	3,180	3,480	3,830	4,220	6,280
ECAFE region	M	1,434	1,561	1,716	1,900	2,120	2,368	3,706
South West Asia	M	50	57	64	72	82	91	146
Africa	M	216	235	256	278	303	333	517
North America	M	182	197	210	225	240	254	312
Latin America	M	183	206	234	265	303	348	592
Europe	M	409	424	440	457	476	495	568
Oceania	M	14.7	16.3	17.8	19.4	21.0	22.5	29.3
USSR	M	197	215	234	254	275	297	379
World total	H	2,690	2,920	3,180	3,500	3,860	4,280	6,900
	M	2,690	2,910	3,180	3,480	3,830	4,220	6,280
	L	2,690	2,900	3,120	3,350	3,590	3,850	4,880
ECAFE region	H	1,434	1,561	1,716	1,900	2,120	2,377	4,069
	M	1,434	1,561	1,716	1,900	2,120	2,368	3,706
	L	1,434	1,550	1,657	1,814	1,957	2,110	2,768

^a H = High

M = Medium

L = Low

¹ United Nations, *The Future Growth of World Population*, (ST/SOA/Series A/28), New York, 1958.

According to the medium assumption, the annual rate of population increase will accelerate from 1.7 per cent in 1955-60 to 1.9 in 1960-65, 2.1 in 1965-70 and 2.2 in 1970-75. It will continue at the rate of 2.2 per annum until 1985-90 when it will be 2.3 per cent. In 1990-95 and 1995-2000 the estimated rate of growth is 2.3 and 2.2 per cent respectively.

The density of population in the ECAFE region, according to the medium assumption, will rise from 68 in 1955 to 81 persons per square kilometre in 1965, 100 in 1975, 125 in 1985 and 175 in the year 2000. Thus, by 1975 the density of population in the ECAFE region will be the highest in the world, having overtaken Europe, which now has the highest density. By 2000 the region's density will exceed that of Europe by over fifty per cent.

2. Future population in selected ECAFE countries

A study of the future trends in population and of their relationship to economic and social development requires detailed estimates of the future growth and composition of the population in individual countries. Such estimates have been prepared by the United Nations on the basis of a detailed analysis of available census data and an evaluation of recent trends in fertility and mortality. The countries and territories of the ECAFE region which have been covered are: British Borneo, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China (Taiwan), the Federation of Malaya, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet-Nam.² In this study use has also been made of future estimates for India and Japan derived from other sources.³

Various assumptions have been used to give the range of possible future developments in the field of population. The first estimates presented assume that mortality will decline at a rate in accordance with the normal past pattern while fertility will continue unchanged at its present level (except in Japan). These projections are conservative in the sense that they assume no major changes in the present trends in mortality and fertility. They are not necessarily the best estimates, but they are, as will be suggested below, comparatively less speculative than the various alternatives. Projections on alternative assumptions are presented in section (b).

(a) INTERMEDIATE ESTIMATES (BASED ON CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS)

The sex and age distribution for 1950 and 1955, in several instances adjusted for inconsistencies in the data, was projected on the basis of the following assumptions.

Mortality was assumed to continue to decline according to the pattern indicated by model tables based on the experience in a number of countries.⁴ It was

² To be published in United Nations, *The Population of South-East Asia, including Ceylon and China (Taiwan), 1950-1980* (ST/SOA/Series A/30).

³ Coale, A.J., and Hoover, E.M., *Population Growth...*, op.cit., and Japan Institute of Population Problems, Welfare Ministry, *Population Projections by Sex and Age*, Tokyo, 1957.

⁴ Trends in mortality appear to have followed a fairly similar pattern in different countries; United Nations, *Age and Sex Patterns of Mortality* (ST/SOA/Series A/22), New York, 1955.

generally assumed that the life expectancy at birth, estimated for the period 1950-55, would increase by one half of a year annually during the period 1955-1980.⁵ Fertility (determined by the gross reproduction rate) was assumed to continue without change at the high level which prevails in all countries of the ECAFE region (except Japan). How long the assumption of constant high fertility is likely to remain reasonable is open to question. But no major decline is likely to occur in the near future. This point is discussed in section 3 below.

In table 18, the estimates of the population by 1980 are presented for thirteen selected countries of the region. According to these estimates, the population will, within the 25-year period 1955-1980, double in Cambodia and Thailand. It will more than double in Ceylon, China (Taiwan), the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines and Singapore. In India, Indonesia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the population will grow at a slower rate but will still be 70 to 80 per cent above the present level in 1980.⁶

Table 18

ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATION AND TOTAL DENSITY, 1955 AND 1980^a

Country	Total population (in millions)		Percentage increase 1980 over 1955	Density (persons per sq.km.)	
	1955	1980		1955	1980
British Borneo.	1.0	1.8	77	5	9
Burma	19.8	32.3	63	29	48
Cambodia	4.4	8.7	99	25	50
Ceylon	8.6	18.3	112	132	279
China: Taiwan.	8.9	21.3	139	248	592
Federation of					
Malaya	6.0	14.0	134	46	107
India	378.7	665.7	76	115	202
Indonesia	82.2	138.5	68	55	93
Laos	1.4	2.5	75	6	10
Philippines ...	23.0	50.8	121	77	170
Singapore	1.3	3.3	147	2,303	5,681
Thailand	20.9	41.6	99	40	81
Viet-Nam	26.3	44.6	70	80	135

^a Source: United Nations, *The Population of South-East Asia, including Ceylon and China (Taiwan), 1950-1980* (to be published). Coale, A.J., and Hoover, E.M., *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, op.cit.

⁵ The projection for India, prepared by the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, which is presented in this report is based on similar assumptions regarding mortality and fertility as the United Nations projections; namely a rapid decline in mortality which would raise the life expectancy at birth from about 32 years in 1951 to around 52 years in 1986, and a continuation of the present high level of fertility.

⁶ For Afghanistan, China (Mainland), Iran, Korea, Nepal and Pakistan the United Nations did not yet make comparable detailed population projections. For these rough estimates of the total population and total density, as well as the percentage increase of the 1975 population over that of 1955, may be derived from the estimates prepared for the major regions of the world (United Nations, *The Future Growth of World Population*, pp.72-75):—

Country	Total population		Percentage increase 1975 over 1955	Density (persons per sq.km.)	
	1955	1975		1955	1975
Afghanistan	12.0	16.9	41	18	26
China: Mainland .	600.0	894.0	49	61	92
Iran	21.8	34.3	57	12	21
Korea	29.0	43.0	48	131	195
Nepal	8.6	13.1	52	6	9
Pakistan	83.2	128.0	54	88	135

Table 19 presents the estimated average annual rate of population increase during quinquennial periods. The figures show a rapidly accelerating population increase in most countries over the next 25 years. Only the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and China (Taiwan) had a population increase of 3 per cent or more per annum from 1950 to 1955; but in about 25 years time also Cambodia, Ceylon, the Philippines and Thailand will experience this rate of increase. For the remaining countries (British Borneo, Burma, India, Indonesia, Laos and Viet-Nam) the annual rate of increase in the period 1975-1980 is estimated to be 2.3-2.7 per cent.

Table 19
ESTIMATED NATURAL RATE OF INCREASE FOR
QUINQUENNIAL PERIODS 1950-1980^a

Country	Annual per cent increase for quinquennial periods (mid-years)					
	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65	1965-70	1970-75	1975-80
British Borneo ..	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.7
Burma	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.3
Cambodia	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.0
Ceylon	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.2	3.3
China: Taiwan.	3.6 ^b	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.7
Federation of Malaya	3.0 ^b	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.8
India	1.5 ^c	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5
Indonesia	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.3
Laos	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.6
Philippines ...	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.4
Singapore	3.7 ^b	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.8	4.1
Thailand	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.0
Viet-Nam	0.3 ^d	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.1

^a See table 18 for sources.

^b Rates according to official vital statistics. These rates are affected by immigration in that period and by minor deficiencies of registration. They are, therefore, not entirely comparable with the rates shown by the population projections for the remaining periods.

^c 1954-55.

^d Estimates for this disturbed period have been assumed somewhat arbitrarily.

Estimates of future population by broad age groups indicate that the child dependency burden will soon be one of the biggest population problems in most ECAFE countries (see table 20). The ratio of children under 15 years of age to the total population which is already high in the region will have increased to around 43-46 per cent of the total population by 1980, according to these estimates. This is twice as high as the present ratio of children in Australia, France and the United Kingdom. The main part of this increase in the proportion of children in the population will take place in the near future. After 1965 or 1970, the ratio of children to the total population will tend to reach a stabilized constant level.

Table 20
AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION, 1955,
1970 AND 1980^a

Country	Year	Age in years			
		All ages	Under 15	15 - 59	60 and over
British Borneo:	1955	100	40.5	55.0	4.5
	1970	100	43.0	52.1	4.9
	1980	100	44.0	50.8	5.2
Burma:	1955	100	39.5	55.9	4.6
	1970	100	40.8	53.7	5.5
	1980	100	41.3	53.2	5.5
Cambodia:	1955	100	42.9	53.0	4.1
	1970	100	44.4	51.2	4.4
	1980	100	44.3	51.3	4.4
China (Taiwan):	1955	100	43.2	52.8	4.0
	1970	100	45.7	49.7	4.6
	1980	100	45.7	49.5	4.8
Federation of					
Malaya:	1955	100	43.9	50.8	5.3
	1970	100	46.3	47.7	6.0
	1980	100	48.1	46.6	5.3
India:	1955	100	39.0	56.1	4.9
	1970	100	41.0	53.4	5.6
	1980	100	41.8	52.3	5.9
Indonesia:	1955	100	37.3	57.6	5.1
	1970	100	40.5	53.9	5.6
	1980	100	39.8	54.0	6.2
Laos:	1955	100	41.3	54.3	4.4
	1970	100	42.2	52.9	4.9
	1980	100	42.8	52.1	5.1
Philippines:	1955	100	45.6	49.8	4.6
	1970	100	46.4	49.4	4.2
	1980	100	46.8	48.9	4.3
Singapore:	1955	100	41.4	54.5	4.1
	1970	100	45.8	48.4	5.8
	1980	100	48.2	46.1	5.7
Thailand:	1955	100	43.0	53.0	4.0
	1970	100	44.4	51.2	4.4
	1980	100	44.3	51.2	4.5
Viet-Nam:	1955	100	34.0	60.1	5.9
	1970	100	41.2	52.6	6.2
	1980	100	38.6	54.7	6.7

^a See table 18 for sources.

It is estimated that in nearly all countries of the region the percentage of persons aged 60 and over will also rise; however, this increase will be a modest one and will come to a near standstill after 1965-1970. In spite of the increase in the old age dependency burden, it will still be only one-half or one-third of the present level in the economically developed countries.

Because of the relative increase in the number of children and old people, the percentage of the population in the 15-59 age group, i.e. the most productive ages, will decline in the period 1955-1980. In a number of countries, this ratio will decline by 3 to 4 or more per 100 persons. For the majority of ECAFE countries, the estimated percentage of the population in the 15-59 age group will be about 50-53 in 1980. This is substantially below the level observed in the economically developed countries where the present ratio is approximately 60 per cent.

Table 21

NUMBER OF PERSONS IN AGE GROUPS UNDER 15 AND 60 YEARS AND OVER PER
100 PERSONS OF 15-59 YEARS OF AGE, 1955-1980^a

Country	Year					
	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
British Borneo	81.8	83.5	88.0	91.9	94.9	96.8
Burma	78.9	81.8	84.2	86.2	86.6	88.0
Cambodia	88.7	92.7	94.9	95.3	95.3	94.9
Ceylon	87.3	90.8	91.2	93.0	96.1	100.0
China: Taiwan	89.4	98.0	104.9	101.2	100.4	102.0
Federation of Malaya	96.8	104.1	102.9	109.6	112.3	114.6
India	78.4	81.0	84.5	87.4	89.4	91.3
Indonesia	73.6	78.9	86.9	85.5	84.2	85.2
Laos	84.2	85.5	86.9	89.0	90.1	91.9
Philippines	100.8	101.2	100.8	102.4	103.3	104.5
Singapore	83.5	98.0	106.2	106.6	109.6	116.9
Thailand	88.7	92.3	94.9	95.3	95.3	95.3
Viet-Nam	66.4	69.5	78.6	90.1	86.2	82.8

^a See table 18 for sources.

Table 21 shows the estimated future changes in the ratio of persons under 15 years and 60 years and over, per 100 persons of 15-59 years of age. The increase will be as high as 15-25 per cent in British Borneo, Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, India and Viet-Nam; in Singapore it will rise by nearly 40 per cent.

However, factors other than the age structure should be taken into account in estimating the future dependency burden and the human resources which will be available for production. The present relatively high activity rates of children and old men, may not continue unchanged. They are associated to a considerable extent with low levels of living and the predominance of agriculture, and are likely to be reduced by the development of industries, increased urbanization, and rises in income per family. This will tend to diminish the proportion of the working population even further.

On the other hand, the dependency burden may to some extent be lessened by the same factors which cause the expected future decline in mortality. Control of various diseases, for example, malaria, and improvements in general health may raise the productivity of the workers and increase the length of their working life. Also, changes in social customs and the status of women may increase the proportion of economically active women. But any substantial relief in the growing dependency burden is not likely to come until there is a marked decline in the level of fertility. This will bring about the favourable changes in the age structure of the population which are outlined below and may also, as a side effect, tend to increase economic activities among women.

(b) ALTERNATIVE FUTURE TRENDS

Alternative future population estimates were prepared by the United Nations for the same selected ECAFE countries as in section (a) above to indicate the range of possible future development.⁷

It is probable that mortality in the ECAFE region will continue to decline, but how rapid the decline will be is, of course, uncertain. The projections presented above were based upon the assumption that the mortality rate will decline according to a pattern which has been found, under varying conditions, in a number of areas.

But a few countries in the ECAFE region experienced an extraordinary rapid decline in mortality in the early postwar years. In Ceylon, China (Taiwan), the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, the death rate had declined by 1953 to less than one-half of the prewar level; this means that life expectancy at birth increased by about one year annually. The rate of decline has tapered off somewhat recently. This experience seems to indicate that the initial rate of decline may in some cases be very rapid for a short period but that, when a fairly low level of mortality has been reached, the rate of decline may slow down. Therefore, alternative projections have been prepared for various countries in the region assuming a mortality decline twice as rapid as normal until the level of mortality is equal to that in

⁷ The future population estimates for India prepared by the office of Population Research, Princeton University, also included alternative future trends based on assumptions of declining fertility in addition to declining mortality. These alternative estimates are not discussed in the present report, but they may be found in Part 2 of Coale, A.J. and Hoover, E.M., *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, *op.cit.*

Ceylon; thereupon, the decline is estimated at the normal pace of an increase in life expectancy of half a year annually. In the case of Ceylon, China (Taiwan) and Singapore, no change in the projections is made, as the initial period of a rapid decline in mortality has been passed.

Additional projections are also presented to illustrate the demographic effects of an early decline in fertility. No decline in fertility is assumed until 1960 as there is no present indication of any decline in the ECAFE countries (except Japan). After 1960, two alternative trends in fertility are assumed: a reduction in fertility at a rate of one per cent a year and a reduction at a rate of 2 per cent.⁸

Table 22

ESTIMATED TOTAL POPULATION AND PER CENT INCREASE
ACCORDING TO FOUR ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS
FOR SELECTED ECAFE COUNTRIES, 1955-1980

Country	1955	1980			
		I	II	III	IV
Population in millions					
British Borneo	1.0	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.6
Burma	19.8	45.3	32.3	30.5	28.7
Cambodia	4.4	9.9	8.7	8.1	7.6
Ceylon	8.7	...	18.3	17.2	16.1
China: Taiwan	8.9	...	21.3	19.9	18.6
Federation of Malaya ..	6.0	14.4	14.0	13.1	12.1
Indonesia	82.2	159.7	138.5	131.0	123.4
Laos	1.4	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.2
Philippines	23.0	57.0	50.8	47.6	44.3
Singapore	1.3	...	3.3	3.1	2.9
Thailand	20.9	47.5	41.6	39.1	36.6
Viet-Nam	26.3	49.1	44.6	42.3	40.0
Percentage increase of population in 1980 over the population of 1955					
British Borneo	101	77	66	55	55
Burma	129	63	53	45	45
Cambodia	127	99	87	75	75
Ceylon	112	99	86	86
China: Taiwan	139	124	109	109
Federation of Malaya ..	141	134	118	103	103
Indonesia	94	68	59	50	50
Laos	102	75	65	54	54
Philippines	148	121	107	92	92
Singapore	147	130	114	114
Thailand	127	99	87	75	75
Viet-Nam	87	70	61	52	52

Legend: I Assuming rapid mortality decline, constant fertility.
II Assuming normal mortality decline, constant fertility.
III Assuming normal mortality decline, moderate fertility decline.
IV Assuming normal mortality decline, rapid fertility decline.

The population estimates for selected countries in the year 1980 are given in table 22 according to all four different sets of assumptions. The future total populations vary considerably according to the various

⁸ The economic—and other—implications of a fertility decline would be much more marked if the projections were extended over a period of time long enough to allow for the more pronounced retardation in growth that will follow as a result of the effect of declining fertility on the number of women in the childbearing ages. This cumulative nature of the consequences of a fertility decline, eventually leading to an accelerated reduction in the rate of population growth, will require two to three decades in order to make its impact on the growth rate noticeable. In the present projections, only the population below the childbearing ages is affected by the assumed fertility changes, since the period of decline covers only a 20-year period.

assumptions. For example, in the case of Indonesia the population will increase from 82.2 million in 1955 to 159.7 million in the case of a rapid future decline in mortality; but only to 131.0 million if an early decline in fertility of one per cent annually takes place (assuming a normal pattern of mortality decline); and to 123.4 million if a 2 per cent decline in fertility occurs.

The rates of population increase in four selected countries are compared in table 23. If we assume an early rapid decline in mortality, the annual rate of population growth will, in the absence of any decline in fertility, be nearly 4 per cent in the Federation of Malaya and the Philippines and 3 per cent in Indonesia in 1975-80. It appears that, even if fertility declines, the population will increase fairly rapidly. A decline in fertility of one per cent a year of the initial level will hardly offset the effect upon population growth of the future mortality decline. The future rates of increase will still exceed or be equal to those in 1950-55. Only if fertility declines at a rapid rate of 2 per cent annually will the rate of population growth slow down in 1975-80 in comparison to 1950-55.

Table 23

ESTIMATED NATURAL RATE OF INCREASE, 1950-55,
1965-70 AND 1975-80

Country	1950-55	1965-70	1975-80
Ceylon	I } 2.7
	II } 2.7	3.0	3.3
	III } 2.7	2.7	2.8
	IV } 2.7	2.5	2.2
Federation of Malaya ..	I } 2.7	3.5	3.9
	II } 2.7	3.4	3.8
	III } 2.7	3.1	3.2
	IV } 2.7	2.8	2.6
Indonesia	I } 1.8 ^a	2.5	3.0
	II } 1.8 ^a	2.0	2.3
	III } 1.8 ^a	1.8	1.8
	IV } 1.8 ^a	1.6	1.3
Philippines	I } 2.7 ^b	3.7	3.9
	II } 2.7 ^b	3.2	3.4
	III } 2.7 ^b	2.9	2.9
	IV } 2.7 ^b	2.6	2.3

Legend: See table 22.

^a Estimated rate 2.0 based upon assumption I.

^b Estimated rate 2.8 based upon assumption I.

Table 24 shows the effects of alternative future trends in mortality and fertility upon the age structure. If an early rapid decline in mortality takes place in countries which now have a fairly high death rate (e.g. Indonesia and the Philippines), the proportion of the population in the 15-59 age group will fall faster than if mortality declines steadily at the normal rate. Even with a moderate decline in fertility the proportion of adults in the population will continue to decline in most countries in the future. A rapid fertility decline of 2 per cent annually is required to bring about a marked increase in the proportion of adults and the increase will not occur sooner than the 1970's. The ratio prevailing in the industrialized countries will generally not be reached until after 1980. It is not until the reduced number of children themselves reach the reproductive ages in large numbers that a major brake will be imposed on the rate of population growth.

Table 24

**AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION OF FOUR SELECTED COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO
FOUR ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS, 1955, 1970, 1980**

Country		Under 15 Years			15-59 Years			60 Years and Over		
		1955	1970	1980	1955	1970	1980	1955	1970	1980
Ceylon	I	41.5	41.9	43.6	53.4	51.8	50.0	5.1	6.3	6.4
	II	41.5	41.9	43.6	53.4	51.8	50.0	5.1	6.3	6.4
	III	41.5	41.0	40.3	53.4	52.6	52.9	5.1	6.4	6.8
	IV	41.5	40.0	36.5	53.4	53.4	56.2	5.1	6.6	7.3
Federation of Malaya . . .	I	43.9	46.7	48.4	50.8	47.3	46.3	5.3	6.0	5.3
	II	43.9	46.3	48.1	50.8	47.7	46.6	5.3	6.0	5.3
	III	43.9	45.3	44.7	50.8	48.6	49.6	5.3	6.1	5.7
	IV	43.9	44.3	40.7	50.8	49.5	53.3	5.3	6.2	6.0
Indonesia	I	37.5	41.5	41.4	57.3	52.5	52.0	5.2	6.0	6.6
	II	37.3	40.5	39.8	57.6	53.9	54.0	5.1	5.6	6.2
	III	37.3	39.6	36.6	57.6	56.0	56.9	5.1	5.7	6.5
	IV	37.3	38.7	33.0	57.6	55.4	60.1	5.1	5.9	6.9
Philippines	I	45.7	47.6	48.2	49.7	48.0	47.3	4.6	4.4	4.5
	II	45.6	46.4	46.8	49.8	49.4	48.9	4.6	4.2	4.3
	III	45.6	45.4	43.4	49.8	50.4	52.0	4.6	4.2	4.6
	IV	45.6	44.4	39.6	49.8	51.3	55.4	4.6	4.3	5.0

Legend: See table 22.

Table 25

**NUMBER OF PERSONS IN AGE GROUPS UNDER 15 AND
60 YEARS AND OVER PER 100 PERSONS OF
15-59 YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO FOUR
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS, 1955-1980**

Country		1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
Ceylon:	I	87.3	90.8	91.2	93.0	96.1	100.0
	II	87.3	90.8	91.2	93.0	96.1	100.0
	III	87.3	90.8	90.8	90.1	89.8	89.0
	IV	87.3	90.8	89.8	87.3	82.5	77.9
Federation of Malaya:	I	96.8	104.5	111.0	111.4	114.1	116.0
	II	96.8	104.1	102.9	109.6	112.3	114.6
	III	96.8	104.1	108.3	105.8	104.1	101.6
	IV	96.8	104.1	107.5	102.0	96.1	87.6
Indonesia:	I	74.5	81.2	90.1	90.5	90.1	92.3
	II	73.6	78.9	86.9	85.5	84.2	85.2
	III	73.6	78.9	86.2	82.8	78.6	75.7
	IV	73.6	78.9	85.5	80.0	72.7	66.4
Philippines:	I	101.2	103.2	104.5	108.3	109.6	111.4
	II	100.8	101.2	100.8	102.4	103.3	104.5
	III	100.8	101.2	99.6	98.4	96.1	92.3
	IV	100.8	101.2	99.2	94.9	88.0	80.5

Legend: See table 22.

Table 25 shows that this pattern is repeated in the estimated proportions of the population in age groups under 15 and 60 years and over, per 100 persons in age groups 15-59 years at various future dates. A rapid decline in mortality will tend to increase the so-called dependency burden quite considerably; for example, in

the Philippines, the ratio will be 6 per cent higher in 1970 if an early rapid decline in mortality takes place than if mortality declines according to a normal pattern. Declining fertility generally will not reduce the present high dependency burden until the 1970's.

(c) FUTURE TRENDS IN JAPAN

Population projections have been prepared for Japan which are not comparable with those presented for other countries and are therefore dealt with separately.

In the projections prepared by the Institute of Population Problems of the Japanese Ministry of Welfare, the population for Japan in 1975 was projected on the assumption that mortality will decline slowly until 1964 and thereafter remain constant,⁹ and that fertility will continue to decline until 1962 and thereafter remain constant.¹⁰

On these assumptions, the total population of Japan is estimated to increase from 89 million in 1955 to only 103 million in 1975. The rate of population increase which for the period 1950-54 amounted to 1.4 per cent per annum, will decline to 0.6 per cent in 1970-75. As regards the age structure, the percentage of children, already low if compared with other ECAFE countries, will continue to decline drastically. From 33.6 per cent of children under 15 years of age in 1955, it will decrease by 1975 to merely 20 per cent of the total population; this is less than the present normal ratio in the economically developed countries (see table 12). On the other hand, the percentage of persons aged 60 and over will increase rapidly from 8 per cent in 1955

⁹ At a life expectancy at birth of 66.5 years for men and 70.9 years for women.

¹⁰ At a gross reproduction rate at 0.7.

to almost 12 per cent in 1975. This means that the Japanese population will reach a level of ageing which will be near the present level in the economically developed countries. But, as the decline in the child dependency will far exceed the increase in the old age dependency, the percentage of the population in the 15-59 age group will increase sharply (from 58 per cent in 1955 to 69 per cent twenty years later). This is a more favourable percentage than that in the developed countries at present (see table 12). In terms of the dependency burden, there will be a reduction of more than one-third within twenty years.

3. Social and economic factors affecting future population trends

In Europe and north America the rather modest decline in mortality in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries was mainly the result of economic development. Industrialization, better nutrition, improved housing and sanitation and the like increased the chance of survival. This decline was accelerated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mainly as a result of advances in medical science and improvements in public health facilities and social legislation.

In the ECAFE countries on the other hand, the recent decline in mortality has mainly been a consequence of concentrated efforts to control epidemics, of the introduction of modern medical practices and public health facilities and recent advances in medical science. It is expected that the decline in mortality will continue in most countries in the future even if the level of living does not improve rapidly. Economic and social development would, however, undoubtedly help to accelerate the decline in mortality.

It is far more difficult to anticipate the future trend in fertility. Most experts agree that the level of fertility will eventually decline as living conditions improve. But the experience of the West suggests that changes in economic and social conditions do not have an immediate effect on fertility. In the West, fertility did not begin to decline generally before the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This experience, however, may for various reasons not be repeated in the ECAFE region. A number of contradictory factors have to be taken into consideration.

One of the most important factors in favour of an early fertility decline in the ECAFE region is the considerable interest of married couples in limiting the family size which recent studies have revealed. Also, the absence in the region, generally, of objections to family planning on religious grounds should be noted.

Three of the most populous countries of the region—mainland China, India and Japan—have already made family planning a major government policy. The main measure taken has been the dissemination by government or government agencies of information on contraception.

In India a new policy was introduced with the first five-year plan in 1951. One of the major measures was to provide advice and assistance on family planning as an integral part of the services in hospitals and health centres. Considerable attention was also given to training of personnel and research. In the second five-year plan, this programme is being intensified, and the funds allocated have been increased almost eight times.

In mainland China, the programme of family planning was launched in 1955. The results of the 1953 population census had just been published, and the effect of the increasing population pressure on the level of living was realized. The programme, first on a modest scale but considerably intensified recently, is making guidance in family planning an important part of the activities of hospitals, child and maternity centres.

In Japan, the Government, before and during the Second World War, enforced a pro-natalist policy. The public interest in family planning rose sharply soon after the close of the War probably owing to economic pressure upon the families. Abortions flourished, and in 1948 abortion and sterilization were legalized on certain specified grounds, and in 1952 further liberalization of the abortion law took place. Abortions are estimated to be approximately equal in number to live births, but the frequency of abortions seems to be on the decline as a result of the vigorous programme for promoting dissemination of information on contraceptives.

In a number of other areas, including Ceylon, China (Taiwan), Hong Kong and Singapore family planning activities are supported by the government although the government itself does not take a lead in promoting such measures. Recently, the Government of Pakistan has proclaimed a policy aimed at checking the high birth rate and has started to support family planning activities. In a few countries such as the Federation of Malaya and Thailand family planning activities are supported by private organizations only, with no direct assistance from the government.

Another factor which may induce a decline in fertility is the rapid decline in infant mortality. If more children survive, fewer births may be required to satisfy parents' desire for a family. Also, the rise in marriage age which is taking place in several countries of the region may tend to reduce the level of fertility.

On the other hand, a number of factors exist which may delay the decline in fertility or even increase fertility temporarily. Customs, social values, and attitudes towards marriage, family and children may change as slowly as in the West; the low level of living, widespread illiteracy and the existence of ignorance and superstition may be delaying factors. The decline in fertility is expected to take place first in a few socio-economic groups and gradually filter to others. In the developed countries of the West, the decline in fertility began among the well-to-do families and spread gradually to the lower income groups; also it began sooner in urban communities than in the country. In a previous section, it was noted that there is little sign as yet of any major

rural-urban differences in fertility patterns in most ECAFE countries. Various studies have also shown little indication of fertility differentials among other socioeconomic groups. In India, for example, the 1951 census did not reveal any major differentials by occupation, and the National Sample Survey showed few differentials in caste, land tenure and economic status.

The control of malaria and other diseases, the maternity welfare programme, and the improved health and sanitary conditions in general, may tend to increase fertility by reducing the still birth rate, the risk of spontaneous abortion and sterility. Further, the decline in mortality among men will tend to reduce the high rate of widowhood prevailing in several countries in the region and so tend to increase fertility.

It should also be noted that a rising age at marriage does not necessarily mean a decline in fertility. As pointed out above, the age at marriage is very low at present in many countries in the region. An increase in the woman's age from under 15 to, say, 18 or 20 years of age may tend to increase fertility by reducing the number of very early pregnancies, which often result in sterility.

The drive for family planning which is being made in a number of countries in the region cannot therefore be counted on to lower fertility substantially in the near future. It is true that as these activities are mostly

sponsored by governments, they are likely to give results sooner than they did in the West where the movement was often opposed by the official authorities. But the fact that the ECAFE populations are predominantly rural, illiterate and poorly housed and fed will delay the dissemination of information on family planning. Considerable research is still required to develop a contraceptive which is inexpensive, easy to apply and acceptable to the large majority of people in the ECAFE region.

Another way of relieving population pressure is by land settlement. The governments of mainland China, the Philippines and Indonesia, for example, have instituted programmes of this type. In mainland China, 680,000 persons from the river plains were resettled in the frontier areas of the northwest and northeast in 1956. But even these movements only go some way towards easing the pressure due to the annual increase in the rural population of China by about 12 million. In Indonesia, 25,000—30,000 persons are moved every year from over-crowded Java to South Sumatra and other islands; but the population of Java increases by a million a year. In the Philippines, the target is to resettle 400,000 people from central Luzon and the Visayan islands within the next ten years—but this is only one-twentieth of the population increase during the same period. It should be noted that such schemes are expensive, and that not all countries have unused arable land available. In general, resettlement can afford only a small and temporary relief to population pressure.

III. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE POPULATION TRENDS

1. Population growth and food supply

The relationship between food and population is frequently analysed on a world-wide basis—that is, the aggregates of present and projected world population and world food production are set against each other. However, it is *relevant* aggregates of food and population, not global aggregates, that must be compared in assessing the adequacy of future food supplies in different parts of the world.¹ Only countries with an export surplus of non-food items can draw upon the food surplus of other countries to support their population.

Self sufficiency in food supply is the rule rather than the exception in most parts of the world. This is indicated by the fact that only about 7 per cent of the world's production of food enters into international trade. Therefore, an idea of the level of consumption in the major regions of the world may be afforded by a comparison of their relative share of the world's agricultural production—more than 85 per cent of which consists of food and food crops—and population. This is shown by the following data for the year 1955/56:²

	Agricultural production (per cent of total)	Population
United States and Canada	18.3	6.8
Australia and New Zealand	2.6	0.4
Latin America	8.8	6.8
Far East	32.0	51.9
Western Asia	2.3	2.8
Africa	6.6	8.5
Western Europe	14.6	11.0
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union	14.7	11.8
World total	100.0	100.0

From the point of view of relative "carrying capacity", it is clear that Asia is already at a heavy disadvantage compared with other major regions of the world. Since Asia also has a high and increasing rate of population growth, the problem of feeding the growing world population will be even more serious in the future.

PRESENT SITUATION

In many ECAFE countries, the average *per capita* supply of calories is below 2,000 per person per day, which is two-thirds or less of the *per capita* supply in most industrialized countries. However, the calorie deficiency is not so great as this simple comparison of the two groups of countries suggests. Owing to smaller stature and less body weight, the calorie needs of Asia's population are on the average smaller than those of the

populations of the western countries. The fact that a large proportion of Asians live in tropical and sub-tropical regions further reduces their calorie requirements. A comparison of the estimated supplies and minimum requirements, calculated in accordance with the recommendations of FAO,³ indicates calorie deficiencies of between 10 and 20 per cent for the few countries where data on supplies exist; it must at the same time be pointed out that estimates of supplies tend to be downward biased to some extent because of the omission of certain minor items consumed on the farm. Calculations of minimum requirements do not, on the other hand, make allowance for individual variability and are thus likely to underestimate actual needs. (Also calculations of minimum requirements—a physiological concept—are not very relevant to a discussion of the impact of population growth on the demand for food under conditions of economic growth and rising *per capita* income. This point is discussed below.)

Deficiencies in the nutritional composition of the Asian food supply are likely to be even more harmful than the inadequate supply of calories as such. This is because nutritional deficiencies appear to be relatively larger than calorie deficiencies and also because an inadequate supply of certain foods (especially certain kinds of protein) prevents the full utilization by the body of other nutrients. According to available data, the share of calories derived from foods rich in animal proteins (meat, eggs, fish and milk) amounts to considerably less than 10 per cent of the total calorie supply in the Far Eastern countries; in western European countries and in the overseas countries of European settlement the corresponding share is between 20 and 30 per cent, and well over 30 per cent, respectively.

In terms of absolute amounts of protein in their diet, Asian populations consume on a *per capita* basis only a little more than half as much as the populations in western Europe and in north America; in terms of animal proteins of high nutritive value (which are essential for a proper balance between the various amino acids that are required for the synthesis of cellular protein) their consumption is, on the average, less than one-fourth and one-sixth, respectively, of consumption in western Europe and north America. As indications of physiological protein deficiencies in Asian diets, these figures undoubtedly give a much exaggerated picture, since the level of protein intake, particularly of animal protein in north America, and in the livestock exporting countries in south America and Oceania, lies well above minimum requirements. Also it is often possible to obtain a better nutritional balance by supplementing the diet with foods which do not merely add a certain quantity of proteins, but also provide a more satisfactory amino acid pattern. Nevertheless, it is clear that protein deficiency, especially among children and adolescents, constitutes one of the serious problems in Asia's difficult food supply situation.

³ FAO, *Calorie Requirements*, Report of the Second Committee on Calorie Requirements, Rome, 1957.

¹ See e.g. Schultz, T.W., *The Economic Organization of Agriculture*, New York, 1953.

² United States Department of Agriculture, *Foreign Agriculture*, April 1958, p.14. Regional delimitations differ from those used elsewhere in this report, but there is no substantial difference between the ECAFE region and the area called the Far East in this calculation. The figures give an inaccurate indication of consumption in that they omit international trade. But an adjustment would not change the order of magnitude of the two sets of figures, and the relationship as far as Asia is concerned would hardly be affected.

In recent years, anxiety over the balance between food and population has grown. Although the rate of increase of agricultural production in recent years has been faster than the accelerating population growth, the increase has so far been insufficient to make up the lag that developed during the war. Consequently, *per capita* production is still below the prewar level,⁴ although, since the difference has in recent years been made up by imports, *per capita* net food supply has so far been maintained at or near the prewar level. What follows is an outline in broad perspective of some of the implications with regard to food requirements of a continuation of present population trends during the next quarter-century.

FUTURE DEMAND FOR FOOD

Population growth

Very large increases in the food supply of Asian countries are necessary, merely to feed the increasing population at the current deficit standards of consumption. We may take as examples, India, which has a relatively low rate of population growth, and Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya and the Philippines, which have very high but slightly differing rates of growth.⁵ If the current deficit (10 to 20 per cent of available supplies) is added to the increased requirements implied by population growth alone, in these four countries, the following conclusions emerge: under conditions of unchanged fertility, minimum calorie requirements would increase above present levels of food supply within a range of about 90 to 140 per cent over the period 1955-1980; with a considerable decline in fertility of 2 per cent per annum over the period 1960 to 1980 (in line with estimate IV in table 22), the increase would be reduced by 20 to 30 per cent. Thus, even under the most favourable conditions, it would still be necessary approximately to double present food supplies in the three countries with very high growth rates.

The age and sex structure of the population also affect food requirements, as children and adult men and women differ considerably in their need for both calories and nutrients. Changes in sex composition are likely to be of only minor consequence, except in a few areas where heavy male migration has occurred. But changes in the proportion of the population in the 0-14 years age group are likely to be of some importance in practically all areas for which projections have been made, as can be seen from table 21 above. However, even in countries like Ceylon and the Federation of Malaya, where such changes are relatively large, the maximum reduction in average calorie requirements in 1980 as compared with 1955 appears to be only 3 per cent. If the nutritional composition and calorie content of the diet were improved in the meantime, such "gains" might easily be outweighed by increased requirements owing to a larger average stature and body weight of the population as well as large protein requirements by children and adolescents.

⁴ *Per capita* food production in the region in 1956/57 was 95 per cent of the prewar level, as against 86 per cent on the average in 1948-1952.

⁵ See the estimates in table 23 above.

Effect of increase in per capita income on food demand

Economic development is usually conceived as a process which raises *per capita* income as well as total production. In economies where large portions of the population live at or near the subsistence level,⁶ the principal result of a *per capita* increase in income will most likely be an increased demand for food. In such countries, the income elasticity for food is likely to lie at or above 0.75, that is, an increase in income of one per cent will lead to an increase in food demand of 0.75 per cent, assuming the same price relationship between food and non-food consumption items. Certain sectors of the economy may have a higher level of *per capita* income, and consequently a lower income elasticity for food; other sectors may have an income elasticity of one or more. An average income elasticity of between 0.7 and 0.8 would not appear an exaggerated estimate for large areas of Asia and the Far East, considering the predominance of agriculture in the economy and the extremely low level of living.

Should it prove possible to maintain a high *per capita* increase in income—say, 3 to 5 per cent a year—for an extended period of time, income elasticities in the demand for food would undoubtedly decline fairly soon. Such high rates of growth have been experienced by some countries, but whether most of the countries of the EGAFF region will be able to achieve such rates and maintain them for a prolonged period is more doubtful. It would therefore seem prudent to illustrate with lower average rates of increase in *per capita* income.

The data in table 26 illustrate the impact on the demand for food, under alternative assumptions of population growth, of rates of increase of *per capita* income ranging from one to 3 per cent. Only two countries have been included: Ceylon, which has at present a very high rate of population growth, and India, whose rate of population growth is low compared with other Asian countries. The income elasticity of demand for food is assumed to average 0.5 for Ceylon and 0.8 for India. These figures are only rough guesses but are in line with the scanty data available on the subject.⁷ They are in any case only intended as an indication of the likely range of increase in over-all food demand in an economy on the borderline between the high food drain type (India) and the intermediate food drain type (Ceylon)⁸ under specified conditions of population growth.

⁶ High food drain economy in the terminology of Schultz, T.W., *The Economic Organization of Agriculture*, p.32.

⁷ Coale, A.J. and Hoover, E.M., *op.cit.*, p.125; India National Sample Survey, No.6, *Survey of Faridabad Township*, Calcutta, 1954; Ceylon, Central Bank of Ceylon, *Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances*, Colombo, 1954. The figure for Ceylon is probably an underestimate, but a relatively low figure was deliberately chosen in view of the fact that the main concern of the present discussion is with demand for food products at the farm level, which decreases relatively fast with rising levels of income, whereas demand for food, including processing and services added to the products, is relatively stable for a fairly wide range of income levels. Average *per capita* income is about 80 per cent higher in Ceylon than in India. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *The State of Food and Agriculture*, 1957, Rome 1957, p.77 ff. United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series E., No.4, *Per Capita National Product of Fifty-five Countries, 1952-1954*, New York, 1957.

⁸ Schultz, *op. cit.*

Table 26
PROJECTED INCREASE IN DEMAND FOR FOOD AS A RESULT
OF DIFFERENT RATES OF GROWTH OF PER CAPITA
INCOME AND POPULATION IN CEYLON AND
INDIA, 1955-1980 (PER CENT)

Annual increase in per capita income (per cent)	Population increase 1955-80 (per cent)	Constant fertility ^a		Declining fertility ^b	
		Ceylon ^c	India ^d	Ceylon ^c	India ^d
		112	78	86	59
1		142	118	112	95
2		180	169	146	141
3		228	234	188	198

^a Estimate II in table 23 above.

^b Estimate IV in table 23 above.

^c Income elasticity 0.5.

^d Income elasticity 0.8.

The composite nature of the figures in the table is indicated by the shift in the relative position of Ceylon and India at different levels of growth of *per capita* income; at lower levels of income increase, India is at a relative advantage owing to its lower population growth, but at higher levels of income increase, the position is reversed owing to India's assumed high income elasticity for food. These conclusions, of course, assume that the income elasticity of demand for food is not altered by the income growth.

These estimates indicate that an annual increase in *per capita* income of one per cent over the twenty-five-year period 1955-1980 (the equivalent of a total increase in *per capita* income of about 28 per cent) would raise the demand little more than enough to enable the population in Ceylon and India to meet the bare minimum standards of consumption given above.⁹

Urbanization

The rapid increase in urban population that characterizes most countries in Asia and the Far East makes special demands on food supply. Recent population growth in urban areas has in many instances been more than twice as high as the average for the country as a whole and it shows no sign of slackening; in fact it is tending to increase. This urban growth necessitates a much more rapid increase in the supply of marketable food than in total supplies, and it is this aspect of the food situation that often appears to be the most pressing for countries undergoing economic development.

A rise in *per capita* agricultural output in an economy dominated by subsistence agriculture, does not necessarily lead to an increase in the marketable food surplus on which the urban and non-agricultural population usually depends. Unless farm prices fall and make it necessary for the farmer to sell more in order to realize the same income, he may choose to retain increased output for his own consumption rather than secure a higher cash income for which he may have

⁹ An increase in *per capita* income of one per cent per annum would imply an increase of about 170 and 130 per cent respectively in Ceylon's and India's total national income, fertility remaining constant, and an increase of about 140 and 100 per cent, respectively, with fertility declining 40 per cent between 1960 and 1980. A three per cent annual increase in *per capita* income would require an increase in national income of more than 340 and 270 per cent, respectively, under the constant fertility assumption, and of about 290 and 230 per cent, respectively, given the assumed fertility decline.

little use, given his own modest needs and the very limited supply of manufactured goods in the market to which he has access. In longer periods, however, if farmers' income continues to increase and the standard of living continues to improve, the increased demand for, and supply of, non-farm products may help to increase the marketable food surplus; but it will only occur if the increase in food production is significantly greater than the increase in agricultural population.

As pointed out in a previous section, the percentage of the population living in urban areas is still relatively low. With the progress of economic development, which implies among other things a relative decline in the proportion of the population dependent on agriculture, a continued rapid or even accelerated growth of the urban population would seem inevitable. The data presented in table 27 show the expected growth of urban population between 1950¹⁰ and 1980 in a few selected Asian countries if it is assumed that urban growth rates are twice as high as those projected for the total population in the same period.

The assumption that past trends will continue is perhaps arbitrary, but it is based on the fact that the "push" effect on prospective urban migrants from an overcrowded countryside is usually as important as the "pull" effect of city life and is likely to become stronger the faster the population is increasing. This may be true even in a country with a relatively low average population density, since pressure occurs in certain parts of such countries also, and usually in those parts where the important urban centres are found. The large cities are thus often within relatively easy reach for the migrant, whereas migration to more distant rural frontier areas, which may from many points of view be more desirable, is likely to pose financial and other problems that cannot easily be tackled either by the individual or by his government.

Since the rate of urban population growth may be considered to depend partly on the degree of pressure towards urban migration which is exerted by the rate of rural population growth in over-crowded rural areas, a high rate of population growth is likely to entail a higher rate of urbanization and thus a greater demand for marketable food, than a low rate of population growth. For example, disregarding any other effect of urbanization on food demand than that implied by the increase in total numbers, the marketable food supply would have to be increased almost four-fold in India and more than six-fold in the Philippines under the "high" assumptions of population growth; on the lower assumptions, the corresponding increases in marketable supplies would need to be about 3 and 4.7 times present requirements.

In addition, urbanization tends to lead to changes in composition of diet, generally towards an improvement in nutritional value and a diversification because of a rise in income level, "demonstration effects" and improvements in food transportation and storage facilities.

Problems arise in securing a steady supply of marketable food as well as in satisfying the over-all demand in food markets. Large year-to-year fluctuations in the marketable food supply occur in countries where

¹⁰ Data on urban population in 1955 are not available.

Table 27
GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION, 1950-1980, IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, ASSUMING THAT URBAN POPULATION WILL INCREASE AT TWICE THE RATE OF PROJECTED GROWTH OF TOTAL POPULATION

	Urban population 1950 ^a		Assumed compound rate of increase 1950-1980	Urban population 1980 ^b		Per cent growth 1950-1980
	Total ('000)	Per cent		Total ('000)	Per cent	
						<i>Constant fertility^c</i>
Ceylon	860	11.4	6.1	5,081	26.7	491
Federation of Malaya	904	17.3	6.9	6,691	47.8	640
India	42,960	12.0	4.6	165,581	24.3	285
Philippines	2,523	12.7	6.4	16,224	31.9	543
						<i>Declining fertility^d</i>
Ceylon	860	11.4	5.0	3,717	23.0	332
Federation of Malaya	904	17.3	5.7	4,769	39.3	428
India	42,960	12.0	3.7	127,772	21.0	197
Philippines	2,523	12.7	5.3	11,879	26.8	371

^a Joint UN/UNESCO Seminar on Urbanization in the ECAFE Region, "Demographic Aspects of Urbanization in the ECAFE Region", E/CN.11/URB/9, Table III, page 8.

^b These figures may exaggerate the increase in urban population in countries where urban population is relatively large, for example, the Federation of Malaya. However, as an indication of the increase in the proportion of the population which is dependent on a marketable surplus of food for consumption, including non-agricultural workers in rural areas, the figures given, with the possible exception of the Federation of Malaya, are more likely to be under-estimates than over-estimates.

^c Estimate II in table 23 above.

^d Estimate IV in table 23 above.

subsistence farming predominates. Such fluctuations may make it necessary to establish special food reserves in order to ensure a stable food supply to urban and other deficit areas.¹¹

FUTURE SUPPLY OF FOOD

According to the figures given in table 26 for India and Ceylon, the supply of food will have to increase at a cumulative rate of about 3 per cent per year for 25 years to meet minimum requirements, even on the very modest assumption of an annual growth rate of one per cent in *per capita* income; a *per capita* rise in income of 2 and 3 per cent per annum would require simultaneous increases in food supply of the order of 4 and 5 per cent per annum respectively. With the exception of Japan, similar relationships would obtain in most other countries in Asia and the Far East. It is a common policy goal of these countries to reserve as high a proportion as possible of their foreign exchange earnings for imports of capital goods and raw materials, and consequently, as a minimum requirement, to prevent any increase in their dependence on imported food-stuffs; in most cases, therefore, the necessary increase in food supply will have to be achieved by an expansion in domestic agricultural production at least proportionate to the demand increase.

Judging from past trends of agricultural production in the region, the prospects for a very rapid increase in food production appear rather slender. With a few notable exceptions,¹² agricultural production, of which food production constitutes four-fifths or more, has made but slow progress during the postwar period, and *per capita* production for the region as a whole still remains at a lower level than during the prewar period. Furthermore, the stagnation of agricultural productivity in many countries is not confined to the postwar period but stretches over several decades.¹³

¹¹ See FAO, *National Food Reserve Policies in Under-developed Countries*, FAO Commodity Policy Studies, No. 11, Rome, 1958.

¹² Ceylon, the Philippines, Thailand.

¹³ "Population and Food Supplies in Asia and the Far East," United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, Vol.VII, No.1, pp.4-5.

The experience of other parts of the world shows that sudden spurts in agricultural production are possible although in the long run the rate of increase in output has tended to be considerably slower than the prospective increase in demand for food in Asia and the Far East. Agricultural productivity in many western European countries rose rapidly towards the end of the last and the beginning of the present century as a result of rationalization and the application of new knowledge; production increases were of the order of 2 per cent per annum, leading to a doubling of output within fifty to sixty years. Under conditions more like those at present prevailing in most Asian countries, Japanese agricultural productivity, in the decade 1911-1920, was more than 75 per cent higher than in the decade 1881-1890.¹⁴ In subsequent years, productivity gains in both these geographic areas have been rather slow, as a more intensive application of hitherto developed production techniques is yielding decreasing returns.

Much more recent trends in Mexico offer an interesting and encouraging example of the possibilities of an accelerated expansion of agricultural production through the application of ready-made techniques that have already been tested and refined elsewhere. In Mexico, food production has increased at a rate of almost 4 per cent per annum over the past two decades as a result of a well planned development programme and considerable capital investments. This represents, as far as is known, the highest sustained rate of increase in agricultural production that has yet been achieved.¹⁵

An appraisal of specific potentialities would be beyond the scope of the present study. The discussion will therefore of necessity be in very general terms. Also, for the sake of simplicity, the problem of food production will be treated as synonymous with that of agricultural production, although demand for food and for agricultural raw materials may not necessarily expand at the same rate.

¹⁴ Johnston, B.F., "Agricultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol.LIX, No.6, December 1951, p.499.

¹⁵ Brown, H., Bonner, J., and Weir, J., *The Next Hundred Years*, London, 1957, p.64.

Present state of food production

Although the yields of a number of important crops have been increasing steadily in most countries of the ECAFE region,¹⁶ they are still rather low compared, for instance, with the northern and central European levels. There are, moreover, a number of countries where the yields have increased only very little, if at all, over the last decade.

The main factors accounting for the low productivity and, especially in the past, slow increase or stagnation of production, are well known. Pressure of population has led to excessive fragmentation and small average size of holdings in many countries. The amount of arable land *per capita* of total population in the ECAFE region—a quarter of a hectare—is only about half of the world average and the ratio between the area of arable land and the population engaged in agriculture is relatively even smaller. Such crowding is a serious obstacle to higher productivity per worker, and thus to higher income levels.

The inefficient production techniques followed in most countries of the region are partly caused by the prevailing low income levels, as a result of which the cultivators cannot afford to use new or improved agricultural methods or requisites (fertilizers, pure strain seeds, tools), and little capital can be formed for basic improvements. Even more important reasons, especially in the past, have been insecurity of tenure, indebtedness, low level of education, lack of organization, and insufficient interest by governments in the problems of cultivators. As a result, the cultivators of the ECAFE region—like those working under similar conditions in other parts of the world—have tended to be wary of attempting new methods and new crops until the value of such innovations has been conclusively proved to them by means of demonstration in the village and until the institutional framework of agricultural production and its related activities has been improved.

Potential increase in traditional agricultural production

The rather low level of productivity of Asian agriculture may, however, mean that even relatively modest expenditures for the improvement of production techniques promise considerable increases in both production and productivity.

Traditional food output can be increased either through an extension of the area under cultivation or through a more intensive utilization of land already in use. The relative advantage of these alternatives varies with local conditions; frequently a combination of both methods is found to be the necessary, or certainly the most advantageous, approach. The general characteristics of Asian agriculture do, however, suggest some order of priorities between different measures. The urgency of the food problem, and the mere fact that the majority of the population tends to be engaged in subsistence farming, indicates the desirability of giving primary attention to means of increasing yields on land already

under cultivation, as this would appear to be the only way of improving conditions in general.¹⁷ It also appears to be the faster method of increasing production at a relatively low cost. As the Japanese example shows, small-size holdings¹⁸ need not be an obstacle to high yields per unit of land. The costs of intensifying agricultural extension work and improving the institutional framework of agricultural production—forms of tenure, marketing, credit etc.—which would be required in order to increase the yields are likely to be relatively low compared with those of bringing new land into cultivation or under irrigation.¹⁹

The scope for an extension of the cultivated area, either through resettlement or through irrigation, is often also limited by lack of additional cultivable land or by insufficient water resources. (There are important exceptions; much unused but cultivable land exists, for example, in Southeast Asia, especially in Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.) Furthermore, land reclamation and irrigation will not dispense with the supplemental need for fertilizers, good quality seeds and the like.

Any kind of agricultural development will be affected by changes in the size and composition of the population. So far, the problem of food production in Asia and the Far East has here been considered without special reference to demographic conditions other than that agriculture in general is characterized by overcrowding, and that present rates of population growth will require a very rapid expansion in agricultural production.

The following comments can be made on the relation of demographic conditions to potentialities for increased food production: the faster the population grows, the more difficult will it be to assure the necessary investment funds for an equivalent increase in agricultural production, and capital is one of the main limiting factors to economic growth in Asian countries. Furthermore, the cumulative nature of changes in population size following from a continued high rate of fertility will increase pressure on effective food supplies unless there is a considerably greater acceleration in such supplies than is at present foreseeable. This is because the already very large growth potential of the population will go on rising for as long as present trends of mortality and fertility persist. Even if fertility should decline soon, the problem of providing a rapidly growing population with an adequate diet is most unlikely to have been solved by 1980, the year to which the projections of populations have been extended. Population growth may by that time have fallen sufficiently to bring constant numbers within sight, but it is not likely to have ceased, and it may well present problems of food supply more formidable than the ones the region is now facing. According to projections for the major regions of the world, up to the year 2000, the population of the ECAFE countries will increase within a range of 30 to 70 per cent from 1980 to 2000, compared with a range

¹⁷ Even where large-scale resettlement schemes are contemplated, they are only intended to affect a minority of the farming population.

¹⁸ Typically 2 to 3 acres.

¹⁹ It should, however, be remembered that insufficient water supply is often a major cause of low and fluctuating productivity and that this can often only be remedied by costly, large-scale irrigation projects.

¹⁶ For instance, the yield of paddy rose between 1948 or 1949 and 1956 or 1957 from about 13 quintals to about 15 quintals per hectare in Burma, from less than 20 to over 30 quintals in China (Taiwan), from 11.6 to 13.4 quintals in India, from 15.8 to 18 quintals in Indonesia, from 40 to 48 quintals in Japan, from 12 to 15 quintals in Ceylon, and from 15 to 21 quintals in the Federation of Malaya.

of about 40 to 60 per cent for the period 1955 to 1980. In absolute numbers, the difference between the "high" and the "low" assumptions amounts to about 1,000 million persons for the ECAFE region as a whole for the period 1980-2000.²⁰ Additional increases in food production are likely to become increasingly costly and difficult to achieve, as extensive modern production techniques become widely applied, and as the declining quantity of utilizable water and soil resources is exploited; the advantages of an early stabilization of population size in Asia and the Far East can therefore easily be appreciated.

New foods and techniques

Recently, a considerable amount of research has been devoted to developing new kinds of food. These include yeasts with a high protein content and certain types of algae which also are rich in protein. Such foods would be a valuable addition to the Asian diet, but it is doubtful how soon their production will be economically feasible or how long it would take to persuade people to eat them.²¹ The production of food through chemical synthesis does not appear likely to be of great significance for the supply of food in bulk, although as a means of providing vitamins and other supplements to the diet it is already of practical importance. A probably more distant, though dramatic possibility is that, as the demand for increased food production becomes more pressing, and marginal costs increase, it might conceivably become economical to purify ocean water for irrigation purposes.

Mention may also be made of the possibility of increasing the supply of calories available for human consumption by reducing the production of animal foods, and by substituting crops with a higher calorie efficiency for present crops. Particularly the former measure could provide a considerable additional food supply in many parts of the world but would only be possible to a very limited extent in Asia and would not be a desirable development considering existing protein deficiencies.

DEMAND VERSUS SUPPLY

From the projections discussed above, it seems certain that the food requirement of most ECAFE countries will at least double or treble within the foreseeable future. If Asian agriculture adopted the modernized techniques used in some other parts of the world, food production in most of the countries could probably be made to keep pace with this upsurge in demand for food. In addition, research and technological advancement may make it possible to cultivate land which has been hitherto considered uncultivable.

A more precise estimate of the population that might potentially be supported in the various countries of the ECAFE region would in the first place require a wealth of unavailable information on soil, climatic and other natural conditions as well as on investment requirements and suitable production techniques. It would furthermore depend on the type of diet considered desirable and on the specific characteristics of the different populations. But on the assumption that

average land productivity in Asia could be raised to Japanese levels, that calorie supplies were increased to 2,500 per person per day and the present low-protein type of diet maintained, many countries could still support a population two or three times as big as their present population. Assumptions, on the other hand, of calorie supplies at the same level as in, say, the western European countries and a diet of a high animal protein content would imply that many countries, even at the very high Japanese levels of land productivity, could support fewer people than their present populations. Some further increases in the food supply might be derived from an extension of the area under cultivation, which one rather widely accepted estimate puts at 30 per cent of the area at present cultivated,²² but this would not basically change the picture sketched above.

All these calculations indicate the need to bring the present divergent trends in mortality and fertility into a closer balance within a not very distant future. The scope for expanded food production through the application of known techniques is considerable, but limited. New techniques might change the prospects for an expanded food supply, but the role to be played by entirely new types of food or new methods of production still remains a matter of conjecture; it appears almost certain that the cost of production would be very much higher than for traditional food production. Equally serious problems are likely to arise in connexion with the mobilization of the human effort necessary to realize the production increases that are technically possible.

The future developments are largely unpredictable, yet it is hoped that the above analysis, however tentative, will draw attention to what appear to be the central issues and provide a framework for the formulation of relevant policies.

2. Capital requirements

A growing population calls for a growing amount of capital, to provide employment for the additional labour force and to produce the consumer goods for the additional consumers. Lack of capital may limit both an increase in employment and an increase in output per worker, and hence, *per capita* income.

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT

From the point of view of employment, the capital requirement depends not only on the number of jobs to be provided, but also on the nature and productiveness of the jobs. Taking a broad average, however, Spengler in 1951 postulated \$1,500 as the capital required per worker for under-developed countries,²³ and an expert group appointed by the United Nations estimated, also in 1951, that \$2,500 was the capital required for each person absorbed into non-agricultural employment, including the cost of industrial research and training.²⁴ On the basis of the 1954 census of manufactures in India, total fixed and working capital per worker in 29 industries (covering factories employing 20 or more workers on any day and using power) is shown to range from Rs. 2,560 in jute textiles to Rs.18,800 in chemicals,

²² Salter, R.M., "World Soil and Fertilizer Resources in Relation to Food Needs", *Science*, May 23, 1947, pp.533-538.

²³ Spengler, J., "Economic Factors in the Development of Densely Populated Areas", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol.95, No.1, February 1951.

²⁴ United Nations, *Measures for Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*, 1951, p.77.

²⁰ United Nations, *Population Studies*, No.28, *The Future Growth of World Population*, New York, 1958, p.69 ff.

²¹ See, for example, Meier, R.L., *Science and Economic Development*, New York, 1956, and Brown, H., Bonner, J., and Weir, J., *op.cit.*, pp.76-77.

and the average for all 29 industries to be Rs.5,100 (equivalent to \$1,100). These figures are probably on the low side, because some of the capital equipment acquired in earlier years may not be replaceable at the original cost. Data gathered for eleven countries by Mandelbaum and Colin Clark show that the capital required per occupied person in manufacturing industry varies between countries and between industries.²⁵ Capital employed per worker in agriculture in different countries may well vary even more than in manufactures.

Thus, capital required per worker depends on the pattern of industries and the method of production. To the extent that there is a certain freedom of choice in both respects, there is some flexibility in the capital requirement per worker. This may make the situation easier for countries where capital is scarce. However, there is a limit to possible reductions in the capital needed per worker. At least a minimum of certain basic facilities requiring large capital per worker, such as railways and electricity, is essential for general economic development. Certain types of labour-intensive methods of production may moreover rule out the chance of maximizing output and income. It follows that the highest short-term level of employment may not always be compatible with the maximum long-term rate of growth. In addition, the industrial pattern or the direction of development may need to take into account such considerations as balanced development, diversification and foreign exchange earnings or savings, which may not always be compatible with maximizing employment in relation to a given amount of capital.

Some further light is thrown on the average capital requirement per worker, including both fixed and working capital, by the provisions of some of the more fully elaborated development programmes, covering all economic activities. The evidence admittedly is not complete. The plans of some countries of the region have estimated only the investment in the public sector, and the increase of employment directly related to it. Others, though including investment in the private sector as well, have not included an estimate of additional private employment. Even where total investment and total increase of employment are both given, there is no way of separating that portion of investment which is intended to increase the productivity of labour already employed (e.g. the cost of power looms designed to replace hand looms, of improved farm equipment, even to a larger extent of irrigation projects) from the investment which is solely designed to equip additional workers. However, investment in most development plans mainly creates new employment, and the increase in *per capita* income from these plans is, except in the field of agriculture, mainly the result of greater-than-average productivity in newly established industries or establishments and of higher levels of employment.

²⁵ For example, capital per occupied person in the chemical industries ranges from £373 in Hungary (1937) to £5,430 in the United States (1939). Even in the textile industry, which is more homogeneous, it ranges from £123 in Brazil (1945) to £813 in Canada (1936). In the United States, capital per occupied person ranges from £435 in textiles and clothing to £5,430 in chemicals. For the average of all manufacturing industries, it ranges from £192 in Hungary (1937) to £1,250 in the United States. For electric light and power, it ranges from £1,740 in India (1938-1939) to £6,250 in Denmark (1928). See Mandelbaum, K., *Industrialization of Backward Areas*, Oxford Institute of Statistics, monograph No.2, p.59; Clark, C., *Conditions of Economic Progress*, third edition, 1957, pp. 582-583. The range would be wider if handicrafts were included.

The amounts of capital per worker recorded for Indian industries and those given by Mandelbaum and by Colin Clark, already cited, were calculated as amounts required to employ a worker in the respective industries, considered as going concerns. But, in the process of economic development, an increase in employment arises also from activities in constructing the various industries, as well as in operating them—although in the latter case the employment will be maintained year after year following an initial investment (assuming normal maintenance), while in the former case, continuous investment is required to provide continuous jobs. In the six-year programme of investment of Ceylon, constructional employment was given separately from operational employment. The following shows “the estimated numbers that would be employed during the period on the operation or working of the various ministry projects included in the Six-Year Programme”²⁶—

	Persons
Increase in constructional employment	41,901
Increase in operational employment ..	94,895
Colonization and settlement, 43,030 families, assuming 1.5 persons in each family employed	64,540
	200,000 ²⁷

Since total “investment” of the ministry projects in six years, excluding defence and acquisition of land, was estimated at Rs.2,300 million,²⁸ the capital required per worker directly engaged in the work equals about Rs.11,500 or \$2,415. This figure must not be regarded as applicable to the economy as a whole. It was limited to government investment in various specific fields, and some of the employment, such as that in colonization and settlement, might require a certain amount of private capital to supplement the government’s investment. However, as the government investment was to be mainly limited to those fields requiring more-than-average capital per worker, an over-all average of capital requirement per worker, including the induced private investment, would have been substantially lower.

Joan Robinson envisaged in a hypothetical development programme for Ceylon, aiming at full employment by the tenth year, a total investment of Rs. 13,000 million, accompanied by an increase of employment of 1.5 million persons. This implies that Rs. 8,700 or \$1,800 are required per worker.²⁹

The planning Commission of India estimated “the additional employment likely to be generated by the second five-year plan” at about 8 million.³⁰ With total investment in five years, in the public and private sectors combined, estimated at Rs.62,000 million,³¹ the proposed

²⁶ Planning Secretariat, Government of Ceylon, *Six-Year Programme of Investment, 1954/55 to 1959/60*, Colombo, 1955, pp.38-39. Although a new plan is being drawn up to replace the six-year programme quoted here, the figures may nevertheless illustrate the thinking of the planners in preparing this programme.

²⁷ The total does not include 100,000 families to be settled under the Village Expansion Scheme, or the indirect impact of the programme on employment, which may require additional private capital.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.41.

²⁹ Robinson, J., “Economic Possibilities of Ceylon, A memorandum presented to the National Planning Council” (mimeographed).

³⁰ Government of India, Planning Commission, *Second Five-Year Plan*, 1956, p.115.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.92.

investment per additional worker employed comes to Rs.7,750, or \$1,600. It was, however, estimated that, if the allied schemes of, for example, land reclamation by manual labour and the effect of irrigation on employment were to be included, rural employment might be further increased by about 1.6 million. This would bring down investment per additional worker to Rs.6,500 or \$1,400.³²

The five-year development programme of the Philippines for the fiscal years 1957-1961 aimed at a total investment in the public and private sectors of P5,200 million, which was expected to generate, directly and indirectly, a total of 1.5 million jobs in five years.³³ This works out at P3,470 per worker, which is equivalent to \$1,730 at the official rate of exchange. If overvaluation of the peso is taken into account, the figure in dollars will be somewhat reduced.

Investment and increase of employment are given, by industry (with the exception of agriculture), in the second four-year plan for Taiwan, China. Investment per worker here ranges from NT\$17,450 (US\$520) in coal mining to NT\$1,628,000 (US\$4,800) in the petroleum industry and NT\$1,787,000 (US\$5,260) in electricity. For the planned development of all industries, excluding agricultural cultivation and handicrafts, investment per worker is put at NT\$134,000 or US\$3,900.³⁴ The exclusions, and the exclusion from the employment figures of the workers required to construct the various facilities, help to explain why the requirement appears so large. If all investment, public and private, and employment in all fields were included, the difference between the capital requirement per worker in Taiwan on the one hand and that in India and the Philippines on the other would be considerably reduced. However, there are also real reasons why the figure should be higher in Taiwan than in other parts of the region with the exception of Japan. The land is already intensively cultivated so that, to increase agricultural employment further, it is generally necessary to apply costly methods such as artificial irrigation.

Total government expenditure on capital construction in mainland China during the first five-year plan period (1952-1957) was reported at 42,740 million yuan, and the increase in the number of employees at 4.2 million.³⁵ In other words, 10,000 yuan (\$4,200 at the official rate of exchange) of capital was invested per new employee. Investment in capital construction in the second five-year plan period (1958-1962) is estimated at 85,480 million yuan, which is expected to increase the number employed by 6.7 million, giving 13,000 yuan (\$5,500) per employee. These figures are higher than those for other countries because of the emphasis on heavy industry and of the exclusion of self-employed workers, especially in the agricultural sector.

³² *Ibid.*, p.118.

³³ *The Five-Year Economic and Social Development Programme for FY 1957-1961*, p.17.

³⁴ Economic Stabilization Board, Executive Yuan, the Republic of China, *The Second Four-Year Plan of Economic Development in Taiwan*, May, 1957 (in Chinese). Figures are here converted into US dollars at the preferential exchange rate of NT\$34 per dollar established for local expenditures of foreign personnel at the time when the plan was released. Increase of employment in agricultural cultivation is not given in the plan. Employment in handicrafts, given in the plan, probably do not relate to full-time employment; however, if investment and employment in handicrafts are included, at face value, the figures will be NT\$97,800 or US\$2,900.

³⁵ United Nations, *Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East*, 1957, p.90, table 42.

Japan's five-year plan for 1958-1962, published in 1957, did not give total investment in the planned period. On the basis of the information given for the previous draft plan for 1957-1961, the ratio between gross capital formation and the increase in gainfully employed persons gives a figure of about ¥2,157,000, or \$6,000 per person.³⁶ This is very high, and certainly few other Asian countries would find it possible, or economical.

All figures on investment and employment in development plans are rough approximation. They represent only the estimates of the planners, based on the rate of development desired and considered possible. The employment figures are liable, generally speaking, to have a larger margin of error than those for investment. For working purposes, \$1,500 will here be taken as the amount of capital per additional worker required for a more balanced development in Asian countries other than Japan. This will make new employment considerably more productive than the existing employment, on the average, and will include some expenditure to secure a moderate increase in the productivity of people already at work.

Given the capital requirement for each additional worker, the total capital needed to provide employment to the new entrants into the labour force and to the unemployed depends on the rate of population growth, the change in sex and age distribution, the extent of existing unemployment and the rate at which it is desired to reduce unemployment.³⁷

Needless to say, the larger the rate of population growth, the larger the capital required each year to give work to the increasing labour force. In all countries in the region with the exception of Japan, the proportion of the population in the most productive age groups will decline in the next few decades, according to the projections shown in table 20. From the point of view of creating employment alone, the capital required for such a population will thus tend to increase more slowly than the rate of population increase. However, with more dependents for each worker to support, productivity of labour will have to increase just to maintain the same *per capita* income. Hence, other things being equal, the capital requirement per worker will also increase.

Unemployment and underemployment, besides reducing *per capita* income and creating social difficulties, contribute yet another problem. Capital is required to provide employment, not only to the new entrants into the labour force, but also to the previously unemployed and underemployed. If fuller utilization of the labour force is achieved, it will reduce the pressure of having a growing number of dependents to be supported by each person of working age.

With a rapid increase of population in the presence of substantial unemployment and underemployment, the capital required to give full employment to the growing

³⁶ Material supplied to the ECAFE secretariat in 1956 shows that total expected gross national expenditure in the plan period 1956-1960 is ¥44,016,500, the rate of gross capital formation is 24.7 per cent, and the increase in gainful employment is 5,040,000 persons. The ratio is calculated from these magnitudes.

³⁷ Or to reduce underemployment—figuring one underemployed person as some fraction of one totally unemployed person.

labour force, improve productivity and provide basic facilities is likely to be very large in relation to national income. Applying the assumed per worker capital requirement of \$1,500 to the estimated recent net annual increase in the labour force in the countries of the region other than Japan, which comes to about 9 million persons,³⁸ the annual capital requirement for the region amounts to \$13,500 million, equivalent to about 14 per cent of the aggregate national income of these countries,³⁹ or almost \$10 *per capita*. This makes only minor provision, however, for improving the employment situation of the existing labour force.

None of the ECAFE countries has included full employment as an immediate objective in its economic development plans. Full employment is a long-term objective in India, but the estimated additional full-time jobs to be created under the second five-year plan is only 80 per cent of new entrants to the labour force, not to speak of the backlog of unemployed, which, at the beginning of the plan period, is estimated at 50 per cent of the new labour force for these five years. Even if employment in rural areas from allied schemes of land reclamation etc. is included, enough jobs are not expected to be created to eliminate the backlog of unemployed. In Japan, the full employment objective specified in the original plan has been abandoned in the revised plan. If full employment were actually made the chief objective to be attained in the immediate future, many of the development plans would have to be radically revised, either to increase the capital from any and all possible sources, or to favour labour-intensive projects by dispersing the limited available capital over a larger number of workers, or both. With investment and labour force well organized and well directed, such dispersion might hasten the immediate increase of national income. But certain basic facilities might have to be sacrificed, which would hamper long-term development. Moreover, in view of the limited amount of investment resources available, disguised unemployment might increase while visible unemployment declined. In actual development plans, therefore, there always has to be a compromise between different objectives, and capital requirements cannot be determined solely by employment considerations.

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND INCREASE OF INCOME

An increase in income is always one of the chief objectives in development plans. Most governments evidently attach a higher priority to it than to full employment. Given the state of technology in the broad sense, the rate of increase of national income depends on the rate of investment and the rate of increase of employment. The actual relation depends on the pro-

duction functions in the country in question.⁴⁰ In the ECAFE region, since capital is a major limiting factor of production and labour is generally in plentiful supply, income may for present purposes be directly related to investment, thus embodying differences in techniques and in factor proportions as elements in the incremental capital-output ratio.⁴¹ This is particularly convenient because, although national income and capital formation have been estimated in a number of the countries of the region, employment and unemployment statistics are generally unavailable or inadequate.

By varying the capital-output ratio to take care of variations in labour input and other factors, the capital requirement may be expressed in terms of the rate of population growth, the desired rate of increase of *per capita* income and the incremental capital-output ratio.⁴²

Table 28 illustrates the problem in quantitative terms. It gives the capital requirement, stated as a percentage of national income, on various assumptions as to three factors—the rate of population growth, the desired rate of growth of *per capita* income and the incremental capital-output ratio.

The hypothetical cases in table 28 may be compared with the actual experience of ECAFE countries in the last five years for which statistics are available, and with

⁴⁰ In the article "Growth Models for Illustrating the Effects of Alternative Investment and Employment Policies", *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, Vol. IX, No. 1, June 1958, the Cobb-Douglas production function, with varying proportions of labour and capital inputs, has been applied in order to project income and related magnitudes, on various assumptions.

⁴¹ It should be noted that the capital-output ratio thus reflects, among other things, the important differences in productivity resulting from differences in the relation between existing population and available, utilized resources—or, roughly speaking, the existing population pressure.

⁴² If the rate of population growth is expressed by p , the desired rate of increase of *per capita* income by y , the incremental capital-output ratio by R , the annual capital requirement as a ratio of national income, k , may be expressed by the following formula:

$$k = R [(1 + p) (1 + y) - 1] = R (p + y) + Ryp$$

For simplicity, Ryp is omitted from the formula in the calculation of the capital requirements as presented in table 28. The difference is insignificant for practical purposes when y and p are both small.

Capital requirements for the formula may be in terms of either net or gross investment, and may include or exclude capital-like (current) expenditures on health, education, training etc. which may help to improve labour productivity. Because depreciation and cost of maintenance of existing assets have no direct relation to current capital formation and the annual increase of income, and because capital-like expenditures have, in most cases, a longer time-lag, with varying effects on income, net capital formation usually has a more stable relationship to income than gross capital formation and capital-like expenditures have. (For example, in an economic downswing, net capital formation may be negative when income decreases but gross capital formation may still be positive; and the effect of education on productivity may take many years to materialize.)

Statistics on net capital formation are available in the national accounts in a number of countries, but some development plans have estimated gross investment only and some have included capital-like expenditures in the planned investment figures. Needless to say, if gross capital formation or investment including capital-like expenditures is used, the capital-output ratio will be larger than when net capital formation is employed.

The capital-output ratio itself is not a sharply defined concept. It depends on the gestation period, which varies according to the type of investment, and the utilization of the equipment. In the present paper, capital formation in a given year is compared with the increase of income in the following year.

³⁸ Rough estimate based on the difference between the projected population at 15-59 age groups in 1960 and that in 1955, assuming all males and one-half of the females in the region in these age groups are in the labour force.

³⁹ By applying an average *per capita* income figure of \$65 (as given in footnote 50 below) to an estimated population of 1,460 million, a total income of about \$95,000 million is derived for the region as a whole. This, of course, is only a rough approximation.

Table 28

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A GIVEN ANNUAL RATE OF INCREASE OF PER CAPITA INCOME

(% of national income)

Percentage increase of per capita income	Incremental capital-output ratio								
	0.5	1	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4	4.5
(a) If population increases by 0% per annum									
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	0.5	1	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4	4.5
2	1.0	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
3	1.5	3	4.5	6	7.5	9	10.5	12	13.5
4	2.0	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18
5	2.5	5	7.5	10	12.5	15	17.5	20	22.5
(b) If population increases by 1% per annum									
0	0.5	1	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4	4.5
1	1.0	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
2	1.5	3	4.5	6	7.5	9	10.5	12	13.5
3	2.0	4	6	8	10	12	14	16	18
4	2.5	5	7.5	10	12.5	15	17.5	20	22.5
5	3.0	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27
6	3.5	7	10.5	14	17.5	21	24.5	28	31.5
(c) If population increases by 1.5% per annum									
0	0.75	1.5	2.25	3	3.75	4.5	5.25	6	6.75
1	1.25	2.5	3.75	5	6.25	7.5	8.75	10	11.25
2	1.75	3.5	5.25	7	8.75	10.5	12.25	14	15.75
3	2.25	4.5	6.75 (l)	9	11.25	13.5	15.75	18	20.25
4	2.75	5.5	8.25	11	13.75 (b)	16.5	19.25	22	24.75
5	3.25	6.5	9.75	13	16.25	19.5	22.75	26	29.25
(d) If population increases by 2% per annum									
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	1.5	3	4.5	6 (s)	7.5	9	10.5	12	13.5
2	2	4	6	8	10 (a)	12	14	16	18
3	2.5	5	7.5	10 (i)	12.5	15	17.5	20	22.5
4	3	6	9	12	15 (M)	18	21	24	27
5	3.5	7	10.5	14	17.5	21	24.5	28	31.5
(e) If population increases by 2.5% per annum									
0	1.25	2.5	3.75	5	6.25	7.5	8.75	10	11.25
1	1.75	3.5	5.25	7	8.75	10.5	12.25	14	15.75
2	2.25	4.5	6.75	9	11.25	13.5	15.75	18	20.25
3	2.75 (p)	5.5	8.25	11	13.75 (T)	16.5	19.25	22	24.75
4	3.25	6.5	9.75	13	16.25	19.5	22.75	26	29.25
5	3.75	7.5	11.25	15	18.75	22.5	26.25	30	33.75
(f) If population increases by 3% per annum									
0	1.5	3	4.5	6	7.5	9	10.5	12	13.5
1	2.0	4	6	8	10 (c)	12	14	16	18
2	2.5	5	7.5 (p)	10	12.5	15	17.5	20	22.5
3	3.0	6	9	12	15	18	21	24	27
4	3.5	7	10.5	14	17.5 (c)	21	24.5	28	31.5
5	4.0	8	12	16	20	24	28	32	36
(g) If population increases by 3.5% per annum									
0	1.75	3.5	5.25	7	8.75	10.5	12.25	14	15.75
1	2.25	4.5	6.75	9	11.25	13.5	15.75	18	20.25
2	2.75	5.5	8.25	11	13.75	16.5	19.25	22	24.75
3	3.25	6.5	9.75 (w)	13	16.25	19.5	22.75	26	29.25
4	3.75	7.5	11.25 (w)	15	18.75	22.5	26.25	30	33.75
5	4.25	8.5	12.75	17	21.25	25.5	29.75	34	38.25

Symbols for countries: A, Pakistan; B, Burma; C, Ceylon; I, India; J, Japan; M, mainland China; P, Philippines; S, Indonesia; T, Thailand; W, China (Taiwan). Capital letters for last five years, small letters for the current development plans. For Ceylon, (c₁) for illustrative model in six-year programme, (c₂) for J. Robinson's ten-year model. For Pakistan, gross capital formation. In the case of the Philippines, the recent rate of capital formation, shown by the location of P, appears to have been underestimated.

the latest development plans.⁴³ Table 29 gives the annual rate of increase of net domestic product and *per capita* income. Because of the apparent inaccuracy of the population statistics in several countries, the rate of increase of *per capita* income at constant prices has been calculated both on the basis of official population estimates and on the basis of the natural rates of population increase estimated by the United Nations.⁴⁴ The experience of the last five years shows that the rate of increase of *per capita* income was the highest in Japan, 5.9 per cent a year, where population increased at 1.2 per cent a year. In a comparison of the rate of increase of income with investment, gains or losses from the change in the terms of trade should be excluded from income; this has been done for those countries where the variation in the terms of trade is large.⁴⁵ The rate of population growth and the rate of increase of *per capita* income may be kept in mind when examining table 30, which gives the rate of capital formation and the incremental capital-output ratio for a few countries where such statistics are available.

The importance of the rate of increase of population may be illustrated by an examination of the actual cases of Japan and China (Taiwan), where the rates of increase of population represent two extremes. In Japan, in the period 1952-1957, net capital formation was nearly 25 per cent of national income, and national income was increasing at an average rate of 7 per cent a year, implying a capital-output ratio of 3.4. With a population increasing at 1.2 per cent a year, *per capita* income was increasing at 5.9 per cent a year, indicating rapid growth. However, the rate of increase of population during this period was falling. The five-year plan (1956/57-1960/61) therefore assumed an annual increase of population of 0.8 per cent, but envisaged about the same rate of capital formation as before. Since the rapid rate of economic growth in the recent past has been due to specially favourable conditions which may not be repeated in this five-year plan period, national income is expected to increase at 5.8 per cent a year, implying a capital-output ratio of 4.3. Consequently, *per capita* income will be expected to increase at 5 per cent a year. Were Japan's population increasing at 3.5 per cent a year as in Taiwan, the planned rate of capital formation and capital output ratio would, on the basis of table 28, result in an increase of *per capita* income of only slightly over 2 per cent a year. For an increase of *per capita* income of 5 per cent a year, as is planned in Japan, capital formation would have to be raised to 37 per cent of national income, which is clearly impracticable. Alternatively, the capital-output ratio might be reduced to about 3, implying a redistribution of the available capital resources over a larger number of workers on account of the larger rate of increase of population. It is probable that, were the rate of popula-

⁴³ Because of inadequacies in basic data and differences in methods used in estimating national income and capital formation, figures given in tables 29 and 30 may not always be comparable between countries. The quality and reliability of these statistics also vary greatly.

⁴⁴ Except in the case of India. (See table 18, footnote).

⁴⁵ For other countries, in which the significance of this element is slight, income at constant prices as estimated by governments has been taken.

Table 29
RATE OF INCREASE OF PER CAPITA INCOME AT CONSTANT PRICE

		Annual rate of increase of net domestic product at constant price	Annual rate of increase of population		Annual rate of increase of per capita income	
			Official statistics ^a (A)	Estimated natural rate ^b (B)	Based on (A)	Based on (B)
Burma	1950/51-1955/56					
	Excluding gains from trade ^c	5.4	1.4	1.4	4.0	4.0
	Including gains from trade ^c	7.6			6.3	6.1
	Plan, 1956/57-1958/59	6.4	1.6	1.6	4.8	4.7
Ceylon	Illustrative model in six-year programme, 1954/55-1959/60	3.9	2.8	2.8	1.1	1.1
	J. Robinson's ten-year model	6.0	3.3	2.8	2.7	3.2
China:						
Mainland	1952-1956	7.1	2.2	...	4.8	...
	Plan, 1957-1961	8.6	2.2	...	6.3	...
Taiwan	1952-1957	7.4	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.7
	Plan, 1957-1960	7.4	3.7	3.4	3.6	3.9
India	1951/52-1956/57	3.8	1.3	1.5	2.5	2.3
	Plan, 1956/57-1960/61	4.5	1.2	1.9	3.3	2.5
	1971/72-1976/77	4.7	1.5	2.4	3.2	2.2
Indonesia	Plan, 1956-1960	3	1.7	2.0	1.3	1.0
	1975	5	2.0	2.1	2.9	2.8
Japan	1952-1957	7.2	1.2	1.2	5.9	5.9
	Plan, 1956/57-1960/61	5.8	0.8	0.8	5.0	5.0
Pakistan	1951/52-1956/57					
	Excluding gains from trade ^c	3.6	1.6	2.0	1.9	1.6
	Including gains from trade ^c	2.6			1.0	0.6
	Plan, 1955/56-1959/60	3.7	1.4	2.0	2.3	1.7
Philippines	1952-1957					
	Excluding gains from trade ^c	6.6	1.9	2.7	4.6	3.8
	Including gains from trade ^c	6.8			4.8	5.3
	Plan, 1959/60-1961/62	5.8	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.8
Thailand	1952-1957	5.0 ^d	1.9	2.3	3.0	2.6

Source: Compiled by ECAFE secretariat and based on government statistics unless otherwise stated below.

^a Present rates are mainly based on column 1, Table 10, planned rates are based on estimates by planning authorities.

^b Taken from column 2, Table 10, for Pakistan; and from Table 19 for other countries.

^c "Gains from trade" here stands as abbreviation for the gains or losses from the change in the terms of trade, over the period in question.

^d Estimated by the Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

tion growth higher than expected, the rate of capital formation, the capital-output ratio and the rate of increase of *per capita* income would all have to be reduced.⁴⁶

This actually happens in areas with higher rates of increase of population. In Taiwan, the rate of population increase in 1952-1957 was 3.6 per cent a year; the rate of net capital formation 15 per cent of national income, the annual rate of increase of national income 7.4 per cent and of *per capita* income 3.8 per cent, implying a capital-output ratio of 2. This is a comparatively favourable condition. The second four-year plan assumes for 1957-1960 a rate of net capital formation of 18 per cent and a more conservative capital-output ratio of 2.4, with an annual increase of total income of 7.4 per cent and *per capita* income of 3.6 per cent. Were Taiwan's population to increase at one per cent a year as in Japan, this rate of capital formation and capital-output ratio might be expected to raise *per capita* income by more than 6 per cent a year.

For easy reference, letters representing countries are inserted in table 28, indicating (by capital letters for the experience in the last five years and by small letters for the current development plans) the approximate relation between the most likely rate of population growth, incremental capital-output ratio, rate of capital formation

and rate of increase of *per capita* income (excluding the gains from the changes in the terms of trade).⁴⁷ The rate of population growth in ECAFE countries ranges between 0.8 and 3.7 per cent a year, including the expected rate in the immediate future covered by development plans. The capital-output ratios are between 2 and 3, except in Japan and the Philippines. The extremely low ratio shown for the Philippines for the last five years is probably not reliable.⁴⁸ In Japan, especially for the

⁴⁷ If the change in the terms of trade is continuously in the same direction and more or less at the same rate, gains or losses from the change in the terms of trade should perhaps be included in the change of income in the calculation of capital-output ratio for the projection of future income. During the period covered by the present study, however, changes in the terms of trade in ECAFE countries are, in the main, not of a permanent nature and the gains derived from them are therefore excluded in calculating the capital-output ratios.

⁴⁸ One of the main reasons for the extremely low capital-output ratio as shown in the statistics for the Philippines is the difference in the basis of valuation of the imported capital goods and of the domestic product. The value of imported capital goods, being converted into pesos at the official exchange rate, is too low as compared with domestic wages and prices, resulting in a low capital-output ratio. There is also a lack of a suitable deflator for estimating the domestic product at constant prices. For other reasons for the under-estimation of capital formation in the Philippines, see Higgins, B., "The incremental capital-output ratio as a tool for development planning", *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, Vol.10, No.1, January 1957, pp.50-53. Higgins considered that, in the Philippines, "a net ICOR in the neighbourhood of 2.0 is a more accurate reflection of relationships likely to prevail in the future than the figure of 0.67 derived from the national accounts".

⁴⁶ In the next section, on supply of capital, it will be demonstrated that the faster rate of population growth will generally be accompanied by a smaller rate of saving.

Table 30
RATE OF INCREASE OF INCOME, RATE OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND INCREMENTAL CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIO

		Annual rate of increase of net domestic product at constant price ^a (%)	Net capital formation as per cent of net domestic product (%)	Incremental net capital-output ratio ^b	Incremental output-capital ratio ^b
Burma	1950/51-1955/56	5.4	14.7	2.7	.37
	Plan, 1956/57-1958/59	6.4	14 ^c	2.2 ^c	.45 ^c
Ceylon	Illustrative model in six-year programme, 1954/55-1956/60	3.9	10	2.6	.39
	J. Robinson's ten-year model	6.0	16 ^d	2.8 ^d	.36 ^d
China:					
Mainland	1952-1956	7.1	20 ^e	2.8 ^e	.35
	Plan, 1957-1961	8.6
Taiwan	1952-1957	7.4	15	2	.5
	Plan, 1957-1960	7.4	18 ^g	2.4	.41
India	1951/52-1956/57	3.8	7	1.8	.6
	Plan, 1956/57-1960/61	4.5	10.2	2.3	.43
	1971/72-1976/77	4.7	17	3.7	.27
Indonesia	Plan, 1956-1960	3	6-8	2.3	.43
	1975	5	20	4.0	.25
Japan	1952-1957	7.2	24.7	3.4	.29
	Plan, 1956/57-1960/61	5.8	25	4.3	.23
Pakistan	Plan, 1955/56-1959/60	3.7	10.6 ^d	3 ^d	.33 ^h
Philippines	1952-1957	6.6	4 ^h	0.6 ^h	1.6 ^h
	Plan, 1959/60-1961/62	5.6	10.1	1.8	.55
Thailand	1952-1957	5.0	15 ^d	3	.33

Source: Compiled by ECAFE secretariat and based on government statistics and data given in table 29.

^a Gains or losses from the change in the terms of trade are excluded for Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan and the Philippines.

^b For historical data, capital formation in a given year is compared with the increase of income in the following year.

^c Estimated.

^d Gross capital formation and gross domestic product. The figure for Thailand is estimated by the IBRD Mission.

^e National income of mainland China excludes services; these reported figures might therefore be lower if the same definition were used as in other countries.

^f The second five-year plan is stated to have a rate of capital formation higher than the first plan, but the exact figure is not known. If the capital-output ratio is the same as in 1952-1956, the planned rate of increase of income of 8.6 per cent per year will require a net capital formation equivalent to 23 per cent of national income.

^g Including investment in some of the special projects already under implementation.

^h Apparently capital formation was under-estimated in the Philippines.

period of the development plan, the expected low rate of population growth and high rate of saving make it possible to maintain at the same time a high capital-output ratio and a high rate of growth of *per capita* income. Among the other countries, the highest capital-output ratios are found in Burma and mainland China, where the figures for the last five years are 2.7 and 2.8 respectively. In Burma, the emphasis on overhead facilities, delays experienced in the installation of imported capital equipment and under-utilization of capacity probably explain the high ratio. The factor responsible in mainland China presumably is the emphasis on basic facilities and heavy industries, with their comparatively long gestation period.⁴⁹

Table 31 gives the capital requirement, under various conditions, of a population increasing at the rate which at present is the average for the region. If Japan is excluded, the region had in 1956 a total population of 1,370 million, increasing at 1.7 per cent a year. The capital required in order to increase *per capita* income by 3 per cent a year, at capital-output ratios of 2, 2.5, and 3, are respectively 9.4, 11.75 and 14.1 per cent of national income. Taking the average *per capita* income of the region excluding Japan at \$65 a year,⁵⁰ the capital required annually would be \$8,500, \$10,600 and \$12,700 million respectively, in the initial years, at these three incremental capital-output ratios.

But if *per capita* income increases at no more than 3 per cent a year, it will not be doubled until after 24 years. It is questionable whether this rate of increase will satisfy the countries of the region. For the same capital-output ratio of 2, 2.5 and 3 and an increase of *per capita* income by 4 per cent a year, implying a doubling of *per capita* income in about 18 years, rates of capital formation equivalent to 11.4, 14.25 and 17.1 per cent of national income, or \$10,300, \$12,800 and \$15,000 million per year respectively, will be necessary in the initial years. These figures are not very different from the previously cited capital requirement, based on estimates of new entrants into the labour force, which was \$13,500 million or 14 per cent of the total national income. If it is considered that, for rapid economic development, a doubling of national income in ten years is desirable, an annual increase of *per capita* income of 7 per cent will be necessary. This will necessitate, at capital-output ratios of 2, 2.5 and 3, rates of capital formation of 17.4, 21.75 and 26.1 per cent, even if the rate of population growth is not further increased, or \$16,000, \$20,000 and \$23,000 million respectively in the initial years.

⁵⁰ Weighted average of Burma, Ceylon, China (mainland and Taiwan), Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, southern Korea, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. The average will be increased by \$10 if Japan is included. These figures are extremely rough in view of differences in the methods of estimation and of the approximations involved in converting these statistics into dollars. *Per capita* incomes of individual countries are taken from United Nations, *Per Capita National Product of Fifty-five Countries: 1952-1954*, p.8, with the exception of China, Hong Kong and Indonesia, for which government statistics or statistics from private sources are used.

⁴⁹ For problems involved in comparing national income and related aggregates from mainland China with those of other countries of the region, see United Nations, *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1957*, chapter 4, especially pp.86, 90 and 106-108. See also footnote c of table 30, above.

Table 31
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A GIVEN ANNUAL RATE OF
INCREASE OF PER CAPITA INCOME FOR A POPULATION
INCREASING AT 1.7% PER ANNUM

Annual rate of increase of per capita income	Number of years for doubling per capita income	Rate of capital formation (% of national income) for capital-output ratios of			Capital requirement* (million of US dollars) for capital-output ratios of		
		2	2.5	3	2	2.5	3
0	—	3.4	4.25	5.1	3,100	3,800	5,600
1	60	5.4	6.75	8.1	4,900	5,600	7,300
2	36	7.4	9.25	11.1	6,700	8,300	10,000
3	24	9.4	11.75	14.1	8,500	10,600	13,000
4	18	11.4	14.25	17.1	10,300	12,800	15,000
5	15	13.4	16.75	20.1	12,100	15,100	18,000
6	12	15.4	19.25	23.1	13,900	17,300	21,000
7	10	17.4	21.75	26.1	15,700	19,600	23,000

* Assuming an average *per capita* income of \$65 or roughly a total income of \$90,000 million for the region.

Although net capital formation in Burma, China and Japan has achieved rates of 14 per cent or more of national income, and in Ceylon has reached 10 per cent, the rates for most countries are far below this level—some in the neighbourhood of 5 per cent. In countries where the rate of population growth is large and the rate of capital formation small, it seems essential, if immediate increase of income is wanted, to lower the capital-output ratio as much as possible. In practice, this is the policy of most countries in the region except Japan. Promotion of cottage and small-scale industries and increase of per hectare yield through community development or other programmes have been incorporated in most of the development plans. In India, for example, the Japanese method of rice cultivation, which requires more labour per hectare, is being introduced. In Taiwan, agricultural policies include improvement of seeds (to shorten the crop period and produce more crops a year), pest control, deep ploughing, closer planting, and the planting of a second crop on the same piece of land before the harvesting of the first crop.⁵¹ The adoption of more labour-intensive techniques and of community development is also provided for in the five-year plan of the Philippines. In mainland China, labour-intensive methods have been adopted even in the iron and steel and machinery industries,⁵² giving a shorter gestation period, smaller overhead cost and reduced requirement for transport facilities to move the materials.

It has been indicated in a previous section that full employment supported by an inadequate supply of capital may not always be compatible with a speedy long-term development. The same factor sets a limit to the reduction of the capital-output ratio. Hence, a country with a smaller rate of population growth has the advantage of requiring a smaller amount of capital for a given rate of progress.

3. The supply of savings

The main source of capital formation is domestic saving. While a larger population tends to provide more workers to generate a larger income, it also requires a larger amount of goods and services for consumption.

⁵¹ See "Technical measures undertaken for agricultural development in Taiwan, China" (DPWP.3/3).

⁵² It has been reported that 1,180,000 tons of pig iron and 200,000 tons of steel would be turned out by handicraft cooperatives in 1958 (New China News Agency release, 3 August 1958).

From the demographic point of view, the savings potential clearly depends, other things being equal, on the rate of increase of population and also on the ratio of employed persons to total population.

Table 32 shows how the savings potential depends on the rate of population growth as such.⁵³ As a first approximation, it is assumed that the capital-output ratio is 3:1, and that for three consecutive years, policies can be adopted that will keep *per capita* consumption constant. On these and other assumptions given in the table, in a period of three years, a country with a population increasing at one per cent a year can raise the rate of saving during this period from 6.7 per cent to 9.2 per cent without lowering the standard of living, while a country with a population increasing at 3 or more per cent a year may face a situation with a decreasing rate of saving and investment even if *per capita* consumption is not increased. The very fast rates of population increase in many countries of the region undoubtedly hold down the savings potential, although, as pointed out in the previous section, they increase the capital requirement.

It is sometimes argued that population growth may increase effective demand and therefore also investment, employment and *per capita* income. But in those ECAFE countries where the density of population is already high and income low, the present low rates of investment and income are clearly due, not to a low total consumption expenditure resulting from small size of population, but rather to inadequate saving and small capital stock—partly caused by population pressure. Since income and savings are low, the excess of disposable savings over actual investment, if any, is small;⁵⁴ usually the relationship is the other way around, with investment larger than domestic saving and imported capital used to finance the remainder. Given a low income level, antiquated techniques, poor organization and limited initiative, an increase in consumption demand associated with population growth in a densely populated area may simply raise prices without bringing any appreciable increase in production. *Per capita* real saving, investment and income may fall instead of rising. Moreover, since in recent years most governments in the region have assumed responsibility for economic development and investment, and since there is generally a tendency toward inflation, demand in ECAFE countries now depends even less than before on population growth.

Table 33 illustrates the relation between employment and savings. With a given population, and given labour productivity, the higher the percentage of employed workers, the higher, naturally, is the aggregate and *per capita* income. Assuming a *per capita* consumption below which health will be endangered or the incentive to work reduced, and assuming that 30 per cent of the income in excess of that minimum level is saved, it is possible to calculate both *per capita* and total savings. A population with a larger proportion of workers can provide not only a larger aggregate savings but also a higher percentage of savings in relation to income. The table illustrates that, whereas a country with 30 per cent of its population working may have a saving rate equal to

⁵³ No account is here taken of effects of variations in the ratio of employed persons to total population.

⁵⁴ It will be shown on p.45 that part of domestic saving in certain countries is marked for international transfer and not available for domestic capital formation.

Table 32

ILLUSTRATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH AND THE SAVINGS POTENTIAL
Capital-output ratio 3:1; per capita annual consumption \$56

Rate of population growth	Year	Population	Capital stock at beginning of year	Income	Consumption	Savings and investment	Rate of consumption (% of income)	Rate of saving and investment (% of income)
0	1	1,000	\$180,000	\$60,000	\$56,000	\$4,000	93.3	6.7
	2	1,000	184,000	61,333	56,000	5,333	91.3	8.7
	3	1,000	189,333	63,111	56,000	7,111	88.7	11.3
1	1	1,000	180,000	60,000	56,000	4,000	93.3	6.7
	2	1,010	184,000	61,333	56,560	4,773	92.2	7.8
	3	1,020	188,773	62,924	57,120	5,804	90.8	9.2
2	1	1,000	180,000	60,000	56,000	4,000	93.3	6.7
	2	1,020	184,000	61,333	57,120	4,213	93.1	6.9
	3	1,040	188,213	62,738	58,240	4,498	92.8	7.2
3	1	1,000	180,000	60,000	56,000	4,000	93.3	6.7
	2	1,030	184,000	61,333	57,680	3,653	94.0	6.0
	3	1,061	187,653	62,551	59,416	3,135	95.0	5.0
3.5	1	1,000	180,000	60,000	56,000	4,000	93.3	6.7
	2	1,035	184,000	61,333	57,960	3,373	94.5	5.5
	3	1,071	187,373	62,458	59,976	2,482	96.0	4.0

Table 33

ILLUSTRATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT, SAVINGS AND PRODUCTIVITY
Population 1,000; minimum consumption per capita \$50; marginal propensity to consume 70%; capital-output ratio 3:1

Employed workers as percentages of total population	First income period					Second income period (stationary population)					
	Production per worker	Total income	Total consumption	Total savings	Savings as % of national income	Additional capital per worker	Production per worker	Total income	Total consumption	Total savings	Savings as % of national income
28	\$200	\$56,000	\$54,200	\$1,800	3.2	\$ 6.43	\$202.1	\$56,588	\$54,612	\$1,976	3.5
30	200	60,000	57,000	3,000	5.0	10.00	203.3	60,990	57,693	3,297	5.4
32	200	64,000	59,800	4,200	6.6	13.12	204.4	65,408	60,786	4,622	7.1
34	200	68,000	62,600	5,400	7.9	15.88	205.3	69,802	63,861	5,941	8.5
36	200	72,000	65,400	6,600	9.2	18.33	206.1	74,196	66,937	7,259	9.8
38	200	76,000	68,200	7,800	10.3	20.53	206.8	78,584	70,009	8,575	10.9
40	200	80,000	71,000	9,000	11.2	22.50	207.5	83,000	73,100	9,900	11.9

only 5 per cent of its income, a country with 40 per cent of its population working, and the same labour productivity, may save 11.2 per cent of its income for further investment. In view, however, of the additional capital per worker, especially in the country having a high employment ratio, labour productivity will then be increased, making possible a further increase in savings. Assuming an incremental capital-output ratio of 3:1 and a stationary population, a country with 30 per cent of its population working will increase its production per worker from \$200 to \$203.3 in the next income period, and savings will be raised to 5.4 per cent of total income, while a country with 40 per cent of its population working will increase its production per worker in the next income period to \$207.5 and savings will be raised to 11.9 per cent of national income. The cumulative effect of the difference is obvious.

Reliable and comprehensive employment statistics are not available in ECAFE countries other than Japan. The only statistics from which the relative magnitudes of employment may be inferred are those for economically active population, which are available for a number of

ECAFE countries for census years. In the nine ECAFE countries listed in table 14 above, 46 to 58 per cent of the male population are recorded as economically active, while, among the 23 European countries where such statistics are available, the percentages are all over 60. If underemployment is taken into account, the relative position may be even less favourable to ECAFE countries. The smaller percentage of the economically active and the employed population acts as a brake on saving, capital formation and the increase in labour productivity.

One of the major reasons for the smaller proportion of the economically active population in the region is the high birth and (at least until very recently) high death rates, which result in a younger population and a shorter working age. It has been indicated that the dependency ratio—or proportion, to the working population aged 15-59, of children below 15 years of age and persons aged 60 and above—ranges from 74 to 96 per cent in the region as compared with around 65 per cent in the more economically developed countries. This ratio will, moreover, tend to increase in the region in

the next few decades. With death rates declining and life expectancy increasing, the working life is gradually lengthening. This, of course, is beneficial. With the present high birth rate, however, the proportion of the population at the most productive ages increases more slowly than total population, and the increasing dependency ratio tends to become more burdensome. As was illustrated in table 24, the future dependency ratio might be lowered if the rate of population growth were reduced by a rapid lowering of the fertility rate.

There are other reasons as well for the low employment ratio, or the proportion employed to total population. In some countries, women do not work outside the home because of social custom or religious belief. The large number of children in each family and the lack of labour-saving devices for housekeeping also prevent many mothers from being gainfully occupied. Extremely hot weather makes work less sought-for in certain areas. Poor health, whether because of deficiencies of nutrition or for other reasons, prevent some people from taking up gainful jobs. Wants tend to be limited, in some areas, and rather easily satisfied. The mutual support system in the family may also reduce the incentive to work. The last two factors are now, however, of declining importance, as the desire to increase consumption and comfort grows stronger.

But the main economic reason for the low employment ratio is that there is an insufficiency of capital and arable land to provide work for all persons of working age. There is a lack of ability to utilize the surplus labour on the limited land and with the limited equipment, and a lack of the knowledge and organization needed to create additional equipment from the existing resources.

At the same time, low productivity further reduces income and saving. Productivity is kept low by poor health and climate, poor organization and inadequate working capital stock (factors already mentioned as tending also to lower the employment ratio), by deficiencies in education, technical knowledge and training, and by the shortness of working life which limits the accumulation of experience and skill. In fact, not only productivity per worker but also in many cases productivity per unit area of land, and sometimes per unit of capital equipment, is lower than in the more developed countries. For example, in 1955, the average yield of rice per hectare was 1,820 kilogrammes in Asia, as compared with 4,230 in Europe; the yield of wheat was 850 kilogrammes in Asia, as compared with 1,670 kilogrammes in Europe. In general, the per hectare yield of most agricultural products in Asia is lower than in other continents with the exception of Africa.

One of the reasons for the low *per capita* productivity is the surplus labour itself. When more and more people come to work on the same piece of land, or in the same store, total production may, beyond a certain point, not increase appreciably. It may, conversely, be possible for each person to work in a more leisurely way or with less intensity, without impairing total production. When once people become accustomed to less intensive work, the work attitude they thus acquire may not easily be changed, even if they start working in factories.

Longer working hours may be required to compensate, in part, for the smaller productivity per labour hour.

The small employment ratio, together with the low productivity, yield an income so low that children have to start to work at early ages. At the same time, many people work only a limited number of days per year. The seasonal nature of most of the jobs naturally increases seasonal unemployment. The all-India agricultural enquiry conducted in 1950-51 revealed that, on an average, agricultural male workers were employed for 189 days in paid agricultural labour and for 29 days in non-agricultural labour. For the remaining period, it was estimated that they were totally unemployed for about 100 days, and self-employed for about 50 days. It was not known whether they worked a full day during the period of self-employment.⁵⁵ Based on a survey conducted in Travancore-Cochin, Datar estimated that, as an upper limit, three million of the population in India were unemployed in 1951, and that 31.1 million persons irregularly employed in Indian agriculture were unemployed for seven months a year, and 6.9 million irregularly employed non-agricultural labourers were unemployed for six months a year.⁵⁶ A sample survey in Ceylon in 1953 showed that 12 per cent of the total labour force worked less than twenty hours a week.⁵⁷ In the four administrative sub-divisions in East Pakistan covered by a sample survey in 1956, visible unemployment among farm families was found to be 12, 26, 41 and 45 per cent of the potential man-days of the economically active males.⁵⁸ The underemployed obviously have the time, and they generally have the desire, to work to increase their income, but they do not have the knowledge or the means to do so.

Only five countries in the region—Burma, Ceylon, mainland China, Federation of Malaya and Japan—have achieved a rate of domestic saving which is higher than 10 per cent of domestic product. (See table 34). However, not all of the domestic savings in Burma, Ceylon and the Federation of Malaya are available for use in domestic capital formation, since part of the income accruing to foreigners has to be remitted abroad and, in the case of Burma, foreign debts have to be repaid. Thus, although total domestic savings in the last five years (as indicated in table 34) exceeded domestic capital formation by Rs.577 million in Burma and by Rs. 670 million in Ceylon, the foreign assets of Burma were reduced by Rs.129 million and those of Ceylon increasing by only Rs.49 million. In Malaya, while domestic savings exceeded domestic capital formation by M\$3,295 million from 1949 to 1953, Malayan-held foreign assets increased by only M\$290 million.

⁵⁵ Ramamurti, B., *Agricultural Labour, How they Work and Live*, Government of India, Ministry of Labour, 1954, p.10.

⁵⁶ Datar, B.N., "The Second Five-year Plan—Employment Approach", *Papers Related to the Formulation of the Second Five-Year Plan*, Government of India, p.251.

⁵⁷ Central Bank of Ceylon, *Survey of Ceylon's Consumer Finances*, Colombo, 1954. In the same survey, it was found that 17 per cent of the economically active population should be considered as involuntarily unemployed.

⁵⁸ *Report on the Survey of Rural Credit and Rural Unemployment in East Pakistan*, Dacca University Socio-Economic Survey Board, 1956, p.103. In the estimate of the potential labour supply, females were excluded, and each economically active male was assumed to have, potentially, 250 working days a year, 10 hours a day.

Table 34

RATE OF DOMESTIC SAVING AND DOMESTIC
CAPITAL FORMATION^a
(Average of latest five years)

	Rate of saving	Rate of domestic capital formation	Excess of rate of saving over rate of capital formation
Burma, 1952-1956	19.0	16.1	2.9
Ceylon, 1952-1956	12.9	10.3	2.6
China:			
Mainland, 1952-1956	19.4	...
Taiwan, 1952-1956	8.0	15.1	-7.1
India, 1949-1953	6.2	6.5	-0.3
Japan, 1953-1957	26.2	25.7	0.5
Korea, southern, 1953-1956 .	-4.2	11.0	-15.2
Malaya (Federation and Singapore), 1949-1953 . .	19.2	8.7	10.5
Philippines, 1953-1957 . .	3.4	4.7	-1.3

^a Net saving and net capital formation as per cent of net domestic product except in the case of Korea and Malaya for which gross capital formation are expressed as per cent of gross domestic product.

Most other countries have domestic savings of less than 10 per cent of domestic product. In some cases—for example, the Philippines, Taiwan and southern Viet-Nam—domestic savings are substantially supplemented by foreign aid for capital formation. In southern Korea, foreign capital in the period in question not only was responsible for capital formation but also financed domestic dissaving. In spite of foreign aid and other foreign capital, the rate of capital formation in most countries in the region is still too low for rapid economic development, given the prevailing rate of population growth.

4. Population trends and economic development

On the level of generalization—population growth may stimulate or retard economic development. It depends on the existing density of population, the excess of income over the minimum needed for subsistence, the availability and utilization of resources, the state of technology, the extent of entrepreneurial and managerial initiative, the social and economic institutions and organizations.

In areas where population is small and available resources relatively large, techniques somewhat advanced and initial income not unduly low, an increase in population may stimulate and speed up economic development because of the possibility of greater specialization and division of labour, better utilization of resources, a larger consumer market and external economies generally. In areas where population density is already high in relation to resources and the state of technology, however, and where *per capita* income is low, as is the case in most of the countries in the region, a high rate of population growth may even reduce *per capita* income and the savings potential to such an extent that domestic capital formation is too low to provide adequate employment for the increasing labour force. It certainly tends to reduce the income margin which may be devoted to education, training and public health services. According to the experience of the countries of the region, the challenge of population pressure has not always been conducive to a correspondingly increased rate

of investment or technological improvement, so that labour productivity and *per capita* income appear to have fallen in a number of cases, rather than risen. National income statistics for most of the countries are available only for postwar years.⁵⁹ But *per capita* food production declined between 1934-1938 and 1956/57—an interval during which population growth was accelerated—in all ECAFE countries except the Philippines and Thailand, where the density of population was relatively small, and Japan, where the rate of economic development in recent years has been especially fast. Estimates of *per capita* consumption expenditure in India also show a decrease in the period 1930-1940,⁶⁰ when population accelerated its rate of growth.

It has been indicated that the rate of population growth in countries in the region, except for Japan, is either already high or is gathering speed. It has also been shown, in table 32, how an increase in the rate of population growth alone will, for any given capital-output ratio, reduce the savings potential. The high rate of population growth also raises the dependency ratio and lowers the employment ratio, resulting in an even smaller savings potential, as is illustrated in table 33. Since the dependency ratio is expected to increase, with the growth of population, in the next few decades in many countries, the situation will be further aggravated unless the employment ratio among the working-age population also is increased and the development effort accelerated. Unless such positive action is taken, the low rate of saving in these countries may limit the rate of capital formation and the capital available per worker and seriously reduce labour productivity and the rate of growth of income. Effects such as these are cumulative; in the course of a few decades, large discrepancies in *per capita* income might appear as between different countries with different population trends.

Thus, unless the rate of increase of population is reduced and the effective period of work of each person lengthened, or unless there is an opportunity for part of the population to migrate from the densely populated areas, whether internally or internationally, an increase of *per capita* income must be obtained by an accelerated rate of economic and technical improvement. When the term over-population is applied to any area, it has reference to the known resources, their accessibility and utilization, the level of technology, the social and economic institutions and organizations. Most of the areas in the region have not been surveyed systematically, and new discoveries will undoubtedly increase the availability of resources. The development of transportation will make them more accessible; better techniques and more effective organization will improve their utilization. However, the acquisition and popularization of the new techniques, and the application of these to surveying, transport and production, will require capital, and other developmental expenditures of a capital-like sort.

⁵⁹ In the few countries where this is not true, the prewar statistics are not always comparable with postwar estimates.

⁶⁰ For consumer expenditure estimates, see Desai, R.C., "Consumer Expenditure in India, 1931/32 to 1940/41", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A, part IV, 1940. The index of real wages in India also failed to show any net increase from 1939 to 1950, when population increased 14 per cent. For statistics of real wages, see Palekar, S.A., "Real Wages and Profits in India, 1939-1950", *The Indian Economic Review*, August 1957, (III.4), p.36.

The extent to which population pressure may be relieved without additional capital—for example, through better organization of labour and the work process—is somewhat limited. There is therefore no escape from the need to increase investment and income in the first place. Economic policies with this end in view are widely discussed. For example, underemployed labour may be utilized for capital construction and the production of other goods and services; savings may be mobilized through various measures, especially savings out of an initial increase in income; resources may be put to more effective use by concentrating investment in directions likely to yield the highest returns.⁶¹ But, only if the utmost effort is made in every direction is domestic saving likely to be increased sufficiently and in time to meet the growing investment requirements of those ECAFE countries whose population is increasing fast and at an accelerating rate.

It has been shown that, even if the present rate of population growth in the ECAFE region, which is 1.7 per cent a year, is not further increased, the capital required to increase *per capita* income by 3 per cent a year, given a capital-output ratio of 3, would equal 14 per cent of national income⁶²—considerably higher than the actual rate of capital formation in most of the countries. At this rate of increase of *per capita* income, it would take about 24 years to double the present *per capita* income. Starting from the present average level of ECAFE countries other than Japan (about \$65), it would take 54 years to reach the present world average, over 80 years to reach the present world average excluding ECAFE countries, and 115 years to reach the present high level of the United States.⁶³ To double the *per capita* income in 10 years, implying an annual increase of *per capita* income of 7 per cent, the rate of capital formation required at the same capital-output ratio would be 26 per cent of national income.⁶⁴ Still higher rates of capital formation are necessary if the rate of population growth is further increased. For rapid economic development in ECAFE countries, an increase of the rate

of capital formation to something like 20 per cent, already reported to have occurred in mainland China, or 25 per cent as in Japan, would be desirable, and it seems that the planning authorities in some of the ECAFE countries are thinking along these lines.⁶⁵

It will take many years for most of the countries to reach a rate of capital formation such as this, if it is to be done without serious sacrifice or even hardship, and if primary reliance is to be put on domestic savings. For example, assuming constant fertility and declining mortality, and an average long-term incremental capital-output ratio of 3, if 50 per cent of the increase in *per capita* income in India were to be saved for capital formation,⁶⁶ it would take almost 30 years before the rate of domestic saving would be increased from the present 7 per cent to 20 per cent of national income.

It is in this respect that foreign capital is especially important during the initial period, so as to generate a higher income and provide a basis for higher domestic saving in subsequent years. At the same incremental rate of *per capita* saving, if the present rate of capital formation of 7 per cent in India, for example, can be raised to 14 per cent, or alternatively to 20 per cent, by the addition of foreign capital, the time required to reach a domestic saving rate of 20 per cent will be shortened to 14, or to 9, years respectively.⁶⁷ In respect of other countries with higher rates of population growth, the domestic capacity to save will be even more inadequate, other things being equal, and the need for foreign capital even more pressing.⁶⁸

* * *

What are the longer-run prospects of economic development in the region? For example, what is the prospect of raising the average *per capita* income in the region to the world average, considering the world average itself will in all likelihood be rising on account of the long-term increase of *per capita* income in both the industrialized countries and the under-developed countries?

⁶¹ See, for instance, "Economic Development and Planning in Asia and the Far East, Problems and Techniques", *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, Vol. VI, No. 3, November 1955.

⁶² Some forces are tending to raise the capital-output ratio gradually, others to lower it. But it is most likely that, in spite of possible technological advances, the ratio of 2 to 2.5 found in a number of countries at present will have to be raised after a given period of development when the factors responsible for a low ratio have been fully exploited. The actual ratio may change from time to time, however, and the figure 3 is used for illustrative purposes only. Any higher ratio will, of course, make the picture even more unfavourable.

⁶³ Average *per capita* income of 55 countries excluding China for 1952-1954 as given in *Per Capita Product of Fifty-five Countries*, *op.cit.*, p. 9, is \$445. It would be about \$320 if China is included. Average excluding ECAFE countries is \$700; excluding ECAFE countries but including Japan, \$770. The *per capita* income of the United States taken for the present calculation is \$2,000.

⁶⁴ If the annual rate of increase of *per capita* income were raised to 5 or 7 per cent, the present world average of *per capita* income would be reached in 33 and 24 years respectively, the present world average excluding ECAFE countries but including Japan, in 50 and 35 years, and the present level in the United States, in 70 and 50 years. If the population continues to increase by 1.7 per cent a year, these alternative results would require a rate of capital formation equal to 20 and 25 per cent of national income respectively.

⁶⁵ Information given in table 29 shows that the Indian Government has planned to raise the rate of capital formation from the present level of 7 per cent to 17 per cent in the fifth five-year plan (for 1971/72-1976/77), and that the Indonesian Government has given consideration to reaching a rate of capital formation of 20 per cent by 1967/68.

⁶⁶ According to the population projections for India as given in table 19, this is equivalent to an incremental rate of saving of 25 per cent of aggregate income in the initial year and about 40 per cent in the thirtieth year.

⁶⁷ To make up a rate of capital formation of at least 14 per cent, a net foreign capital is required for only 7 years, amounting to, on the average, 3 per cent of the national income during this period. To make up a rate of capital formation of at least 20 per cent, foreign capital will be required for 8 years, amounting to, on the average, around 5.5 per cent of national income. These calculations, however, make no allowance for payment of interest, dividends etc. on the foreign capital subsequently.

⁶⁸ On the same assumptions incremental rate of *per capita* saving and capital-output ratio, if India's population continues to increase at 1.5 per cent a year, the rate of domestic saving may be increased to 20 per cent in 16 years without foreign capital. For more elaborate illustrations of the role of foreign capital in countries with different rates of population growth, see "Growth Models", *op.cit.*, pp. 27-30.

The density of population in most countries of the region is high, not only with reference to their own existing techniques, resource utilization and capital stock, but also in relation to the present level of techniques, resource utilization and capital stock in the more industrialized countries. As was shown in table 3, the average population density in the region is 69 persons per square kilometre. This is only 18 per cent smaller than the density of 84 persons in Europe excluding the Soviet Union. But the high and accelerating rate of population growth will rapidly increase the density, which will be over 113 persons per square kilometre in 1980, or 35 per cent higher than the present European density excluding the Soviet Union and 13 per cent higher than the latter projected to 1980. Excluding Afghanistan and Iran, which have very low densities, the density will be 46 per cent higher than it is in Europe today and 23 per cent higher than in Europe in 1980. Techniques, resource utilization and capital stock, however, cannot be expected to reach the European level in such a short period. Among the individual countries, India's density may be as high as 200 per square kilometre, equivalent to the present density in Germany and the United Kingdom, while the density in Ceylon may rise to 280 per square kilometre, which is nearly equal to the present density in Belgium. Yet beyond 1980 the population in the region is expected to increase still further. The prospects of improving the level of living will thus depend on the race between technology, organization and capital formation on the one hand and population on the other.

To offset the population pressure, one of the obvious means of increasing income and capital formation is to make the fullest possible use of the human resources—the abundant factor. This can be done both quantitatively and qualitatively—quantitatively by increasing employment and reducing underemployment, qualitatively by improving the health, education and technical training of the people and reducing disguised unemployment so as to raise productivity. Although the elasticity of substitution of labour for land or capital is limited at the present level of technology, and although it is a controversial question how much surplus labour can be absorbed into productive activities with reasonable returns if not backed by considerable natural resources and capital, the problem is being attacked to some extent in various parts of the region. Mainland China has introduced labour-intensive work on a large scale. On a much smaller scale, several other countries also are increasing their efforts to make use of their surplus labour for capital formation or in other productive ways, through community development projects or similar schemes. These activities include the construction of roads, houses and canals, the digging of irrigation wells, more intensive cultivation, the development of household handicrafts etc. It is clear that much depends, in this

type of undertaking, on the provision of incentives, on organization,⁶⁹ and on careful selection of the type and location of work.⁶⁹

In any case, however, intensive utilization of manual labour without considerable capital and improved techniques and skill can at best be only a temporary means of speeding up capital formation and augmenting income. To raise the *per capita* income of the more densely populated ECAFE countries—with their population growing rapidly—to the world average, even the levels of technology now prevailing in the industrialized countries may soon prove inadequate. Unless there is a technological revolution in the near future, diminishing returns from land may slow down the rate of increase of *per capita* income from primary production. Ultimately, means will have to be found of increasing production with less help from the scarce resource, land, including its mineral resources, than the industrialized countries now require. Technological advance may make it possible to utilize at reasonable cost some of the land which is at present uncultivable, and to obtain wealth from the sea. But, in the end, an increase of income in densely populated areas will have to depend less and less on primary production.

This line of reasoning suggests that, if they are to raise their *per capita* income to that of the industrialized countries, densely populated areas not now industrialized might have to depend on non-agricultural production to an even greater extent than do the less populous among the industrialized countries at present. In other words, relying to a considerable extent on foreign trade to offset the effect of the diminishing returns from land and to enable them to raise their *per capita* incomes to the world level, a number of ECAFE countries might ultimately have to finance the importation of food and of agricultural and mineral raw materials by successfully competing in the world market with the industrialized countries in the export of industrial products. Since most ECAFE countries have had little experience in manufacturing as yet, it is clear that the postulated goal of equality of *per capita* income with the industrialized countries is less practicable for the present than one of, say, doubling and then re-doubling existing *per capita* incomes in the ECAFE countries.

Even the latter objective, however, will depend primarily on the efforts made by the countries concerned to speed up and render more effective the process of capital investment and technological and organizational advance. And, in general, a greater effort will be necessary if the rate of population growth is high.

⁶⁹ For an illustration of the effect of fuller utilization of labour in speeding up economic development, assuming a flexible capital-output ratio, see "Growth Models", *op.cit.* It can be shown that a country with a faster rate of population growth but fuller utilization of labour may, other things being equal, generate a faster rate of growth of *per capita* income than a country with a smaller rate of population growth but a smaller employment ratio. It has also been shown in the article, however, that there is a limit in the fuller utilization of labour to increase income if the supply of capital is limited.

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF ASIA AND THE FAR EAST, 1958

Corrigendum

Note: For special tables A and B as well as general tables, in the section on Asian Economic Statistics of the 1958 *Survey*, amendments are incorporated in the section on Asian Statistics of the present issue of the *Bulletin*, which follows this corrigendum.

Page	Column	Para.	Table or chart	Line	Footnote or heading	Original	Correction
16			2		Tea, % increase over 1957	40	49
34	2			23		export surplus	external aid
67	1			23-24	2	at the 18th parallel	near the 17th parallel
76	2	4		19		Sumimoto	Sumitomo
85			23		Iran (1949-1955)	10.6, 26.7, 5.0, 31.7, 42.3	10.6, 26.7, 5.5, 32.2, 42.8
86			24		Pakistan	1.30, 0.5, 1,248, 4.0, ..., 0.2	1.30 ^a , 0.5, 1,248, 0.4 ^a , ..., 0.2 ^a
105	1	3	35		Percentage distribution	Hydro-electricity, Natural Gas, Coal and Lignite, Petroleum	Coal and lignite, Petroleum, Hydro-electricity, Natural Gas
140	1	2		3		have both risen:	have both risen (1953=100):
144	1	1		7		following numbers:	following numbers (gross, not net):
152			52		Economic services	Investment. Loans and advance	Investment ^e . Loans and advance ^e . ^e Predominantly for economic services; includes also capital outlays for administrative and social purposes.
152			52		Hong Kong	37.4, 24.2, 9.1, 4.6, 10.8, 11.2, 9.9, 9.3, 18.1, 31.4, ..., 8.0, 28.0, 48.7	39.7, 28.4, 9.1, 5.3, 21.8, 22.6, 9.9, 9.0, 19.5, 30.5, ..., 4.1, 29.4, 43.6
156	1	2		8		standards of living	levels of living
161			D		Rice production, Federation of Malaya, 1957	774	800
162			D		Millet and sorghum production, Burma (Millet), 1955, 1956, 1957	50 50 50
165			F		Number of passenger cars, Japan, 1958	339.3	239.3
167			G		k	Footnote k amended to read as follows: Customs figures adjusted to an f.o.b., basis.	
173			L		Ceylon, Loans and advances (net), 1954/55	3	-3
173			L		Hong Kong, Social Services	41, 46, 52, 61, 79	83, 91, 106, 120, 146
173			L		Hong Kong, Other current expenditure	187, 173, 189, 220, 239	138, 123, 129, 151, 155
173			L		Hong Kong, Investment	65, 103, 139, 152, 222	72, 108, 145, 162, 239
178			O		Japan, 1956	9,304, 5,416, 948, 749, 1,552, 705, -66	9,264, 5,436, 905, 749, 1,541, 701, -68
178			O		Japan, 1957	10,061, 5,781, 1,048, 757, 1,878, 732, -135	10,085, 5,877, 1,102, 757, 1,888, 477, -15
179			P		China (Taiwan), net national product at factor cost, 1957	29,882	29, 982
210	3			2	China (mainland)—India	Caustic soda ash,	Caustic soda, soda ash,
211	3			2	China (Taiwan)—Ryukyus	\$176,000	\$1,176,000
212	3			6	Japan—Philippines	China grass, rawan	rattan
212	2			1-2	Pakistan—Viet-Nam (southern)	As from 12 May 1959	As from 12 May 1958
220	5			2-3	Iran—France	7 January 1957	7 January 1958
220	5			2	Japan—Brazil	end-1958	end-1957
224	2			1	Viet-Nam (northern)—USSR		Through 1959

ASIAN ECONOMIC STATISTICS

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UNITS AND SYMBOLS EMPLOYED

Unless otherwise stated "tons" relate to metric tons, and "dollars" relate to United States dollars.

The following symbols have been used throughout:

* = average of six to eleven months.	. = not applicable.
‡ = 12 months beginning April of the year stated.	... = not available.
† = 12 months ending September of the year stated.	— = nil or negligible.
ø = 12 months ending June of the year stated.	r = revised figures from this issue.
Mn = million.	Figures in italics are provisional or unofficial.
I, II, III, and IV for quarters of years.	Figures in brackets are from national sources.

Substantial breaks in the homogeneity of a series are indicated either by a horizontal line across the column or by vertical double lines in a row of figures.

SOURCES

To ensure comparability, data compiled or published by the United Nations Statistical Office have been incorporated wherever feasible; material supplied by governments, publications of governments, of the United Nations specialized agencies and of international commodity study groups have been used as additional sources.

SPECIAL TABLES

A. AREA AND POPULATION

	Area (km ²)	LATEST CENSUS		ESTIMATES OF MIDYEAR POPULATION (THOUSAND)							
		Date	Population	1937	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Afghanistan	650,000	.	.	10,972	13,000	13,000	...
British Borneo:											
Brunei	5,765	27/11/1947	40,657	35	49	52	58	63	68	73	...
North Borneo	76,115	4/ 6/1951	334,141 ^a	295 ^b	347	355	364	373	383	397	(410)
Sarawak	123,025	26/11/1947	546,385	440	581	592	602	614	626	640	...
Burma	677,950	1/ 2/1953	2,940,704 ^c	15,635	18,860	19,272	19,464	19,659	19,856	20,054	20,255
Cambodia	172,511	-/ 4/1958	4,740,000 ^d	3,046 ^e	4,043	...	4,100	...	(4,359)	4,600	(4,740)
Ceylon ^f	65,610	20/ 3/1953	8,097,895 ^g	5725	8,074	8,290	8,520	8,723	8,929	9,165	9,361
China:											
Mainland	9,761,012	30/ 6/1953	582,603,417 ^h	446,930	568,910	581,390	594,840	608,185	621,225
Taiwan ⁱ	35,961	16/ 9/1956	9,863,264 ^j	5,530	8,003	8,261	8,617	8,907	9,240	9,506	9,851
Federation of Malaya ^k	131,287	17/ 6/1957	6,276,915	4,083	5,506	5,706	5,889	6,058	6,252 ^m	(6,279)	...
Hong Kong ⁿ	1,013	7/ 3/1931	840,473	1,135	2,250	2,250	2,277	2,340	2,440	2,583	2,748
India	3,288,876	1/ 3/1951	356,879,394	303,626	367,530	372,300	377,130	382,390	387,350	392,440	397,540
Indonesia	1,491,562	7/10/1930	60,412,962	67,398	78,300	79,500	80,500	81,500	83,200	85,100	86,900
Iran	1,630,000	1-15/11/1956	18,944,821	16,200 ^p	20,493	20,678	21,181 ^m	18,347	18,794	19,253	19,723
Japan ^q	369,661	1/10/1955	89,275,529 ^r	70,040	85,500	86,700	88,000	89,000	90,000	90,900	91,760
Korea	220,792	1/10/1944	25,120,174 ^t	21,528	...	30,000
southern Korea ^u	96,929	1/ 9/1955	21,526,374	...	21,206	21,376	21,687 ^m	21,526	21,956	22,303	22,655
Laos ^v	236,800	.	.	1,012 ^e	(1,400)	(1,445)	(1,505)	(1,550)	(1,600)	(1,655)	...
Nepal	140,798	28/ 5/1952- 28/ 5/1954	8,256,625	6,000	8,445	8,555	8,666	8,787	8,910
Pakistan	944,824	28/ 2/1951	75,842,165	...	78,886	80,039	81,186	82,240	83,280	84,450	85,635
Philippines	299,404	28/5- 3/ 6/1956	21,590,700 ^w	15,445	20,646	21,039	21,440	21,849	22,265	22,690	23,122
Singapore ^x	580	17/ 6/1957	1,459,660	651	1,077	1,121	1,165	1,211	1,262 ^m	1,460	1,515
Thailand	514,000	23/ 2/1956	20,095,139 ^y	14,492	19,193	19,556	19,925	20,302	20,686	21,076	21,474
Viet-Nam ^z	326,034	.	.	18,972 ^e	...	25,880	26,000	26,300	26,600	27,200	...
southern Viet-Nam	170,831	9,668	12,366	12,300	...

Source: United Nations Statistical Office and FAO, except those in brackets which are from national sources.

General Note: For details and explanatory notes, see United Nations Demographic Yearbook 1957.

- a. Excluding 1,442 transient and 66 men of British armed forces.
- b. Excluding population of Labuan acquired from Straits Settlement in 1946 (population 7,507 at 1 April 1931 census).
- c. De jure population in 252 towns approximating the urban area of the Union; these are the results of the first stage of a multi-stage sample census. In the second stage enumeration carried out 1 February 1954, an additional 2,908,001 persons were enumerated in 3,159 village tracts, 2,143 of which were in Burma proper and 1,016 in Kachin State.
- d. Based on result of a rural sample survey of education which covered every third village in the country.
- e. 31 December estimate.
- f. Population excluding non-resident military and shipping personnel, numbering 36,606 at 1946 census.
- g. Population actually enumerated; total, both sexes, including 0.7% adjustment for underenumeration is 8,154,680.
- h. Excluding the overseas Chinese and Chinese students abroad. Source: communiqué of the State Statistical Bureau of China on the Development of National Economy and the Results of the Implementation of the State Plan for 1954.
- i. Estimates exclude armed forces and, beginning 1952, foreigners.
- j. Including Quemoy and Matsu Islands.
- k. Population excludes transients afloat and service personnel in service establishments.

m. Estimates for this and previous years not yet revised to accord with latest census.

n. Civilian population.

p. 21 March estimate.

q. Population excludes Allied military and civilian personnel and their dependents stationed in the area. For estimates, Japanese nationals for Japan only.

r. De jure population actually enumerated, not including 0.39 per cent adjustment for underenumeration.

t. De jure population.

u. Excluding alien armed forces, civilian aliens employed by armed forces and foreign diplomatic personnel. 1955, 1 September estimate, other years year-end estimates.

v. 1952-1957 figures are from national source, all revised upward from previous estimates because of the following reasons: (1) Reintegration of the two provinces of Phongsaly and Samneua; (2) immigration of 200,000 people from Thailand; (3) Includes persons less than 20 years old not recorded in previous census estimates. This group is estimated to comprise more than 50% of the total population of Laos.

w. Non-institutional population only.

x. Present territory, i.e., Singapore Island only, excluding Christmas Island which ceases to be part of the Colony on 1 January 1958 and was transferred to Australia on 1 October 1958. Population excludes transients afloat and service personnel in service establishments numbering 3,466 and 10,937 respectively at 1957 census.

y. Based on results of a demographic and economic sample survey which covered 2,241 villages and 64 large municipalities. Total is subject to error of ± 1.58 per cent.

z. Comprising former Annam, Cochinchina and Tonkin.

SPECIAL TABLES

B. CRUDE RATES OF LIVE BIRTHS AND DEATHS PER ANNUM

Number of Live Births or Deaths per 1,000 persons

	British Borneo			Burma	Ceylon	China: Taiwan ^a	Fed. of Malaya ^b	Hong Kong	India ^c	Iran	Japan ^d	Philip- pines	Singa- pore ^e	Thai- land
	Brunei	North Borneo	Sara- wak											

(1) Live births

1935-1939	32.1 ^f	35.6	44.7	40.2	26.7 ^g	33.8	...	29.2	32.2 ^f	46.0	34.9
1940-1944	36.5 ^f	45.8 ^g	40.7 ^g	26.3 ^g	29.1	26.8 ^g	30.1	32.5 ^g	44.9 ^g	35.2
1945-1949	45.2 ^g	19.0 ^g	14.0 ^g	36.3 ^g	38.2 ^f	41.1 ^g	40.5 ^g	25.3 ^g	27.0	27.3	29.9	25.6	46.4 ^g	25.1
1950	50.7	26.6	22.2	39.6	39.7 ^f	43.3	42.0	26.8	24.9	27.9	28.2	21.9	45.7	28.4
1955	57.3	31.6	22.9	37.1 ^h	37.3 ^f	45.3	43.0	38.7	27.0	43.8 ^f	19.4	(34.1)	47.6 ^f	34.2
1956	59.6 ^f	32.5	25.2	35.9 ^h	36.4	44.8	45.5	39.7	27.4	35.4 ^f	18.5	24.4	48.0 ^f	...
1957	45.5	37.3	24.0	(36.0) ^h	36.5	41.5	46.2	37.9	24.2	37.8	17.2	22.7	42.9	...
1958	41.7	...	38.8	...	24.9	17.9
Jun	(34.9)	38.0	...	36.4	21.7	20.4	15.9
Sep	45.1	...	47.5	29.6	22.6	17.2

(2) Deaths

1935-1939	22.0 ^f	24.5	20.2	20.8	29.1 ^g	22.6	...	17.4	16.6 ^f	22.1	16.4
1940-1944	19.7 ^f	18.3 ^g	20.1 ^g	35.8 ^g	22.6	13.8 ^g	16.3	16.6 ^g	20.8 ^g	17.3
1945-1949	19.7 ^g	13.3 ^g	5.9 ^g	37.7 ^g	16.0 ^f	13.7 ^g	17.5 ^g	8.6	18.6	8.2	16.7 ^f	13.1 ^g	12.5 ^g	13.3
1950	18.1	11.9	11.2	46.8	12.4 ^f	11.5	15.8	8.2	16.1	7.9	10.9	8.2	12.1	10.0
1955	14.0	11.0	7.1	21.1 ^h	10.8 ^f	8.6	11.5	8.2	11.7	10.4 ^f	7.8	9.9 ⁱ	8.7	9.2
1956	13.2 ^f	10.2	6.6	21.9 ^h	9.8	8.0	11.3	7.9	11.6	8.1 ^f	8.0	9.2	8.1	...
1957	15.6	9.4	6.6	(21.4) ^h	10.1	8.5	12.4	7.5	11.8	8.3	8.3	8.8	7.3	...
1958	7.6	...	7.5	7.4
Jun	(8.0)	7.2	...	7.8	11.2	3.0	6.4
Sep	7.2	...	7.8	15.1	4.2	6.5

Source: United Nations Statistical Office, except figures in brackets which are from national sources and may not be comparable with other figures.

a. Excluding armed forces and beginning 1949 excluding foreigners, births excluding births among tribal aborigine but rates are computed on population including them; births also excluding live-born infants dying before registration of births, death excluding deaths of infants dying before registration of birth.

b. Prior to 1941, territory of former British Malaya, i.e. including Singapore.

c. Prior to 1947, registration area of former British provinces, representing approximately 75% of former India, not including Burma. Beginning 1947, data are for the registration area of the Republic of India; for 1947-50, area consisted of States of Ajmer, Andhra, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Coorg, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal; beginning 1951, Mysore replaced Assam in the area. For 1953, data for Ajmer are excluded, and for 1955, data for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa are excluded.

d. Japanese nationals in Japan only. Beginning 1952 including Tokoro Archipelago and beginning 1954 including Amami Islands acquired from Ryukyu Islands on 5 December and 25 December 1953 respectively.

e. Present territory, i.e., excluding Christmas Island, which ceased to be part of the Colony on 1 January 1958 and was transferred to Australia 1 October 1958. Rates for 1957 computed on population excluding service personnel and transients afloat.

f. Registration area only, representing 82.8% of total population at 1931 census.

g. Average of less than 5 years.

h. Data for certain towns only, numbering 49 in 1950, 61 in 1955, 74 in 1956, 68 in 1957 and having a population of approximately 2 million.

i. Data for registration area only, comprising about 90% of total population.

REGIONAL STATISTICS

1. REGIONAL STATISTICAL SERIES (Cont'd)

Annual and quarterly figures

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	I	II	III	IV
									IV	I	II	III	IV
EXTERNAL TRADE (Cont'd)													
Direction of trade (million US dollars)													
Exports to:—													
ECAFE countries	3,522	2,964	2,562	2,539	2,669	2,984	3,180	2,800	801	721	687	664	730
Western Europe (including U.K.)	2,713	1,863	1,759	1,789	2,135	2,198	2,120	1,993	540	509	412	510	562
U.K.	1,249	840	744	845	1,004	1,004	922	1,003	251	242	205	266	290
U.S.A.	1,641	1,390	1,238	1,172	1,530	1,532	1,652	1,613	429	384	378	403	448
Sterling area	4,006	2,851	2,339	2,691	2,964	2,990	3,191	2,951	849	737	660	754	798
Imports from:—													
ECAFE countries	3,364	3,100	2,794	2,679	3,012	3,388	3,648	3,331	854	826	829	767	904
Western Europe (including U.K.)	2,349	2,436	2,221	2,188	2,202	2,590	3,183	2,433	787	658	576	560	634
U.K.	1,029	1,073	930	902	955	1,133	1,323	1,037	312	280	239	246	274
U.S.A.	1,992	2,193	1,800	1,813	1,990	2,414	3,371	2,576	725	695	650	573	658
Sterling area	2,954	2,914	2,682	2,400	2,659	3,076	3,613	2,891	849	731	696	698	768
Export of primary products*													
Quantum indexes (1953=100)													
General	101	98	100	102	108	109	112	...	110	110	95	109	...
Food	99	96	100	107	108	115	120	...	101	130	105	114	...
Agricultural materials	107	101	100	99	109	105	101	...	112	97	84	103	...
Mineral products	81	95	100	95	100	111	133	...	139	103	112	120	...
Unit value index (1953=100)													
General	147	118	100	100	108	102	102	...	102	96	97	98	...
Food	94	100	100	105	95	91	93	...	100	86	94	98	...
Agricultural materials	189	131	100	97	119	111	110	...	103	104	97	96	...
Mineral products	105	109	100	93	95	101	102	...	104	107	107	106	...
Quantity of exports (thousand tons)													
Food													
Fish, fresh or simply preserved	121	145	153	164	180	173	172	267	44	69	52	67	78
Rice and rice products	3,410	2,945	2,654	2,987	3,294	3,244	3,988	3,054	711	1,010	907	644	492
Sugar	857	1,255	1,755	1,604	1,689	1,632	1,804	1,959	280	660	495	473	345
Tea	432	394	436	459	408	458	420	457	111	105	83	133	134
Spices	49	62	59	74	80	90	84	72	22	18	10	20	24
Agricultural materials													
Hides and skins, raw	44	22	24	24	22	20	20	18	4	3	4	5	5
Oilseeds, oil nuts & oil kernels	1,427	1,143	1,017	1,219	1,232	1,416	1,396	1,075	346	222	208	307	320
Rubber, natural	1,756	1,692	1,611	1,688	1,782	1,699	1,737	1,687	468	386	346	468	487
Wood and lumber	893	1,094	1,481	1,732	2,023	2,251	2,359	3,338	576	594	860	907	977
Cotton, raw	283	321	379	222	320	265	204	216	39	56	63	56	41
Jute, raw	1,078	841	982	892	981	958	785	906	270	398	123	106	278
Hemp, raw	149	127	132	122	135	143	141	117	30	30	26	28	34
Vegetable oils, not essential	425	495	404	499	602	515	450	417	125	84	95	120	119
Mineral products													
Iron ore	2,144	3,152	3,728	3,540	4,399	5,636	6,631	5,877	1,381	997	1,602	1,965	1,313
Tin ore and concentrates	42	46	45	45	44	45	42	28	12	7	7	7	7
Manganese ore	1,162	1,463	1,593	1,006	936	712	1,742	976	436	302	214	262	197
Coal	2,451	2,729	2,201	2,063	1,562	1,940	1,655	1,800	400	431	461	462	446
Crude petroleum	4,974	5,670	6,963	7,083	8,367	10,027	12,408	12,447	3,373	2,755	3,120	3,193	3,378
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE													
ASSETS ^f (end of period, million US dollars) ^g													
	4,742	5,381	5,073	5,121	5,833 ^f	5,587 ^f	4,443 ^f	4,138	4,453	4,486 ^f	4,128	4,165	4,138

GENERAL NOTES: In general, the regional statistical series cover the countries of the ECAFE region except mainland China, Nepal and, in most of the cases, Afghanistan and Iran; in some cases, other countries have also been omitted because of lack of data. Except in the case of mainland China, countries omitted from the regional series are, from the point of view of the series, usually less important. To ensure comparability, the countries included in different periods for each series are the same.

a. Crop year beginning from the year stated. FAO source except rubber for which the International Rubber Study Group figures are used.

b. The present index of production of mining and manufacturing industries, published since February 1958 issue in the United Nations, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, replaces the provisional index of industrial production compiled by the ECAFE secretariat and published in the earlier issues of this Bulletin. This index covers Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China: Taiwan, Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, southern Korea, Laos, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and southern Viet-Nam.

c. For countries covered see table 5 below.

d. Based on quantum indexes of exports and imports compiled by governments for Burma, Ceylon, China (Taiwan), Federation of Malaya and Singapore, India, Japan, and the Philippines. Quantum indexes for Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand are derived from unit value indexes. These national indexes are combined to form the regional index with the dollar values of exports and imports in the base year 1953 as weights. Exports of the countries included in the index account for 88 per cent of total exports of the

region, excluding mainland China, in the base year, and imports of the countries included in the index account for 85 per cent of total imports of the region, again excluding mainland China. Intra-regional trade is not deducted, and the index shows changes in the total quantum of trade of ECAFE countries, and not changes in the trade of the region vis-à-vis other regions. The regional unit value indexes of exports and imports are derived from the regional quantum indexes and the total values of exports and imports of these countries in United States dollars.

e. Exports of 18 primary products and food from 19 countries and territories (excluding Afghanistan, mainland China and Nepal) are included in the index. To minimize the effect of transit trade, only export of domestic produce is included for Hong Kong and net export of rubber is used for the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. The quantity of exports of each item is totalled for 19 countries and territories and relatives have been then weighed by the total value of exports of each commodity in 19 countries and territories in terms of United States dollars in 1953 to form the quantum index. The unit value index is obtained by dividing the index of total value of exports in United States dollars by the quantum index. The commodities included in the index account for 44 per cent of the total value of exports from the 16 countries. (If Hong Kong and Japan are excluded, the percentage is increased to 58.)

f. Includes Burma, Ceylon, China (Taiwan), Federation of Malaya and Singapore, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, southern Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and southern Viet-Nam. Figures prior to 1952 exclude Japan and those prior to 1955 exclude Viet-Nam.

PRODUCTION

2. INDEX NUMBERS OF PRODUCTION

1953=100^a

	Weight	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
CHINA (Taiwan)														
Industrial production ^b	100.0	107	119	125	142	149	165	150	160	152	179	183	...	
Mining and quarrying	10.5	100	114	120	134	144	157	133	158	129	155	181	...	
Coal	7.4	88	99	106	122	133	137	121	140	128	143	179	...	
Manufacturing ^b	76.6	107	120	125	143	148	169	152	161	155	183	188	...	
Food ^b	19.0	85	101	104	126	121	224	196	161	159	180	187	...	
Textiles	17.8	116	122	115	128	119	140	111	116	108	141	129	...	
Chemicals	9.5	109	120	134	158	164	173	143	164	153	198	197	...	
Construction of buildings	1.1	106	145	104	118	177	170	197	157	174	178	131	...	
Public utilities	11.9	115	123	135	149	162	157	149	160	161	179	168	...	
Electricity	7.6	115	126	144	163	184	175	164	181	181	210	189	...	
INDIA ^c														
Industrial production	100.0	107	116	126	130	...	131	132	131	128	125	
Mining	7.2	103	107	110	122	...	132	126	133	120	126	
Manufacturing	90.7	107	116	126	130	...	130	131	130	127	124	
Food	11.8	96	115	124	134	
Textiles	48.0	103	106	112	109	...	109	100	108	104	100	
Rubber products	3.4	117	129	139	152	...	164	158	181	167	160	
Chemicals	4.2	108	122	132	140	...	139	144	164	159	160	
Non-metallic mineral products ^d	3.3	115	124	141	160	...	176	173	183	172	170	
Basic metal industries	8.0	121	119	124	126	...	130	128	110	129	130	
Non-electrical machinery	0.6	153	205	269	371	...	433	442	451	453	467	
Electrical machinery	1.5	112	138	184	216	...	229	218	236	240	243	
Transport equipment	2.9	113	171	236	246	...	246	236	198	240	213	
Electricity	2.1	112	128	145	163	...	167	166	188	188	185	
Industrial production (seasonally adjusted)	137	131	131	129	138	
INDONESIA														
Export products														
General ^e	...	108	109	109	118	
Estate	...	100	99	96	100	
Peasantry	...	123	117	110	108	
Mining	...	105	111	117	137	
Estate products (7 items)	...	99	94	92	93	...	92	91	89	88	
JAPAN														
Industrial production	100	108	117	144	167	167	165	167	163	166	179	174	190	
Manufacturing and mining	92.8	108	117	143	169	170	166	168	163	167	180	174	192	
Mining	7.2	96	97	107	118	114	124	115	107	114	119	113	114	
Manufacturing	85.6	110	119	147	174	176	171	174	170	173	186	180	200	
Food	11.5	108	115	122	128	139	103	193	118	121	127	143	232	
Textiles	15.0	109	121	144	159	143	159	141	138	143	149	141	152	
Chemicals	10.7	114	132	159	187	195	188	181	197	197	205	204	205	
Ferrous metal	8.9	105	117	143	162	153	149	143	155	152	160	160	164	
Machinery	17.0	113	114	166	230	249	236	229	239	249	277	253	274	
Public utilities	7.2	106	114	131	146	155	150	147	154	153	165	166	157	
KOREA, southern (1954=100)														
Industrial production	100.0	100	119	143	187	194	209	167	205	212	194	
Mining	10.0	100	115	145	194	212	228	217	210	198	222	
Manufacturing	87.0	100	120	143	188	194	208	161	206	216	191	
Textiles	48.0	100	119	142	188	197	210	174	203	206	203	
Metal products and machinery	13.0	100	128	179	235	207	269	190	190	245	204	
Electricity	3.0	100	98	124	148	169	162	168	160	160	188	
PAKISTAN														
Industrial production	...	128	161	182	192	215	202	214	206	213	227	
Mining	...	101	107	125	130	145	133	146	140	142	153	
Manufacturing	...	131	167	189	200	222	211	221	212	234	222	
PHILIPPINES														
Mining	.	94	102	113	126	123	136	117	129	110	136	
Manufacturing	.	113	127	147	158	166	161	165	164	169	166	

a. Original base: China (Taiwan), 1954; India, 1951; Indonesia, 1938; Japan, 1955; southern Korea, 1955; Pakistan, 1950; Philippines, 1952 for 1954, 1955 for succeeding years.

b. Sugar production is excluded from the monthly and quarterly index but included in the annual index. Weights relate to annual index.

c. Quarterly figures relate to the mid-month of each quarter.

d. Manufactures of non-metallic mineral products except products of petroleum and coal.

e. 18 products, including forest products (jungle wood and rattan).

3. PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES

Monthly averages or calendar months

PRODUCTION

Thousand tons

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
NATURAL RUBBER^a														
Cambodia	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.7	2.6	2.8	3.7	1.6	2.4	3.1	4.1	3.3
Ceylon	8.3	8.0	7.9	8.1	8.3	8.5	9.5	8.0	8.1	8.5	9.4	9.2	4.8	...
Fed. of Malaya & Singapore	48.6	49.5	54.1	53.1	54.1	56.2	56.7	54.7	48.6	59.8	61.7	65.8	49.9	...
India	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.8	2.3	1.0	...
Indonesia	58.6	62.5	62.1	58.1	58.0	52.0	52.6	37.3	42.1	63.1	65.7	43.4	48.3	...
Sarawak	2.0	2.0	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.4	2.7	3.0	3.8	3.7	2.5	2.3	...
Viet-Nam	4.2	4.6	5.5	5.9	5.8	6.0	7.9	3.3 ^r	5.6 ^r	6.4 ^r	8.6	6.8	0.3	...
COAL														
China (Taiwan)	199	177	197	211	243	265	273	242	280	254	285	358
Federation of Malaya ^b	24	19	17	15	13	6	10	7	6	4	5	6	8	...
India	3,046	3,123	3,237	3,339	3,684	3,839	3,892	3,847	3,806	3,772	3,923	4,152
Indonesia	75	75	68	69	60	50	66	51	41	52	54
Iran	13	21	15	27	27
Japan	3,878	3,560	3,535	3,880	4,311	4,139	4,523	4,283	3,801	4,128	4,345	4,178	4,174	...
Korea, southern	72	74	109	151	203	231	252	201	243	201	260	281	264	...
Pakistan ^c	49	47	45	55	44	51	46	58	45	37	62
Philippines	13	10	11	13	17	9	12	11	10	8	7
Viet-Nam, southern	1.0	1.7	1.4	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.3	0.8	...
IRON ORE^d														
Federation of Malaya	90	103	124	207	252	237	181	119	264	342	222	174	212	...
Hong Kong	10	8	10	10	8	9	8	9	9	8	10	9	10	...
India	309	333	361	359	391	483	423	464	486	450	533	614
Japan ^e	128	136	126	159	187	167	200	141	166	178	182	150	160	...
Korea, southern	2	3	2	5	15	22	18	20	26	21	20	39	22	...
Pakistan	0.1	—	0.6	2.0	0.5	1.5	1.7	0.2	—	—
Philippines	101	119	119	120	112	91	86	84	91	93	98
TIN CONCENTRATES (tons)														
Burma	80	80	94	67	59	102	59	102	102	102	102
China (mainland)	525	625	1,016	1,186	1,354	1,524	1,524	1,524	1,524	1,524	1,524
Federation of Malaya	4,763	5,139	5,186	5,274	5,020	3,256	5,170	3,981	3,331	2,900	2,812	3,118	2,602	...
Indonesia	2,858	3,036	2,825	2,545	2,347	1,968	2,636	1,801	1,980	2,281	1,796	1,639	1,463	...
Japan	62	61	76	78	80	92	84	90	93	91	93
Laos	9	21	20	44	51	42	52	51	51	51
Thailand	885	828	933	1,057	1,145	654	1,299	694	640	640	642	781	525	...
PETROLEUM, CRUDE^f														
Brunei	407	399	438	470	450	434	452	429	415	438	455
Burma	12	15	18	19	33	39	32	34	37	42	42
Indonesia	852	898	982	1,061	1,289	1,342	1,414	1,250	1,348	1,412	1,359
Iran	124	292	1,422	2,207	2,927	3,333	2,999	3,280	3,206	3,514	3,330	3,432	3,416	...
Japan	25	25	29	29	27	31	29	30	30	31	31	31	30	...
Pakistan	20	22	23	24	25	25	25	25	25	26	26
Sarawak	4	6	6	6	6	...	6	5	5	4
SALT														
Burma	5.2	7.7	8.4	7.2	9.7	9.2	9.8	7.9	10.6	9.5	8.9
China (Taiwan)	13.5	30.7	35.1	25.4	32.3	36.6	53.7	30.9	56.4	12.2	46.9	38.4
India	268.5	229.9	252.2	276.9	307.5	350.1	92.7	269.3	878.3	148.8	103.9
Indonesia	22.3	10.9	3.8	9.1	28.9	19.6	103.2	—	—	10.4	67.8
Japan ^g	38.4	35.4	46.1	52.3	69.3	88.2	74.6	66.7	84.3	111.5	90.1	80.5	64.1	...
Korea, southern	16.1	15.0	29.5	16.4	32.0	36.4	25.4	0.5	62.4	61.6	21.0	—	—	...
Pakistan	26.7	33.6	33.8	32.8	38.3	...	24.4	39.2	34.8	20.6	28.0
Philippines	4.0	4.0	6.7	5.3	8.6	11.6
Thailand	29.5	18.5	19.7	20.6	21.9
Viet-Nam, southern	6.4	5.0	6.6	5.1	0.7	6.4	10.9	1.3	1.8	0.1
SUGAR^h														
China (Taiwan)	76.7	53.5	66.9	64.6	76.5	72.2	93.9	184.6	19.5	—	84.9	213.7
India	109.3	85.3	135.0	157.2	170.0	165.7	168.2	412.8	85.7	7.5	156.8
Indonesia	51.6	59.8	71.4	65.5	69.0	64.5	10.8	—	80.7	160.2	15.7	—	—	...
Iran	5.9	5.8	6.4	6.8	6.3
Pakistan	7.3	6.4	8.0	7.4	9.4	13.8	11.5	29.2	12.6	0.1	13.2	33.3	31.4	...
Philippines	85.7	108.4	103.7	97.0	85.8	114.8
Thailand	3.0	3.7	4.5	5.4	5.7
TEA														
Ceylon	13.0	13.9	14.4	14.2	15.0	14.9	13.8	15.5	16.7	12.1	15.3	15.3	15.2	...
China (Taiwan)	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.2	0.8	1.2	1.6	1.0	1.1
India	23.0	24.1	25.0	25.1	25.2	26.6	28.5	4.9	24.7	45.5	31.5
Indonesia	3.1	3.9	3.6	3.5	3.9	3.9	4.4	3.9	3.8	3.6	4.3	3.8	3.5	...
Pakistan	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.4	0.2	1.8	3.9	2.9	0.2	0.1	...

PRODUCTION

3. PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES (Cont'd)

Monthly averages or calendar months

Thousand tons

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
COTTON YARN														
Burma	0.11	0.15	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.14
China (Taiwan)	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.6
Hong Kong	2.7	3.3	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.5	4.4	4.6	3.8
India	56.9	59.0	61.8	63.2	67.3	63.7	67.2	63.5	60.3	64.9	66.2	68.5
Japan	34.5	38.7	34.9	41.1	43.1	36.6	39.8	37.0	35.7	36.5	37.1	34.0	38.7	...
Korea, southern	1.1	1.7	2.2	2.6	3.4	3.7	3.9	3.2	3.6	3.6	4.2	4.1	3.9	...
Pakistan	4.5	7.3	10.4	11.4	12.0	13.0	12.7	12.4	11.9	13.4	14.4
Philippines	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06
COTTON FABRICS (Mn metres)														
Ceylon (Mn sq. metres)	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.4
China (Taiwan)	10.9	13.8	13.6	11.6	13.0	12.2	14.2	10.9	13.1	11.4	13.6	12.0
India	372	381	388	404	405	375	392	376	371	378	377	393
Indonesia	3.6	3.8	4.2	4.4	4.7	...	5.3	4.7	4.1	5.0
Japan (Mn sq. metres)	196	222	210	242	268	218	272	234	224	203	213	204	229	...
Korea, southern (Mn sq. metres)	6.0	8.0	8.4	10.2	13.8	10.4	15.0	9.3	10.2	10.7	11.3	11.9	11.2	...
Pakistan	19.2	26.5	34.5	38.1	40.0	44.4	42.0	46.6	42.9	44.2	44.2
Philippines	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.4	1.2	...	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.9
Thailand	3.1	4.4	4.1
JUTE MANUFACTURES														
China (Taiwan)	0.70	0.75	0.90	1.05	1.01	0.73	1.05	0.85	0.56	0.41	1.11	1.21
(Gunny bag. Mn pieces)	73.6	78.6	87.0	92.5	87.2	89.9	90.8	91.1	89.8	88.8	89.8
India	4.2†	4.5	7.5	12.1	12.6	14.5	12.7	13.4	13.0	14.1	17.6	20.3
Pakistan	0.05	0.05	0.24	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
Thailand (Gunny bag. Mn pieces)
PAPER														
China (Taiwan)	2.0	2.5	2.8	3.6	5.0	6.0	5.9	5.4	5.8	6.0	6.8	8.0
India	8.1	8.7	10.1	10.4	10.7	13.1	11.5	12.7	12.7	13.1	13.7
Japan ¹	146.8	160.1	183.6	214.0	246.8	249.1	240.2	237.6	253.0	241.2	264.7	275.3	282.1	...
Korea, southern	0.8	1.5	1.7	2.0	1.8	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.8	2.5	2.5	...
Pakistan	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.1	1.8	1.4	1.9	1.8	...
Thailand	0.08	0.17	0.17	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
VEGETABLE OILS														
China (Taiwan): Edible oil	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.9	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.2	0.8
Federation of Malaya: Coconut oil	6.7	8.2	8.0	9.2	8.2	6.4	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.5	4.1	4.3	3.6	...
Palm oil	4.2	4.6	4.8	4.7	5.0	5.8	5.2	4.8	5.8	7.2	5.6	5.3	4.9	...
India: Edible oil (Vanaspati)	16.2	19.5	22.1	21.6	25.5	25.0	26.0	27.2	26.6	23.4	22.6
Indonesia: Palm oil	13.4	14.1	13.8	13.7	13.4	12.3	12.5	10.5	12.9	14.3	11.3	9.8	8.6	...
Japan: Coconut oil	1.2	1.6	2.3	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	...
Others	8.8	9.0	13.0	15.1	16.3	19.9	16.9	17.5	17.5	21.3	23.4	18.7	18.6	...
Pakistan: Vegetable oil	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.3	0.7	2.1	...
Philippines: Coconut oil	11.8	12.2	13.3	17.7	...	19.1
Singapore: Coconut oil	1.4	3.2	2.8	3.4	4.1	2.6	4.9	2.8	2.0	3.2	2.3	2.3	1.0	...
SUPERPHOSPHATES¹														
China (Taiwan)	5.8	6.5	6.7	8.4	8.6	8.7	9.5	6.6	9.4	8.4	10.1
India	4.1	8.9	6.3	6.9	12.0	...	11.6	12.4	13.8	16.7	13.1
Japan	118.9	143.5	149.6	171.5	155.3	146.5	131.5	161.1	138.7	143.8	142.4	155.3	161.1	...
AMMONIUM SULPHATE														
China (Taiwan)	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.9
India	27.0	28.9	33.3	32.9	32.1	...	35.3	34.0	30.6	30.7	33.5
Japan	161.3	172.9	177.4	193.6	206.7	217.5	213.1	197.6	221.5	227.9	223.2	230.0	207.4	...
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS^k														
Burma	8.3	10.2	10.7	11.4	17.6	24.4	20.0	21.2	25.9	24.5	25.9
China (Taiwan, thousand Kilolitres)	27.0	37.0	51.0	52.8	55.8	56.7	52.6	53.9	52.0	58.8	62.1	72.4
Indonesia	808.2	825.8	863.9	859.0	911.1	847.8	923.1	876.0	773.9	852.8	888.3
Iran	234.2	606.2	919.2	1,285.3	1,257.5	1,161.3	1,161.3	1,287.3	1,298.3	1,283.0
Japan (thousand Kilolitres)	505.6	616.7	717.8	984.1	1,212.6	1,346.5	1,316.7	1,185.7	1,273.4	1,412.7	1,514.2	1,494.0	1,488.2	...
Pakistan	5.4	6.2	6.3	7.0	7.2	7.4	7.6	7.4	7.0	7.9	7.2	10.0	6.1	...

3. PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES (Cont'd)

PRODUCTION

Monthly averages or calendar months

Thousand tons

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
CEMENT														
Burma	3.5	4.9	5.0	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.0	1.9	2.8	3.5	3.8
Ceylon	5.5	7.0	7.1	7.1	4.1	6.7	3.5	5.6	6.4	6.7	8.0
China (Taiwan)	43.3	44.7	49.2	49.2	50.3	84.6	46.3	71.1	85.4	89.4	92.4	92.3
Federation of Malaya	6.4 ^a	7.2	9.1	8.7	9.5	9.2	9.4	9.6	9.0	8.8	9.3	10.7	11.0	...
Hong Kong	5.3	8.4	9.7	10.1	8.7	12.7	9.1	15.2	10.5	9.6	15.5	16.2	12.7	...
India	320.0	372.0	379.9	417.2	474.3	513.6	544.6	564.2	532.3	487.0	470.7	508.0	511.0	...
Iran	5.4	5.2	11.0	18.7	11.6	12.2	11.6	11.5	10.8	13.9	12.7
Japan	730.7	889.6	879.7	1,085.3	1,264.7	1,249.0	1,303.6	1,199.0	1,171.0	1,257.0	1,367.0	1,080.0	1,181.0	...
Korea, southern	3.5	5.1	4.7	3.8	7.7	24.6	12.0	19.2	25.3	25.6	28.4	22.0	22.6	...
Pakistan	50.5	57.0	57.8	65.5	91.3	90.9	95.2	87.1	91.1	91.1	94.2	89.4	83.3	...
Philippines	26.5	26.7	34.1	37.0	37.2	46.2	36.6	39.3	44.4	47.7	53.2
Thailand	24.0	31.9	32.2	33.1	33.5	38.0	35.7	41.3	38.8	34.6	37.3	41.0	34.3	...
BUILDING BRICKS (million units)														
China (Taiwan)	28.83	31.33	30.67	33.42	39.00	43.92	48.43	46.47	44.00	34.47	50.76
Federation of Malaya	6.51	6.92	9.05	10.76	11.90	...	12.05	10.40	11.65	10.91	11.27
Japan	18.33	20.00	19.00	21.25	23.00	19.00	24.13	15.00	20.00	23.00	20.00	13.00	10.00	...
Korea, southern	1.23	2.27	2.08	7.08	15.95	13.81	15.86	7.67	19.21	17.01	11.38	0.32	—	...
STEEL (ingots and metal for castings)														
China (Taiwan)	2.5	4.1	4.8	6.0	7.4	8.9	8.5	8.3	7.9	8.3	11.1	11.1
India	127.6	143.4	144.3	147.1	145.2	153.5	152.8	156.6	132.8	163.3	160.0	156.0
Japan	638.5	645.0	784.0	925.5	1,047.5	1,009.8	939.6	957.2	966.1	1,013.5	1,072.5	1,157.5	1,151.0	...
Pakistan	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.4	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.6	...
TIN METAL (tons)														
Federation of Malaya	5,284	6,025	5,980	6,203	6,036	3,838	5,799	5,139	3,593	3,418	3,204
ELECTRICITY (million kWh)														
Cambodia	2	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	4	4	4	4
Ceylon	12	14	15	16	17	18	18	16	18	19	19	19	19	...
China (Taiwan)	130	150	164	187	213	237	228	214	236	236	263	247
Federation of Malaya ^m	64	73	79	84	89	74	93	82	75	70	71	71
Hong Kong	36	41	47	54	62	68	62	62	67	72	69	73	65	...
India	559	625	716	803	906	1,031	935	954	1,021	1,051	1,079	1,156
Japan	4,642	4,967	5,433	6,011	6,476	6,656	6,169	6,521	6,905	6,932	6,265	7,226	5,990	...
Korea, southern	61	75	73	93	110	126	121	125	119	119	140	147	124	...
Pakistan	34	41	51	64	78
Philippines (Manila)	52	58	65	77	93	107	99	100	105	110	111	114	108	...
Singapore	23	27	31	36	41	47	44	45	48	49	47	50
Thailand (Bangkok) ⁿ	8	13	16	18	22	24	23	23	23	24	24
Viet-Nam ^p	24	15	17	17	18	20	19	19	20	20	21	21

- a. Including latex. b. Lignite. c. Including lignite.
d. Approximate metal content of ores as follows: Hong Kong 45%; India, 65%; Japan and the Philippines, 55%; Federation of Malaya, 60%.
e. Including iron sand.
f. Specific gravity: Brunei, Burma, Iran, Pakistan and Sarawak, 0.84; Indonesia, 0.85; Japan, 0.90.
g. Production in government licensed plants only.
h. Annual figures relate to crop year for Iran, India, the Philippines and Thailand, but calendar year for other countries.
i. Including paper board.
j. 16% P₂O₅ content.

- k. Comprising motor spirit, kerosene and diesel oil for Burma; gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene and fuel oil for China (Taiwan); motor spirit, aviation spirit, kerosene, heavy oil, wax and paraffin, asphalt and cutback for Indonesia; motor spirit, kerosene, distillate fuel oil and residual fuel oil (prior to 1957) for Iran; gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene, fuel oil, gas oil, lubricating oil and others for Japan; motor spirit and kerosene for Pakistan.
m. Including electricity purchased from Singapore.
n. Consumption of electricity; Bangkok Electric Works and Sam Sen Power Station.
p. Beginning 1954, southern Viet-Nam only, which represented 57% of total production in 1954.
q. Annual rate based on production of August-December.

PRODUCTION, TRANSPORT

4. CONSTRUCTION—NEW BUILDING

Monthly averages or calendar months

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
Ceylon: completed^a (Floor area—thousand sq metres)														
Residential	6.27	7.22	6.72	6.49	5.97	...	3.87	2.17	1.58	1.36	2.16
Non-residential	2.29	2.70	2.02	2.20	2.54	...	3.05	1.38	1.50	0.71	1.60
China (Taiwan) (Floor area—thousand sq metres)														
Public	6.09	4.81	6.15	4.71	5.68	8.41	7.21	9.19	9.77	4.38	10.29
Private	22.39	25.67	32.73	23.55	26.67	35.85	40.57	43.77	22.95	40.74	35.95
Federation of Malaya: completed (Cost—thousand Malayan dollars)														
Residential	3,526	4,376	...	5,095	4,463	2,709
Industrial	347	404	...	339	238	203
Commercial	425	516	...	664	481	466
Others	990	1,212	...	2,088	1,000	730
Hong Kong: completed (Cost—thousand Hong Kong dollars)														
Residential	4,128	4,236	8,902	8,654	10,267	10,489	14,103	10,041	6,563	16,320	9,033
Industrial	564	671	862	815	1,016	2,330	837	1,302	1,470	1,672	4,977
Commercial	86	886	336	1,438	1,204	2,438	2,796	122	396	4,180	5,053
Others	1,828	1,807	1,845	2,197	1,696	4,847	2,188	2,340	4,160	3,733	9,156
Japan: started (Floor area—thousand sq metres)														
Residential	1,421	1,400	1,454	1,752	1,870	1,933	1,897	1,602	2,074	2,075	1,979	1,425
Non-residential	1,448	1,367	1,328	1,665	1,775	1,593	1,635	1,421	1,516	1,658	1,775	1,560
Korea, southern: permits issued (Floor area—thousand sq metres)														
Residential	13 ^b	27	22	37	23	11	40	54	43	6	8	...
Non-residential	53 ^b	65	66	67	73	30	83	88	68	27	58	...
Philippines: permits issued (Value—thousand pesos)														
Residential	1,573	850	1,295	1,596	1,732	1,807	1,442	2,135	2,244	1,395	1,454	1,658	1,424	...
Non-residential	2,339	1,620	1,857	2,298	3,122	2,194	2,739	4,393	1,460	1,430	1,495	2,829	7,764	...
Singapore: completed (Number of dwelling units)														
Public ^d	227	239	279	184	124	340
Private ^e	148	120	200	186	156	145	80	49	53	75	110	26
Thailand: permits issued (Number of permits)														
Residential	251	214	244	201	204	226	196	256	237	213	200	188
Non-residential	57	72	72	64	44	27	30	26	28	23	30	33

a. Excluding particulars of buildings under building schemes.

b. December.

c. Manila only.

d. Comprising buildings erected by or on behalf of Public Works Department, Singapore Improvement Trust and City Council.

e. Quarterly figures exclude buildings erected in city area which are not available.

f. Bangkok only.

5. VOLUME OF TRAFFIC: RAILWAYS, SEA-BORNE SHIPPING AND CIVIL AVIATION

Monthly averages or calendar months

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
RAILWAYS^a														
Passenger-kilometres (million)														
Burma†	47	57	66	70	78	90	85	91	101	86	111
Cambodia	4	4	5	6	7	6	6	7	7	6	6
China (Taiwan)	173	186	211	237	287	308	298	310	314	299	309	303	374	...
Hong Kong	7	6	7	9	9
India†	4,723	4,892	5,040	5,464	5,554	5,606	5,448	5,487	6,110	5,420	5,407
Iran	31	31	39	37
Japan†	6,963	7,253	7,603	8,174	8,437	8,851	8,263	8,356	8,945	8,994	8,628	9,009	7,798	...
Korea, southern	241	325	309	337	286	348	332	322	346	362	361	341
Pakistan†	730	772	788	860	901	...	901	602	889	926	900	871
Philippines	32	35	37	43	49	58	57	54	70	51	61	64
Thailand	191	196	167	155	164	164	149	197	180	136	141
Viet-Nam ^b	8	11	31	32	37	...	35	38	35	35	34
Freight ton-kilometres (million)														
Burma†	35	44	53	51	51	52	47	59	55	45	46
Cambodia	4	5	2	4	5	5	4	6	7	3	3
Ceylon†	21	22	22	24	24	...	22	20	20	27
China (Taiwan) ^c	120	122	137	142	159	158	162	160	158	147	168	177	137	...
Fed. of Malaya and Singapore	31	32	33	37	36	32	32	33	32	33	32
Hong Kong	0.29	0.33	0.51	0.65	0.57	0.66	0.70	0.51	0.50	0.39	1.22
India†	4,002	4,159	4,595	5,166	5,892	6,077	5,878	6,511	5,762	6,045	5,987
Indonesia	75	81	88	87	87
Iran	79	99	104	113	125	...	124	129	114	111
Japan†	3,368	3,277	3,500	3,859	3,971	3,731	4,292	3,607	3,624	3,497	4,099	3,425	3,640	...
Korea, southern	241	155	156	169	197	204	213	182	205	203	227	216
Pakistan†	472	449	469	529	557	...	570	408	616	525	580	625
Philippines	12	12	13	12	13	17	17	17	15	16	13	14
Thailand	54	57	65	76	85	91	89	100	96	85	81
Viet-Nam ^b	15	12	7	5	7	...	6	6	8	7	8

TRANSPORT

5. VOLUME OF TRAFFIC: RAILWAYS, SEA-BORNE SHIPPING AND CIVIL AVIATION (Cont'd)

Monthly averages or calendar months

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
INTERNATIONAL SEA-BORNE SHIPPING														
Freight loaded (L) and unloaded (U) in external trade (thousand tons)														
Ceylon ^d	L . . .	73	92	88	82	83	67	70	53	81	71	52	66	
	U . . .	182	203	191	205	268	280	271	274	257	317	345	275	
China (Taiwan)	L . . .	120	85	106	104	111	149	160	141	151	145	156	...	
	U . . .	109	142	155	177	193	189	198	171	221	167	179	...	
Fed. of Malaya	L . . .	182	183	226	284	310	258	230	134	288	391	218	168	...
	U . . .	185	193	231	241	235	221	227	240	211	207	227	213	...
Hong Kong	L . . .	126	126	141	162	143	163	147	131	163	151	209	154	137
	U . . .	279	303	347	386	426	443	428	430	436	429	478	430	377
Indonesia ^e	L . . .	1,034	1,068	1,016	1,086	1,252	1,272	1,522	1,069	1,315	1,312	1,391	316	720
	U . . .	350	326	272	354	525	292	555	352	237	233	347	118	130
Japan ^f	L . . .	413	476	624	681	645	725	637	720	709	708	768	628	765
	U . . .	2,607	2,794	3,058	3,870	4,890	4,294	4,455	3,792	3,961	4,340	4,299	3,945	3,976
Korea, southern	L . . .	12	9	8	11	15	10	11	9	10	6	16	11	...
	U . . .	95	82	171	74	104	98	76	87	107	100	96	129	...
Pakistan	L . . .	109	101	124	120	100	92	118	88	73	75	131	135	98
	U . . .	293	218	236	335	382	373	358	413	425	334	319	484	288
Philippines	L . . .	375	442	483	587	494	...	420	328	337
	U . . .	283	251	280	347	297	...	279	209	220
Singapore	L . . .	438	450	510	552	554	483	600	551	519	417	444	390	320
	U . . .	732	769	883	921	958	855	1,009	1,000	857	792	769	756	686
Thailand (Bangkok)	L . . .	143	138	161	164	186	162	157	191	149	154	157	148	148
	U . . .	107	108	116	126	138	142	132	140	156	126	145	141	159
Viet-Nam (Saigon)	L . . .	17	37	39	28	42	...	27	55	40	25	46
	U . . .	106	127	111	108	114	...	94	121	134	123	135
Entrances (E) and clearances (C) of vessels with cargo in external trade (thousand net registered tons)														
Burma ^g	E . . .	104	122	116	112	117	...	128	86	195	174
	C . . .	135	168	154	155	149	...	132	130	231	159
India	E . . .	750	753	806	829	947	...	945	1,021	940	999
	C . . .	885	800	702	737	702	...	823	783	782	825
CIVIL AVIATION^h														
Passenger-kilometres (million)														
Burma	...	4.58	4.55	5.11	4.96	4.31
Ceylon	...	1.67	0.77	0.79	2.45	3.28	3.81	3.90	3.89	3.86	3.96	3.53
China (Taiwan)	...	3.12	3.64	3.85	3.99	4.49	4.55	4.99	4.34	4.87	4.43	4.56
India	...	32.15	36.70	42.92	56.60	65.13	72.0	78.77	69.0	70.0	70.3	78.8	76.5	...
Indonesia	...	14.03	15.01	19.95	22.40	14.86	11.96	17.74	20.74
Japan	...	11.20	19.47	27.43	37.96	47.37	...	48.14	42.04	62.14	68.02
Pakistan	...	3.46	4.88	9.21	12.03	17.71	...	20.19	20.34	18.07	19.09	18.07
Philippines	...	18.97	10.84	10.08	11.74	13.94	15.61	14.89	13.49	17.50	14.26	17.14	16.90	18.09
Thailand	...	2.60	3.35	4.14	5.01	6.53	4.2	7.29	4.77	5.38	3.1	3.5	3.7	...
Freight ton-kilometres (thousand)														
Burma	...	127	161	112	94	80
Ceylon	...	69	12	14	118	144	120	143	112	127	120	123
China (Taiwan)	...	179	199	203	162	165	168	179	150	156	144	220
India	...	2,203	2,357	2,879	3,215	3,225	3,402	3,302	3,417	3,255	3,327	3,609	3,646	...
Indonesia	...	620	621	662	729	762	453	808	505	329	460	520
Japan	...	55	258	508	762	939	...	1,119	967	1,080	1,245
Pakistan	...	153	147	214	260	357	...	441	438	611	636	504
Philippines	...	778	398	347	335	386	347	411	313	328	341	405	303	392
Thailand	...	140	151	107	112	156	73	161	85	102	67	40	40	...

a. Railway traffic coverage: China (Taiwan), Taiwan Railway Administration; India and Pakistan, class I railways; Indonesia, postwar data relate to Federal area only; Japan, State Railways only; Philippines, Manila Railroad Company.

b. From August 1954, southern Viet-Nam only.

c. Including service traffic.

d. For 1953 port of Colombo only.

e. Federal area only.

f. Cargo carried by steel vessels only; excluding military goods.

g. Total number of entrances and clearances made during each voyage but excluding sailing vessels.

h. Scheduled domestic and international routes.

EXTERNAL TRADE

6. VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS AND BALANCE OF TRADE

Monthly averages or calendar months

Millions

	Ex-ports	Im-ports	Balance	Ex-ports	Im-ports	Balance	Ex-ports	Im-ports	Balance	Ex-ports	Im-ports	Balance	Ex-ports	Im-ports	Balance	Ex-ports	Im-ports	Balance
	BRUNEI (Malayan dollar)			BURMA (kyat)			CAMBODIA (riel)			CEYLON (rupee)			CHINA (Taiwan) (NT dollar)			FEDERATION OF MALAYA ^a (Malayan dollar)		
															ICA imports			
1953	23.5	9.5	+14.0	94	70	+24	161	124	+37	131	134	-3	165	230	92	133	121	+12
1954	22.8	8.3	+14.5	100	81	+19	184	172	+12	151	116	+35	121	275	125	135	110	+25
1955	25.3	8.7	+16.6	90	72	+18	117	139	-22	162	122	+40	160	262	127	198	129	+69
1956	27.5	9.5	+18.0	98	78	-20	107	165	-58	144	135	+9	244	400	166	188	146	+42
1957	28.5	9.0	+19.5	91	117	-26	151	170	-19	140	150	-10	306	438	172	182	151	+31
1958	27.0	6.6	+20.4	77	81	-4	154	214	-60	142	143	-1	322	467	138	157	138	+19
1957 IV	28.4	7.7	+20.7	59	120	-61	129	221	-92	122	134	-12	239	502	192	178	143	+35
1958 I	26.9	7.4	+19.5	75	104	-29	156	304	-148	143	136	+7	451	476	155	156	145	+11
1958 II	25.7	7.4	+18.3	96	63	+33	169	212	-43	101	109	-8	273	362	82	146	135	+11
1958 III	27.9	6.7	+21.2	72	82	-10	150	188	-38	167	151	+16	289	470	171	155	131	+24
1958 IV	28.3	6.1	+22.2	64	74	-10	142	177	-35	156	175	-19	274	561	143	171	141	+30
1959 Jan	44	79	-35	126	160	-34	135	153	-18	549	540	219	170	134	+36
1959 Feb	57	126	159	-33	633	400	26	171	115	+56
	HONG KONG (HK dollar)			INDIA (rupee)			INDONESIA ^c (rupiah)			IRAN ^d (1,000 Mn rials)			JAPAN (1,000 Mn yen)			KOREA, ^f southern (US dollar)		
			Exports, domestic												Special procure- ments ^e			
1953	228	323	53	443	479	-36	798	726	+72	0.72	1.41	-0.69	38.2	72.3	13.3	3.3	29.0	-25.7
1954	202	286	57	469	515	-46	823	598	+225	1.02	1.88	-0.86	48.9	72.0	7.2	2.0	20.6	-18.6
1955	212	310	61	506	561	-55	898	600	+298	1.46	2.25	-0.79	60.3	74.1	5.2	1.5	28.7	-27.2
1956	268	381	65	516	685	-169	838	813	+25	1.99	2.09	-0.10	75.0	96.9	5.0	2.1	32.4	-30.3
1957	252	429	62	536	855	-319	921	757	+164	2.30	2.10	+0.20	85.7	128.5	6.9	1.9	37.2	-35.3
1958	249	383	105 ^b	482	720	-238	718	492	+226	0.73	2.69	-1.96	86.3	91.0	4.3	1.4	32.6	-31.2
1957 IV	251	416	65	557	727	-170	889	695	+194	0.78	2.15	-1.37	91.6	104.3	3.7	1.6	28.4	-26.8
1958 I	231	373	100	478	676	-198	588	567	+21	1.00	2.43	-1.43	85.3	96.5	2.4	1.1	35.2	-34.1
1958 II	237	371	107	382	624	-242	634	460	+174	0.50	2.54	-2.04	81.6	93.0	8.8	1.2	38.0	-36.8
1958 III	244	359	100	544	604	-60	781	456	+325	0.58	2.48	-1.90	82.6	87.9	3.7	1.2	30.4	-29.2
1958 IV	285	429	114	527	705	-178	840	494	+356	0.87	3.32	-2.45	95.7	85.5	2.3	1.9	26.7	-24.8
1959 Jan	233	334	158	453	666	-213	393	309	+84	62.9	86.6	2.5
1959 Feb	205	331	145	429	598	-169	99.1	91.4	2.0
	LAOS (kip)			NORTH BORNEO (Malayan dollar)			PAKISTAN (rupee)			PHILIPPINES ^g (peso)			SARAWAK (Malayan dollar)			SINGAPORE ^h (Malayan dollar)		
1953	6	32	-26	4.7	5.5	-0.8	121	97	+24	66.4	75.4	-9.0	35.4	32.9	+2.5	221	252	-31
1954	3	47	-44	6.4	6.2	+0.2	99	92	+7	66.8	79.8	-13.0	35.5	33.2	+2.3	224	252	-28
1955	4	55	-51	8.7	7.3	+1.4	125	90	+35	66.8	91.3	-24.5	39.8	36.8	+3.0	281	322	-41
1956	4	103	-99	10.1	9.8	+0.3	135	166	-31	75.5	84.4	-8.9	40.6	38.7	+1.9	286	327	-41
1957	3	122	-119	10.0	10.1	-0.1	134	174	-40	72.0	102.4	-30.4	41.6	38.6	+3.0	290	338	-48
1958	5	87	-82	10.9	10.7	+0.2	118	157	-39	82.2	93.7	-11.5	38.6	36.1	+2.5	282	312	-50
1957 IV	3	171	-168	10.1	9.2	+0.9	142	178	-36	58.2	99.5	-41.3	42.4	39.4	+3.0	290	309	-19
1958 I	5	113	-108	10.2	9.9	+0.3	171	171	-	70.0	101.3	-31.3	35.7	34.9	+0.8	279	336	-57
1958 II	5	74	-69	10.6	10.3	+0.3	83	172	-89	83.5	87.6	-4.1	35.6	34.9	+0.7	267	326	-59
1958 III	4	85	-81	11.5	11.4	+0.1	87	143	-56	86.9	84.2	+2.7	41.0	36.7	+4.3	242	288	-46
1958 IV	5	75	-70	11.2	11.2	-	131	143	-12	88.6	101.7	-13.1	42.3	38.1	+4.2	259	297	-38
1959 Jan	133	149	-16	77.3	73.4	+3.9	269	340	-71
1959 Feb	111	131	-20	225	253	-28
	THAILAND (baht)			VIET-NAM ^a (piastre)														
1953	492	514	-22	157	883	-726												
1954	515	556	-41	164	946	-782												
1955	597	600	-3	201	768	-567												
1956	578	624	-46	122	614	-492												
1957	630	697	-67	232	842	-610												
1958	538	668	-130	159	677	-518												
1957 IV	616	682	-66	267	869	-602												
1958 I	635	701	-66	174	629	-455												
1958 II	542	705	-163	184	732	-548												
1958 III	502	624	-122	107	639	-532												
1958 IV	473	641	-168	173	708	-535												
1959 Jan	665	656	+9	73	428	-355												
1959 Feb	151	574	-423												

General Notes: Special trade system for Cambodia, China: Taiwan, Indonesia, Iran, southern Korea, Laos, North Borneo, Sarawak and Viet-Nam; general trade for other countries. Figures on imports include aid unless otherwise specified.

a. Including movements between Federation of Malaya and Singapore.

b. For 1958 only, products wholly or principally of Hong Kong origin.

c. Data compiled and published in rupiah at the official rate.

d. Years beginning 21 March. Including value of exchange certificates. From 1957, quarterly figures on exports exclude petroleum; for 1952, 1957 and later, imports exclude "official" imports.

e. Not included in trade statistics.

f. Prior to 1955, figures based on foreign exchange settlements at the Bank of Korea. From 1955 onwards, government imports are still based on exchange settlements, but exports and private imports are based on data of Bureau of Customs.

g. Imports valued f.o.b.

h. Prior to January 1955, excluding trade with Cambodia and Laos but including transit trade of these countries with other countries through Viet-Nam. Beginning June 1955, trade of the Republic of Viet-Nam only.

7. DIRECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

EXTERNAL TRADE

Quarterly averages or quarters

Million dollars

Area of origin for imports and area of destination for exports	Year and Quarter	BURMA		CAMBODIA		CEYLON		CHINA (Taiwan)		FEDERATION OF MALAYA		HONG KONG		INDIA		INDONESIA ^b	
		Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
1. All countries	1953	59.4	44.2	82.3	84.5	31.9	45.5	75.2	73.1	120.8	170.6	279.0	300.2	210.0	191.2
	1954	62.1	51.1	95.0	73.4	23.3	52.8	76.2	66.1	105.9	150.3	295.6	323.8	214.0	157.3
	1955	56.7	45.2	10.0	11.9	101.8	76.7	30.8	50.2	112.3	78.1	111.1	162.8	319.1	353.4	236.4	157.8
	1956	61.2	49.4	9.3	13.7	91.1	85.8	29.6	48.4	117.0	186.2	140.8	199.8	312.8	427.2	220.5	213.3
	1957	52.5	74.0	12.9	14.6	83.4	94.7	37.1	53.1	114.2	90.0	149.8	243.0	337.5	538.6	242.4	199.2
	IV	30.8	76.2	11.4	19.2	72.1	84.1	28.9	60.8	115.9	83.8	149.5	235.7	318.3	590.6	295.8	182.7
	1958	13.2	18.7	86.7	90.1	39.0	56.6	101.7	81.3	141.1	211.5	304.0	453.7	188.8	...
	I	41.2	65.6	13.4	26.0	87.2	86.0	54.6	57.6	101.5	85.1	139.7	214.5	301.1	425.9	155.0	148.5
	II	58.8	39.6	17.3	18.2	60.7	68.7	33.1	43.8	93.0	78.2	132.0	202.2	249.1	393.2	167.8	118.2
	III	45.0	51.7	12.8	15.6	101.9	95.3	35.0	56.9	99.4	78.7	137.7	197.6	342.8	380.8	207.8	120.0
	IV	12.1	15.2	97.0	110.5	33.1	67.9	112.9	83.1	155.1	231.6	322.8	614.9	224.8	...
2. ECAFE countries ^a (including Japan)	1953	45.0	22.9	16.3	34.8	20.7	17.5	13.5	35.2	90.0	93.4	53.3	40.4	71.8	78.2
	1954	52.1	26.3	18.6	32.0	18.2	20.7	13.9	31.9	72.5	76.1	46.6	60.7	85.2	64.6
	1955	40.4	21.5	4.3	7.4	13.7	32.7	24.4	18.0	16.0	38.6	69.0	91.7	58.6	59.6	79.7	47.9
	1956	45.4	22.6	3.3	8.8	15.9	36.4	20.4	19.7	20.6	40.5	93.1	115.6	53.2	62.1	86.0	77.0
	1957	39.0	35.2	5.3	8.3	13.0	37.8	25.5	20.6	28.1	43.3	75.8	120.7	53.5	67.9	105.5	68.8
	IV	21.6	39.0	4.6	10.7	10.0	39.6	23.1	21.6	27.4	40.6	70.6	121.0	38.3	68.3	155.0	56.5
	1958	5.1	9.5	8.5	35.0	26.8	25.2	26.2	40.3	62.9	114.9	51.1	69.4	88.2	...
	I	31.4	29.3	8.3	12.9	7.3	31.7	40.8	24.8	19.9	40.8	59.7	106.5	43.5	56.7	65.7	41.7
	II	5.7	10.3	4.2	24.7	24.4	24.8	26.3	36.9	59.6	107.8	43.4	74.9	78.9	49.4
	III	33.4	24.0	3.6	8.0	9.5	41.4	17.7	22.2	34.0	41.3	57.8	111.1	57.5	53.3	93.5	59.1
	IV	2.1	6.6	13.0	42.3	24.1	28.9	24.5	42.3	74.4	134.3	60.0	92.9	114.9	...
3. Japan	1953	11.2	7.3	0.5	3.6	14.5	13.5	5.0	1.9	9.7	16.8	14.2	6.5	9.4	31.8
	1954	14.6	11.2	0.8	4.0	11.9	17.6	5.3	2.2	5.0	20.3	8.6	8.8	12.5	34.2
	1955	11.4	9.6	0.1	1.2	0.6	5.2	18.3	15.3	7.3	3.6	6.4	23.0	13.8	16.9	18.3	21.6
	1956	9.3	8.2	0.4	2.6	0.8	6.0	11.0	17.6	9.8	3.8	13.9	35.5	15.7	22.9	18.4	33.4
	1957	5.9	17.7	0.3	2.4	1.1	6.8	13.1	17.6	14.4	3.6	10.0	33.4	14.4	28.6	10.0	30.0
	IV	1.3	24.8	0.2	5.6	1.1	6.6	17.9	17.8	11.4	3.7	3.9	38.5	7.8	27.0	6.6	27.1
	1958	0.1	3.3	2.0	8.2	16.3	22.4	13.4	3.2	5.2	26.1	13.6	20.8	6.8	...
	I	5.2	17.2	—	5.0	1.8	9.5	29.8	22.4	7.8	3.5	4.9	29.3	11.2	21.1	5.1	15.4
	II	0.3	3.4	1.0	5.0	16.0	22.5	13.2	3.3	4.9	24.6	16.7	21.9	7.4	21.2
	III	1.0	9.1	0.2	2.6	1.8	7.7	3.5	19.1	16.3	2.5	4.4	23.5	15.2	13.4	6.8	18.2
	IV	—	2.0	3.2	10.5	16.0	25.5	16.3	3.4	6.8	27.1	11.2	26.9	8.1	...
4. Western Europe (including UK)	1953	6.4	16.9	30.4	27.3	3.9	6.3	36.8	28.3	10.5	50.9	102.7	127.8	74.2	65.2
	1954	5.4	20.2	34.8	24.2	1.4	4.5	37.2	27.2	10.6	42.4	122.2	144.2	71.6	52.0
	1955	8.8	18.8	3.1	3.7	38.8	26.6	1.7	3.5	58.3	31.4	15.9	41.6	126.6	159.2	79.3	60.4
	1956	7.5	18.9	3.1	3.0	35.8	30.2	1.8	4.5	54.8	36.4	18.6	46.9	130.6	219.6	80.8	75.8
	1957	4.9	27.2	3.3	4.4	30.5	29.2	1.3	4.9	50.0	36.5	20.7	61.2	119.3	265.6	78.0	73.6
	IV	2.6	29.9	4.2	5.4	27.3	24.5	1.3	7.9	61.9	32.8	21.7	56.5	117.7	290.3	74.1	72.5
	1958	3.6	7.3	37.8	30.4	1.5	4.9	42.8	31.9	24.9	46.9	116.2	190.9	47.3	...
	I	3.9	22.8	1.7	10.7	35.7	29.9	0.7	4.9	55.1	33.3	23.2	47.1	105.8	203.1	39.8	62.4
	II	5.3	6.1	32.8	26.2	2.0	4.4	39.2	33.0	24.1	45.8	88.9	165.7	42.0	33.8
	III	4.5	19.3	3.8	5.5	45.4	29.3	2.6	4.1	37.9	29.0	24.5	44.4	135.3	179.3	57.2	32.9
	IV	4.5	6.6	37.5	36.0	0.8	6.1	39.2	32.2	27.8	50.3	134.7	215.6	50.2	...
5. United Kingdom	1953	4.4	11.8	20.4	19.0	2.1	2.0	18.5	23.1	5.2	20.8	78.5	74.2	4.4	13.5
	1954	3.9	12.5	26.4	15.4	0.7	1.3	14.9	21.3	7.1	16.2	93.1	79.2	9.8	8.5
	1955	4.8	11.5	0.2	0.1	26.5	16.2	0.9	0.6	26.5	24.1	11.0	19.3	88.3	84.8	23.0	8.7
	1956	4.4	10.4	0.1	0.2	26.3	18.3	0.7	0.8	23.2	27.2	13.0	22.4	96.7	109.1	19.6	12.9
	1957	3.2	15.7	—	0.2	24.0	19.4	0.3	0.8	24.6	26.8	14.7	29.2	84.5	125.2	17.6	11.4
	IV	2.0	16.4	—	0.2	20.4	17.5	0.2	0.8	38.8	25.6	16.0	27.7	86.3	127.5	21.0	9.7
	1958	—	0.4	29.7	21.8	0.2	1.0	20.7	24.5	17.2	23.2	87.3	88.5	24.0	...
	I	3.5	10.6	—	0.6	28.2	20.8	0.1	0.9	31.4	25.3	16.8	24.3	75.7	97.3	16.4	8.7
	II	0.2	0.2	28.1	18.5	0.1	0.7	19.3	25.7	16.7	22.0	63.0	73.3	21.6	5.5
	III	3.3	12.2	—	0.3	36.2	20.5	0.4	0.9	16.1	22.7	16.2	22.0	105.1	84.5	27.6	5.9
	IV	—	0.6	26.2	27.6	0.1	1.5	15.9	24.4	19.1	24.6	105.4	98.8	30.2	...
6. Eastern Europe	1953	—	0.2	0.2	0.6	—	—	1.5	0.2	—	1.0	1.8	2.0	1.1	1.4
	1954	0.2	0.6	0.1	0.6	—	—	1.9	0.2	—	1.0	2.8	4.0	1.8	3.3
	1955	5.6	0.4	—	—	0.1	0.4	—	—	2.1	0.2	—	0.8	2.4	5.5	6.7	7.2
	1956	5.5	3.8	—	—	0.1	0.4	—	—	4.7	0.3	—	0.8	9.3	15.4	3.0	2.8
	1957	4.4	5.2	—	—	0.3	0.4	—	—	3.4	0.4	—	0.6	12.6	19.8	2.2	1.6
	IV	1.9	5.3	—	—	0.3	0.3	—	—	1.5	0.3	—	0.5	10.7	11.7	4.1	1.1
	1958	—	0.2	0.3	0.4	—	—	9.6	0.2	—	0.4	16.0	17.8	2.7	...
	I	1.6	4.9	—	—	0.5	0.4	—	—	3.5	0.1	—	0.5	9.8	22.9	4.8	1.8
	II	0.1	—	0.2	0.4	—	—	6.4	0.5	—	0.4	14.1	14.5	3.3	0.5
	III	3.6	3.0	—	—	0.1	0.5	—	—	6.9	0.2	—	0.4	21.1	14.2	2.1	0.7
	IV	—	0.6	0.4	0.5	—	—	21.7	0.2	—	0.3	18.3	19.4	0.7	...

EXTERNAL TRADE

7. DIRECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Cont'd)

Quarterly averages or quarters

Million dollars

Area of origin for imports and area of destination for exports	Year and Quarter	BURMA		CAMBODIA		CEYLON		CHINA (Taiwan)		FEDERATION OF MALAYA		HONG KONG		INDIA		INDONESIA ^a	
		Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
7. North America	1953	1.1	1.8	10.8	3.6	1.4	19.4	21.0	2.2	4.3	12.5	58.6	57.0	48.4	35.1
	1954	0.3	2.1	10.2	2.6	1.3	25.3	18.7	1.5	5.0	14.8	54.2	44.2	36.6	23.1
	1955	0.3	1.4	2.6	0.7	14.5	5.4	1.4	24.6	29.7	1.7	6.4	16.3	57.0	50.7	49.9	24.2
	1956	0.4	1.4	2.5	1.5	12.8	4.2	1.7	20.6	31.7	2.1	7.8	20.6	54.3	53.3	36.2	35.1
	1957	0.9	3.0	2.6	0.8	12.3	4.4	1.4	21.6	26.2	2.5	12.0	25.8	81.3	97.2	37.8	33.1
	IV	0.2	2.9	3.8	1.2	11.1	2.2	1.8	22.9	19.0	2.6	13.9	22.0	104.3	128.3	42.8	27.1
	1958	3.3	1.6	11.6	5.3	2.5	21.6	17.7	1.8	20.6	21.4	61.0	103.3	32.9	...
	I	0.5	2.7	1.2	2.4	12.0	3.1	1.2	22.0	17.6	2.3	15.7	21.1	78.1	72.1	34.6	24.5
	II	4.6	1.5	7.4	3.4	2.1	12.1	15.5	1.9	22.0	25.9	50.3	64.7	25.9	20.1
	III	0.2	3.5	4.2	1.7	13.2	4.4	3.7	27.2	15.9	1.7	20.8	18.8	60.8	65.4	32.5	17.1
IV	4.7	1.1	13.9	10.3	2.9	24.9	21.9	1.5	24.1	19.8	54.7	211.1	38.7	...	
8. United States of America	1953	1.1	1.8	6.4	2.7	1.3	17.9	19.0	2.0	3.3	9.9	51.2	47.2	43.0	34.1
	1954	0.3	2.1	6.2	1.9	1.3	24.6	16.4	1.3	4.1	12.4	46.2	38.8	35.9	22.7
	1955	0.3	1.3	2.6	0.6	9.3	2.4	1.4	23.9	26.7	1.5	5.2	14.3	48.7	46.6	41.8	23.9
	1956	0.4	1.4	2.4	1.4	7.4	2.1	1.7	20.4	28.2	1.8	6.5	18.6	46.0	49.5	35.3	35.1
	1957	0.6	2.9	2.5	0.8	7.7	3.6	1.3	21.2	23.1	2.2	10.0	23.6	69.3	89.4	36.9	33.1
	IV	0.2	2.7	3.7	1.2	6.5	1.9	1.7	22.3	16.3	2.3	12.2	20.3	80.0	120.1	40.8	26.5
	1958	3.3	1.6	7.1	4.0	2.4	21.1	15.2	1.6	15.6	19.2	48.9	84.8	32.5	...
	I	0.5	2.6	1.2	2.4	7.5	2.6	1.2	21.4	15.5	2.0	13.6	18.8	66.0	64.3	33.8	24.1
	II	4.6	1.5	4.3	3.3	2.1	11.9	12.4	1.6	15.0	23.5	42.8	59.5	25.5	19.9
	III	0.2	3.5	4.2	1.7	7.8	2.9	3.6	26.4	13.4	1.5	15.7	17.1	43.5	49.6	31.9	17.4
IV	4.7	1.1	8.8	7.3	2.8	24.7	19.6	1.3	18.3	17.6	43.2	165.7	38.7	...	
9. Latin American Republics	1953	—	—	0.4	—	0.4	0.1	1.4	—	—	0.4	16.1	1.5	0.4	0.1
	1954	—	—	0.2	—	0.3	0.2	1.8	—	—	5.0	12.2	4.8	1.4	...
	1955	—	0.2	—	0.1	0.5	2.4	0.1	0.1	2.6	—	—	1.0	11.8	3.6	6.6	0.1
	1956	—	—	—	0.1	0.7	1.7	0.1	—	1.7	0.1	0.1	2.5	8.6	1.3	0.6	21.1
	1957	—	—	—	—	0.4	—	0.1	0.1	3.4	0.1	1.1	1.1	11.4	1.3	0.8	0.1
	IV	—	0.1	—	—	0.5	—	0.1	—	3.2	0.3	1.3	0.6	8.8	0.3	0.6	0.3
	1958	—	—	0.5	—	0.2	0.1	1.7	0.1	1.1	0.8	10.5	0.9	0.6	...
	I	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	0.1	0.1	2.3	0.1	1.0	1.1	8.0	0.7	0.9	...
	II	—	—	0.3	—	0.2	—	2.1	—	1.3	0.3	4.7	0.3	0.3	...
	III	—	—	—	—	0.7	—	0.3	0.3	1.0	—	1.1	0.9	20.3	0.4	0.7	...
IV	—	—	0.3	—	—	—	1.5	0.1	1.1	1.0	8.9	2.1	0.5	...	
10. Oceania	1953	—	1.1	8.7	9.2	0.2	0.6	0.8	6.6	2.1	2.5	10.2	14.5	6.0	4.4
	1954	—	1.0	11.2	5.6	0.1	0.6	1.5	4.3	3.0	2.8	14.6	8.7	8.6	3.1
	1955	—	1.3	—	—	10.2	4.6	—	0.2	1.9	4.5	3.6	3.7	16.7	11.2	6.3	3.1
	1956	—	1.6	—	—	7.3	5.0	—	0.5	1.6	4.9	3.8	4.8	14.8	7.3	9.4	4.6
	1957	—	1.7	—	—	6.9	5.7	—	0.3	1.5	5.4	4.5	5.2	16.6	10.2	12.1	4.6
	IV	—	1.4	—	—	5.3	3.9	—	0.4	1.5	5.8	5.3	3.9	13.7	11.5	11.6	3.1
	1958	—	—	7.9	3.0	0.1	0.6	2.1	5.0	5.0	5.2	14.8	8.6	12.4	...
	I	—	1.6	—	—	8.4	2.6	—	0.5	1.7	5.5	4.5	5.3	14.7	7.6	7.7	4.1
	II	—	0.1	4.9	3.2	—	0.6	1.9	4.9	4.9	3.7	14.4	10.8	13.4	1.9
	III	0.1	1.1	—	—	10.3	2.1	0.1	0.6	2.2	4.5	5.4	4.6	16.6	9.5	15.5	0.5
IV	—	—	8.1	4.0	0.1	0.9	2.6	5.0	5.2	7.0	13.3	6.7	12.8	...	
11. Sterling area	1953	34.0	28.2	39.1	53.5	8.3	6.4	24.5	39.3	32.2	45.4	146.9	145.1	67.8	63.1
	1954	38.8	28.1	52.6	42.6	5.7	4.3	22.7	24.5	36.2	36.6	167.7	162.5	84.3	45.2
	1955	27.4	23.4	1.6	2.8	54.5	45.3	5.0	2.5	34.9	38.6	42.5	42.4	164.9	162.3	84.9	47.5
	1956	29.1	19.6	2.2	4.3	48.3	46.8	8.3	3.1	32.7	42.8	46.1	48.0	164.1	172.4	84.1	61.0
	1957	32.7	31.9	4.1	4.8	40.8	51.8	11.7	8.4	34.1	42.2	48.6	55.6	157.3	192.0	108.2	57.3
	IV	25.6	31.5	3.5	4.4	33.5	47.8	2.7	12.2	47.3	42.3	52.3	54.2	146.9	196.3	161.0	55.3
	1958	4.3	4.1	46.5	48.0	8.5	5.7	29.2	40.0	50.8	45.1	150.8	159.8	95.6	...
	I	28.9	22.7	7.7	6.1	45.7	43.2	10.3	8.0	38.4	42.0	50.5	46.9	141.2	157.2	77.4	34.0
	II	5.1	4.5	37.3	38.6	7.0	4.8	28.0	39.0	48.7	42.1	115.6	158.8	89.3	23.2
	III	27.2	24.9	2.4	2.8	59.1	43.5	11.5	6.6	25.7	37.5	46.6	40.3	178.9	145.1	100.2	34.7
IV	1.9	2.9	43.8	58.8	5.1	3.5	24.5	41.7	57.4	51.0	167.5	178.1	115.6	...	
12. ECAFE sterling countries ^a	1953	26.1	14.9	3.1	19.6	5.5	3.7	4.8	9.3	20.1	18.5	32.4	32.5	56.0	38.6
	1954	31.9	14.4	6.0	18.5	4.8	2.4	5.4	6.7	19.4	14.3	31.2	49.1	65.3	23.6
	1955	21.4	10.6	1.4	2.7	6.4	22.1	3.7	1.6	4.9	8.7	20.6	16.2	31.8	40.0	54.5	21.4
	1956	25.3	7.6	2.2	4.1	5.2	21.2	6.7	1.8	6.1	9.1	21.6	16.7	28.1	31.2	55.6	28.2
	1957	26.0	13.7	4.1	4.6	3.1	23.6	7.8	2.2	6.4	8.6	21.7	15.4	29.4	31.8	78.1	25.2
	IV	17.8	10.8	3.5	4.1	2.9	24.8	2.5	3.1	5.6	9.6	23.3	13.4	22.4	30.9	127.5	17.5
	1958	4.2	3.7	2.5	18.2	6.6	2.2	5.0	9.0	21.4	11.2	29.2	40.4	59.5	...
	I	24.8	9.5	7.7	5.5	1.9	14.8	7.5	1.8	4.2	9.3	22.4	9.5	25.4	28.6	52.9	10.6
	II	4.9	4.2	0.9	15.9	5.6	1.6	4.9	7.6	20.6	12.0	20.6	49.3	54.3	12.9
	III	22.1	8.4	2.4	2.5	4.4	18.1	8.7	2.6	6.2	8.8	17.7	10.4	32.5	32.2	57.8	22.0
IV	1.9	2.6	2.7	23.9	4.4	2.6	4.9	10.3	25.0	13.1	38.3	51.6	72.9	...	

GENERAL NOTES: (1) As complete breakdowns are not given, the sum of total trade of any individual country with different regions does not add up to the total given under trade with "all countries".

(2) See general note to table 6.

(3) Trade between the Federation of Malaya and Singapore is excluded.

a. ECAFE countries comprise:

i) Sterling countries—British Borneo, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Federation of Malaya, India, Pakistan and Singapore.

ii) Non-sterling countries—Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Philippines, Thailand and Viet-Nam.

7. DIRECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Cont'd)

EXTERNAL TRADE

Quarterly averages or quarters

Million dollars

Area of origin for imports and area of destination for exports	Year and Quarter	JAPAN		KOREA, southern		LAOS		PAKISTAN		PHILIPPINES		SINGAPORE		THAILAND ^c		VIET-NAM ^e	
		Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp. ^c	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp. ^d	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
1.																	
All countries	1953	318.7	602.4	9.9	66.9	109.7	87.5	101.0	114.2	171.3	191.4	87.1	75.8
	1954	407.3	599.8	6.1	55.4	89.7	81.2	101.3	120.7	177.8	190.3	73.0	67.8
	1955	502.7	617.9	4.5	85.0	0.4	4.7	100.2	72.3	100.2	136.9	227.2	234.0	90.8	75.0	17.2	65.8
	1956	625.2	807.4	6.2	96.6	0.3	8.8	85.0	104.1	112.8	126.6	223.2	253.1	83.6	92.4	11.3	54.4
	1957	714.6	1,071.0	5.6	110.0	0.3	10.4	84.2	110.0	107.3	153.6	226.5	267.7	91.4	102.4	19.9	72.1
	IV	763.0	869.0	3.5	86.9	0.3	14.6	89.3	112.6	87.4	148.3	226.9	244.0	88.9	99.3	23.0	74.5
	1958	719.1	758.0	4.1	...	0.5	6.8	74.4	90.0	122.2	140.5	202.6	253.2	77.2	96.1	13.8	58.0
	I	711.1	803.4	3.3	106.9	0.4	9.7	107.8	107.8	103.6	151.9	216.0	276.2	91.8	102.4	14.9	53.9
	II	680.1	775.8	3.8	108.1	0.4	6.3	52.1	108.6	123.9	131.4	208.0	266.7	77.8	101.2	15.8	62.8
	III	688.1	732.4	3.6	85.3	0.4	7.3	55.0	90.1	128.7	126.3	187.5	226.2	72.0	89.6	9.2	54.7
	IV	697.0	720.5	5.8	...	0.7	4.0	82.6	99.1	132.8	152.5	199.1	243.9	67.3	91.2	15.1	60.7
2.																	
ECAFE countries ^a (including Japan)	1953	139.1	160.3	2.2	30.8	36.9	11.9	13.4	11.7	63.9	118.1	63.5	35.0
	1954	167.7	139.5	2.5	27.2	26.4	15.4	14.4	17.6	59.5	115.6	50.0	32.8
	1955	174.3	177.2	2.8	9.1	0.5	2.9	36.7	15.7	16.8	25.5	70.6	151.5	53.8	36.2	5.6	17.4
	1956	217.9	191.0	2.6	4.9	0.6	5.5	29.7	11.1	22.8	26.2	82.0	159.1	51.2	46.8	1.4	19.7
	1957	240.6	202.7	3.8	5.5	0.2	6.1	26.8	21.8	22.7	35.7	92.7	165.7	58.5	48.0	3.9	24.0
	IV	251.1	156.2	2.6	5.7	0.2	10.3	25.0	24.5	16.9	38.0	94.4	149.7	55.5	50.9	4.6	21.8
	1958	214.6	155.1	2.8	...	0.4	3.7	16.4	25.8	27.2	38.8	89.8	161.8	44.5	48.0	4.3	19.0
	I	241.6	156.8	2.0	4.4	0.3	5.3	15.3	20.4	18.5	43.9	102.4	180.6	59.5	52.3	5.0	18.4
	II	214.8	173.4	2.6	4.5	0.1	3.4	15.4	17.5	24.3	32.8	99.0	165.4	47.1	52.7	9.9	20.9
	III	181.0	131.5	2.4	5.2	0.4	4.0	18.2	26.1	28.5	40.8	82.0	140.3	43.2	41.3	0.7	17.0
	IV	220.9	159.2	4.4	...	0.7	2.1	16.7	39.1	37.3	37.9	75.7	161.0	28.3	45.6	1.6	19.6
3.																	
Japan	1953	.	.	1.5	26.7	21.4	4.5	12.0	5.1	7.9	8.6	21.2	13.1
	1954	.	.	1.8	17.2	7.8	8.7	12.6	7.3	8.2	9.8	17.3	16.3
	1955	.	.	1.8	4.2	—	0.4	11.6	10.2	15.2	10.8	16.2	15.9	15.8	15.8	0.4	8.8
	1956	.	.	2.0	2.3	—	1.4	10.6	5.2	20.1	12.8	17.6	17.2	7.2	15.2	0.1	14.0
	1957	.	.	2.7	2.9	—	2.3	11.0	4.0	19.5	18.4	19.9	18.4	7.2	21.1	1.0	15.4
	IV	.	.	1.8	3.5	—	3.4	10.0	3.4	15.4	17.0	15.2	18.1	4.9	20.2	0.3	11.8
	1958	.	.	2.4	...	—	1.1	7.5	5.6	24.4	20.3	15.4	22.0	5.8	22.5	0.2	11.2
	I	.	.	1.9	3.0	—	2.0	7.0	6.9	17.1	23.7	16.9	24.2	3.9	26.8	0.2	12.0
	II	.	.	2.3	3.0	—	1.1	8.0	6.3	21.7	16.5	13.5	27.7	7.0	23.1	0.1	13.0
	III	.	.	1.9	3.3	—	1.0	6.1	4.2	25.3	18.4	15.1	17.4	4.4	18.4	0.1	8.9
	IV	.	.	3.7	...	—	0.4	8.9	5.0	33.3	22.6	15.9	18.5	7.7	21.6	0.2	11.1
4.																	
Western Europe (including UK)	1953	28.9	50.8	0.1	4.2	53.6	25.4	13.8	5.8	44.4	44.3	3.3	24.7
	1954	36.9	49.2	0.1	4.4	43.4	39.2	20.2	10.7	52.2	45.1	6.4	22.7
	1955	49.0	43.8	0.3	5.9	—	1.4	42.2	31.4	18.1	12.4	78.3	50.8	7.5	24.4	5.9	35.2
	1956	63.7	58.0	0.9	3.7	—	2.4	39.0	29.6	23.5	16.2	73.5	55.9	8.1	28.4	7.7	17.9
	1957	79.6	97.5	0.7	2.0	0.1	2.8	37.8	42.8	22.8	23.0	62.1	60.4	8.3	34.1	10.5	30.5
	IV	81.6	70.6	0.5	2.7	0.2	3.0	44.8	47.2	18.1	23.3	61.2	52.8	6.4	30.1	16.5	37.4
	1958	84.3	66.8	0.5	...	0.1	2.1	38.0	38.2	23.3	18.6	54.1	52.7	11.2	27.8	7.9	23.7
	I	77.4	63.9	0.8	3.2	0.1	2.9	65.3	46.4	20.2	20.0	57.4	55.6	12.5	28.3	9.1	23.6
	II	61.4	71.4	0.6	4.2	0.2	2.1	24.7	33.5	15.2	19.4	54.6	53.8	11.5	28.8	5.6	24.6
	III	75.8	65.7	0.6	3.5	—	2.2	21.9	32.8	28.4	16.1	53.7	48.7	12.1	27.2	7.2	21.1
	IV	122.6	66.2	0.2	...	0.1	1.2	42.1	40.3	29.4	18.8	50.7	52.6	8.7	27.0	9.8	25.4
5.																	
United Kingdom	1953	8.3	12.2	0.1	0.6	21.1	14.4	1.3	1.1	21.1	31.0	0.6	10.0
	1954	12.8	9.3	0.1	1.5	17.4	23.2	1.2	2.3	22.1	27.8	1.8	8.1
	1955	15.2	9.5	—	1.1	—	0.1	15.2	17.6	1.4	3.2	35.8	32.3	1.8	8.6	0.4	1.1
	1956	15.8	16.6	0.2	0.6	—	0.3	13.6	14.4	1.7	3.8	33.0	34.7	2.6	10.6	0.1	0.9
	1957	18.4	24.6	0.2	0.3	—	0.6	13.4	21.0	1.8	5.8	25.1	36.6	2.8	11.6	—	1.6
	IV	20.0	12.9	0.1	0.4	—	0.4	16.4	21.7	1.5	5.5	26.7	32.6	2.0	10.6	—	2.5
	1958	26.3	14.8	0.2	...	—	0.3	14.7	17.6	1.6	4.8	20.9	32.7	4.1	10.3	0.3	1.6
	I	14.9	13.8	0.2	0.4	—	0.5	25.0	23.3	1.5	6.2	21.9	34.6	5.8	10.8	0.1	1.5
	II	18.2	13.3	0.2	0.5	—	0.3	6.6	16.1	1.4	5.5	22.0	33.4	4.3	11.2	—	1.9
	III	26.1	18.1	0.1	0.5	—	0.4	9.3	14.3	2.0	3.8	19.9	29.4	3.7	8.9	0.1	1.4
	IV	46.1	14.1	0.1	...	—	0.1	18.0	16.5	1.7	3.5	19.8	33.4	2.6	10.3	1.0	1.5
6.																	
Eastern Europe	1953	1.0	1.4	—	—	3.2	0.4	—	—	2.8	1.4	—	0.1
	1954	1.3	1.1	—	—	2.0	0.7	—	0.1	2.1	0.9	—	—
	1955	3.8	0.8	—	—	—	—	1.7	0.2	—	—	2.7	0.8	0.1	—	—	...
	1956	0.6	0.8	—	—	—	—	1.3	0.4	—	—	6.3	1.0	—	0.5	—	0.1
	1957	3.9	4.6	—	—	—	—	2.8	0.9	—	—	8.3	1.1	...	0.8	—	—
	IV	8.3	4.1	—	—	—	—	4.5	1.1	—	—	8.7	0.7	—	0.6	—	—
	1958	5.4	6.1	—	—	—	—	3.7	2.7	—	—	10.8	0.8	—	0.8	—	—
	I	4.6	1.9	—	—	—	—	5.5	2.1	—	—	5.1	0.7	—	0.7	—	—
	II	6.4	2.7	—	—	—	—	1.5	2.9	—	—	7.5	1.1	—	0.5	—	—
	III	2.6	9.2	—	—	—	—	3.8	3.1	—	—	10.0	1.0	—	1.4	—	—
	IV	8.1	10.4	—	...	—	—	4.1	2.2	—	—	20.6	0.5	0.1	0.5	—	—

EXTERNAL TRADE

7. DIRECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Cont'd)

Quarterly averages or quarters

Million dollars

Area of origin for imports and area of destination for exports	Year and Quarter	JAPAN		KOREA, southern		LAOS		PAKISTAN		PHILIPPINES		SINGAPORE		THAILAND ^c		VIET-NAM ^c	
		Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp. ^c	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp. ^d	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
7. North America	1953	65.2	242.4	7.6	27.8	7.4	4.2	69.6	90.6	24.1	10.3	17.7	14.6
	1954	83.2	266.0	3.5	23.0	6.1	6.2	62.4	85.4	25.3	11.9	14.0	11.5
	1955	134.8	255.5	1.8	62.1	—	0.3	8.4	8.6	60.3	93.6	37.9	11.8	26.6	13.4	4.0	8.0
	1956	164.5	358.6	2.7	82.1	—	0.8	8.5	6.8	61.0	79.2	28.0	15.1	21.0	14.9	2.0	15.0
	1957	183.5	495.6	1.0	98.6	—	1.5	9.8	34.4	56.7	88.5	27.0	12.6	18.3	17.8	2.8	16.5
	IV	243.7	485.7	0.7	74.2	—	1.7	8.6	32.3	47.5	82.9	26.6	11.5	21.0	17.6	0.8	13.5
	1958	211.0	338.4	0.7	...	—	0.9	8.0	30.7	68.1	76.0	19.4	10.6	14.2	17.1	1.3	14.4
	I	178.3	380.2	0.5	96.3	—	1.3	15.0	32.7	61.3	80.6	17.0	12.6	14.7	19.5	0.2	11.1
	II	200.4	336.8	0.5	96.3	0.1	0.9	4.7	55.1	79.9	73.3	18.5	11.8	13.0	18.0	0.1	16.1
	III	224.1	344.4	0.8	74.7	—	0.9	3.7	20.9	69.0	60.6	17.3	10.1	13.5	18.3	1.1	16.2
IV	241.2	292.3	1.1	...	—	0.6	8.8	15.7	62.3	89.7	25.0	8.1	15.8	12.6	3.8	14.0	
8. United States of America	1953	58.5	189.4	7.6	24.0	7.2	4.1	69.0	87.8	20.2	9.5	17.5	14.2
	1954	70.7	212.3	3.5	21.9	6.0	5.2	61.6	81.6	21.2	10.9	13.6	11.0
	1955	114.3	193.5	1.8	60.9	—	0.3	7.7	8.0	60.0	89.0	32.4	10.7	26.2	12.8	4.0	7.9
	1956	137.9	266.8	2.7	81.2	—	0.8	7.8	6.5	60.6	75.1	23.2	13.5	20.8	14.2	2.0	14.9
	1957	151.6	406.6	1.0	98.5	—	1.5	9.6	30.1	56.2	84.3	22.4	11.4	18.1	16.9	2.8	16.4
	IV	168.1	311.0	0.7	74.0	—	1.8	8.0	23.2	47.1	78.3	22.3	10.6	20.3	15.1	0.8	13.3
	1958	170.1	263.5	0.7	...	—	0.9	7.9	27.0	67.6	73.1	15.8	9.5	14.0	16.7	1.3	13.7
	I	141.7	310.0	0.5	95.8	—	1.3	14.9	29.8	60.7	78.3	13.6	11.0	13.2	18.9	0.2	11.1
	II	159.2	267.0	0.5	95.2	0.1	0.9	4.5	49.9	79.1	70.3	14.6	10.7	12.7	17.3	0.1	15.0
	III	182.5	262.2	0.8	74.4	—	0.8	3.6	16.5	68.4	58.6	12.2	9.0	13.5	17.6	1.1	15.3
IV	197.1	214.7	1.1	...	—	0.6	8.5	11.9	62.1	85.3	22.7	7.4	16.5	13.1	3.7	13.4	
9. Latin American Republics	1953	26.1	66.2	—	0.5	0.5	—	2.8	0.2	3.7	0.1	—	—
	1954	50.3	77.2	—	0.3	0.9	—	3.0	0.7	4.9	0.2	0.1	—
	1955	44.8	60.7	—	0.3	—	—	1.6	—	3.6	0.7	8.1	0.2	0.2	—	—	—
	1956	41.0	87.3	—	0.2	—	—	0.9	—	3.8	1.2	4.9	0.4	0.2	—	—	0.4
	1957	37.3	77.1	—	—	—	—	1.2	2.8	3.6	0.9	9.2	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
	IV	41.8	75.4	—	—	—	—	1.6	1.9	3.8	0.8	6.8	0.2	0.1	—	—	0.2
	1958	48.4	64.7	—	—	—	—	0.8	0.4	2.6	1.2	5.6	0.3	—	0.1	—	0.6
	I	47.8	58.4	—	—	—	—	0.7	1.5	2.4	1.7	8.0	0.4	—	—	—	—
	II	45.9	65.2	—	0.5	—	—	0.3	0.3	3.9	0.8	5.9	0.4	—	—	—	1.0
	III	49.0	64.0	—	—	—	—	0.6	—	1.8	1.1	3.9	0.3	—	0.3	—	0.9
IV	50.8	71.0	—	...	—	—	1.3	0.1	2.3	1.2	4.4	0.1	0.1	—	0.1	0.6	
10. Oceania	1953	3.6	50.2	—	3.4	1.4	0.5	0.2	0.3	15.5	7.4	—	1.0
	1954	8.8	34.0	—	0.7	1.6	0.5	0.2	0.8	15.3	7.2	—	0.6
	1955	17.2	50.8	—	0.2	—	—	1.4	0.6	0.3	1.3	17.4	7.8	0.1	0.8	—	0.2
	1956	10.8	71.6	—	0.1	—	—	0.6	0.6	0.3	1.4	19.8	9.1	0.1	1.0	—	0.1
	1957	14.6	109.4	—	—	—	—	0.5	4.6	0.2	2.7	16.1	10.2	0.2	1.1	—	0.1
	IV	21.9	90.7	—	—	—	—	0.7	9.1	0.1	2.1	14.4	9.7	—	1.0	—	0.2
	1958	22.0	62.8	—	—	0.6	0.9	0.2	2.8	11.5	9.0	0.2	0.9	—	0.2
	I	15.3	68.4	—	—	—	—	0.2	1.5	0.2	3.9	12.5	11.1	0.3	1.1	—	0.2
	II	19.2	61.5	—	0.1	—	—	0.1	0.8	—	2.4	12.4	9.1	0.2	0.9	—	0.3
	III	21.3	64.9	—	0.5	—	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.3	2.2	10.8	8.3	0.3	0.9	—	0.2
IV	32.0	56.5	—	...	—	—	1.4	1.0	0.2	2.7	10.4	7.7	0.1	0.7	—	0.1	
11. Sterling area	1953	79.0	150.6	0.8	7.4	37.0	23.4	2.3	6.0	67.3	71.8	39.9	30.3
	1954	122.8	108.4	0.7	10.8	33.6	32.6	2.4	10.2	70.1	69.6	32.1	22.5
	1955	160.2	147.2	0.5	5.0	—	0.4	38.5	25.9	2.6	12.1	85.3	79.1	35.7	26.7	2.4	3.5
	1956	171.2	204.4	0.7	2.2	0.1	1.8	32.4	20.7	4.0	12.4	84.8	87.3	38.8	40.0	0.6	2.3
	1957	201.7	280.4	1.2	1.2	0.1	2.0	30.3	37.6	3.5	17.2	78.1	82.3	43.9	35.2	1.4	3.3
	IV	227.1	223.1	0.8	2.0	0.2	3.1	31.6	45.4	2.1	16.5	72.7	74.4	41.2	36.1	0.8	4.7
	1958	192.5	199.8	0.5	...	0.1	1.3	24.9	29.4	2.9	14.8	62.2	84.2	38.7	33.0	2.1	3.8
	I	182.6	187.3	0.3	1.2	0.1	1.8	35.0	37.5	2.4	17.9	65.2	88.4	49.0	33.6	2.2	3.6
	II	174.2	193.9	0.5	0.9	—	1.2	17.0	27.0	2.4	14.0	64.4	85.8	37.8	34.9	4.2	4.4
	III	181.0	207.9	0.5	2.0	0.1	1.4	19.0	26.2	3.3	14.7	61.0	77.9	37.8	29.3	0.4	3.1
IV	232.0	209.9	0.6	...	0.2	0.7	28.2	27.1	3.6	12.6	58.0	84.7	30.3	34.4	1.5	3.9	
12. ECAFE sterling countries ^a	1953	47.8	82.1	0.7	3.3	13.2	6.6	0.6	4.5	26.0	29.0	37.8	19.1
	1954	72.0	60.2	0.6	8.5	11.6	6.3	0.7	6.7	27.2	21.2	28.0	13.7
	1955	87.3	74.6	1.0	3.8	—	0.2	16.9	5.5	0.7	7.3	25.5	31.7	31.6	17.0	1.9	2.3
	1956	99.2	92.2	0.5	1.6	0.1	1.3	13.8	4.6	1.6	7.1	29.1	34.6	34.5	26.6	0.5	1.2
	1957	111.0	105.2	1.0	0.9	0.1	1.4	12.0	11.1	1.4	8.2	30.9	31.4	38.0	21.9	1.3	1.5
	IV	118.5	77.8	0.7	1.6	0.2	2.8	10.2	13.8	0.3	7.8	25.6	28.5	36.1	24.1	0.8	1.9
	1958	94.9	77.9	0.3	...	0.1	0.9	5.4	10.4	0.6	5.6	23.8	31.9	31.3	21.1	1.8	1.9
	I	107.4	67.1	0.1	0.8	0.1	1.3	5.9	11.9	0.5	7.0	23.9	31.7	39.0	21.5	2.1	1.6
	II	87.9	80.0	0.3	0.3	—	0.9	6.3	9.7	0.7	5.7	24.3	29.6	31.0	22.3	4.2	2.0
	III	81.6	80.8	0.4	1.0	0.1	0.9	5.3	11.2	0.6	4.6	24.2	31.2	31.3	19.0	0.3	1.9
IV	102.6	83.8	0.5	...	0.2	0.6	4.2	8.9	0.4	4.9	22.7	35.0	23.9	21.7	0.5	2.1	

b. Figures for trade with the Netherlands are as follows:—

	Exp.	Imp.		Exp.	Imp.
1952	50.0	31.1	1957	39.5	17.8
1953	48.4	22.4	IV	38.0	19.3
1954	41.3	16.4	I	12.3	15.2
1955	37.7	17.7	II	6.6	7.1
1956	42.9	22.8	III	6.5	5.7
1957	40.7	19.6	IV	5.8	...
1958	7.8	...			

c. Figures prior to 1955 for southern Korea and 1956 for Thailand are derived from trade returns of partner countries. Totals for geographical and currency areas may not be complete.

d. Imports valued f.o.b.

e. See table 6, footnote h.

EXTERNAL TRADE

8. VALUE OF IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS

Monthly averages or calendar months

Millions

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
BURMA (kyat)														
Food	9.4	10.3	8.0	6.8	10.9	...	12.6	9.7	10.5	9.5
Chemicals	4.1	4.6	5.4	7.1	10.3	...	9.4	7.0	3.7	4.3
Textiles	24.0	24.1	16.6	22.4	33.0	...	20.1	17.9	14.1	14.6
Base metals and manufactures	7.3	9.4	8.4	6.9	14.1	...	18.4	14.8	5.1	10.1
Machinery	5.8	7.8	7.3	10.1	12.0	...	13.8	20.4	11.8	20.6
Transport equipment	2.0	4.6	5.7	6.3	11.2	...	13.7	11.5	4.0	7.2
Other manufactured goods	9.2	11.2	9.3	9.7	13.9	...	14.1	13.1	7.8	7.3
CAMBODIA (riel)														
Food	11.2	10.0	14.0	14.8	18.4	20.4	25.2	22.9	19.3	19.5	19.9	16.3
Beverages and tobacco	22.4	22.8	9.0	5.2	6.7	8.0	9.0	9.6	6.7	8.5	7.4	6.3
Mineral fuels	9.8	13.6	11.8	9.9	5.3	3.5	3.7	5.3	6.1	2.2	0.5
Textiles	24.5	26.9	27.8	33.4	35.0	40.1	67.1	61.4	28.7	42.5	28.2	24.5
Base metals and manufactures	7.8	10.1	13.1	13.6	20.0	23.4	26.6	42.8	16.1	16.9	17.8	31.4
Machinery	4.3	5.6	11.3	16.1	11.9	29.0	8.4	31.7	34.3	25.9	24.0	25.0
Transport equipment	11.8	10.2	10.8	15.1	11.3	28.1	13.4	46.4	27.7	19.8	18.4	12.3
CEYLON (rupee)^a														
Food	64.6	53.8	50.3	56.7	59.4	57.8	50.2	52.5	40.7	69.2	68.8	50.1	62.4	...
Cereals and cereal preparations	43.4	33.0	26.1	28.3	29.0	26.0	25.2	18.5	18.2	33.5	33.8	26.0	24.8	...
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	12.1	9.9	12.0	10.6	18.7	11.8	19.7	10.4	9.8	12.6	14.4	15.9	12.0	...
Chemicals	5.4	6.1	7.6	8.2	10.1	8.7	7.9	9.6	6.7	8.4	10.2	10.0	9.7	...
Textiles	13.5	12.2	11.3	13.4	13.6	15.1	11.7	14.6	10.0	15.4	20.3	16.6	16.9	...
Machinery	7.7	5.7	7.1	8.7	9.5	10.6	8.2	9.5	7.7	10.0	15.2	11.5	14.1	...
Transport equipment	7.0	4.8	5.9	6.9	7.3	8.9	7.2	8.5	8.5	7.1	11.7	13.3	12.1	...
Other manufactured goods	19.3	20.0	21.8	25.1	25.3	24.1	24.3	24.2	20.9	24.8	26.5	29.2	27.5	...
CHINA (Taiwan, new Taiwan dollar)														
Food	35.3	43.7	26.6	42.4	33.6	46.7	51.6	60.5	8.6	73.4	44.3	17.3
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	52.2	66.9	63.5	92.1	107.4	93.0	86.5	96.8	68.5	107.0	97.9	135.0
Oil-seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels	15.6	17.5	19.0	23.3	25.0	20.4	26.8	22.6	12.3	30.1	16.4	37.8
Textile fibres, raw	25.7	31.8	31.8	37.1	43.7	41.8	21.9	44.7	31.7	53.4	37.5	54.1
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	10.9	9.3	21.3	26.2	46.3	36.6	70.0	38.2	19.4	30.3	58.5	49.3
Chemicals	33.3	47.6	44.8	75.7	62.1	103.2	44.3	96.3	104.0	88.0	124.7	59.4
Textiles	15.4	6.4	4.4	3.9	3.9	0.9	9.3	1.1	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.0
Base metals and manufactures	23.1	29.0	25.9	45.7	48.0	47.9	54.0	43.7	40.5	50.9	56.4	41.8
Machinery	25.3	33.5	43.8	60.6	74.9	76.2	118.9	69.4	53.7	58.4	123.3	168.6
Transport equipment	11.1	8.6	8.0	14.2	16.6	23.3	18.6	25.7	30.1	20.8	16.5	18.6
Other manufactured goods	34.8	20.0	16.9	26.7	33.4	28.0	36.2	29.1	25.9	30.7	26.3	39.7
FEDERATION OF MALAYA^b (Malayan dollar)														
Food	47.3	35.1	39.8	43.7	44.0	43.8	41.6	46.3	41.0	43.4	45.1	38.0	37.2	...
Cereals and cereal preparations	21.6	12.0	14.5	15.6	15.5	16.2	15.3	18.1
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	8.5	11.5	14.1	16.5	17.3	15.2	16.9	15.8	15.0	15.3	15.0	13.4	13.6	...
Metal ores and scrap	3.0	3.9	5.3	5.9	7.3	4.4	8.8	4.7
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	9.0	9.6	10.5	11.3	12.5	11.2	11.1	11.7	11.4	10.3	11.3	9.8	9.8	...
Textiles	6.8	7.4	8.9	8.3	8.4	7.3	8.2	8.2
Machinery	9.1	8.2	8.3	10.6	11.7	10.4	11.0	11.0
Transport equipment	5.2	4.1	6.2	8.6	8.6	7.9	8.9	9.3
Other manufactured goods	20.5	19.6	23.7	26.8	27.3	22.5	24.3	24.0
INDIA (rupee)^a														
Food	94.3	81.7	89.2	39.8	71.6	148.8	107.5	68.2	111.9	75.3	340.0	87.6
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	74.9	72.7	94.2	99.6	93.5	66.7	61.2	71.4	74.8	61.0	59.7	53.5
Cotton raw and waste	41.5	47.9	44.6	44.7	40.5	25.6	16.4	28.1	37.3	16.8	20.0	12.9
Petroleum and products	66.0	72.5	78.3	90.4	89.6	63.2	106.7	63.8	54.5	60.2	74.2	64.3
Chemicals	33.5	41.9	44.0	49.0	64.0	54.4	54.2	51.3	48.0	60.4	57.9	51.6
Base metals and manufactures	38.6	45.3	69.0	131.2	191.2	125.6	201.7	130.3	106.7	110.7	154.9	107.0
Machinery	65.8	75.7	76.9	127.5	194.1	157.4	226.9	191.8	136.3	138.5	163.1	181.2
Transport equipment	22.2	31.7	56.2	64.4	63.2	49.6	63.2	45.0	46.5	45.4	61.4	58.4
Other manufactured goods	49.3	55.8	68.2	90.8	66.4	43.8	59.4	43.4	31.8	43.0	56.7	53.2
INDONESIA (rupiah)														
Live animals, food products, beverages and tobacco	131.9	96.0	63.3	176.1	131.5	114.7	128.1	121.8	107.5	96.4	133.6	63.7
Chemicals and allied products	40.9	37.0	53.6	55.8	59.8	43.2	59.5	48.4	37.0	31.6	55.6	52.2
Textiles, apparel and footwear	212.9	173.8	175.0	202.0	165.5	100.0	146.0	90.7	103.1	131.0	75.2	51.0
Base metals and manufactures	67.9	63.1	70.4	79.3	110.9	53.1	80.5	70.3	50.8	42.9	48.4	39.1
Machinery and transport equipment	136.3	115.7	102.4	144.6	134.0	88.9	116.6	118.1	95.1	72.8	69.8	54.9

EXTERNAL TRADE

8. VALUE OF IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS (Cont'd)

Monthly averages or calendar months

Millions

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
JAPAN (thousand million yen)														
Food	18.21	19.30	18.34	16.47	17.06	15.66	17.50	15.21	17.20	16.01	14.15	11.17	14.73	
Cereals and cereal preparations	12.98	14.66	13.20	11.08	9.36	9.43	9.11	9.12	11.18	9.96	7.47	5.14	9.05	
Sugar and sugar preparations	3.79	3.39	3.64	4.02	5.08	3.85	5.49	3.97	3.57	3.39	3.87	3.85	3.65	
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	34.63	33.78	36.77	51.31	60.29	38.98	44.95	42.93	39.98	36.68	36.48	39.19	38.87	
Oil-seeds, oil nuts & oil kernels	2.41	2.91	4.41	4.01	4.23	4.04	3.80	4.74	3.71	3.96	3.74	4.78	5.31	
Crude rubber	1.51	1.30	2.24	2.66	3.05	2.59	2.40	2.34	2.33	2.49	3.02	3.09	3.20	
Textile fibres, raw	19.98	18.54	17.57	23.16	23.86	18.23	18.86	21.00	20.24	15.80	15.86	17.44	15.88	
Metal ores and scrap	5.20	5.13	5.57	13.70	20.78	7.73	13.29	8.65	7.58	7.48	7.20	7.14	7.98	
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	8.66	8.02	8.67	12.38	20.39	15.43	19.78	16.15	14.42	14.92	16.21	14.44	13.69	
Chemicals	2.08	1.92	2.41	4.90	5.50	4.99	4.39	4.85	4.70	4.93	5.48	5.95	5.45	
Machinery	2.79	3.77	3.29	3.93	7.26	9.11	8.69	9.81	9.89	8.71	8.02	9.56	10.00	
Transport equipment	2.03	1.55	0.68	0.92	1.41	1.15	1.34	1.50	1.25	0.97	0.87	1.05	0.95	
Other manufactured goods	2.68	2.54	2.41	5.68	15.26	4.42	6.62	4.75	4.38	4.52	4.14	4.06	4.52	
KOREA, southern (hwan)														
Food	821	276	555	452	922	691	969	737	721	606	702	2,747	...	
Cereals and cereal preparations	697	122	78	65	558	...	525	348	186	...	99	
Beverages and tobacco	67	126	198	220	224	174	171	201	176	166	152	3	...	
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	103	106	115	120	206	456	369	439	401	426	558	3,055	...	
Chemicals	306	351	693	370	325	492	426	489	441	492	547	2,104	...	
Textiles	229	604	1,273	663	345	...	630	386	466	...	389	
Machinery	42	203	276	254	262	...	230	232	256	...	462	
Transport equipment	21	113	52	79	48	...	38	48	51	...	31	
Other manufactured goods	223	461	862	711	711	...	922	768	796	...	1,104	
LAOS (kip)														
Food	15.2	18.0	17.0	16.5	18.8	17.3	14.8	12.9	21.0	
Cereals and cereal preparations	7.4	10.5	6.2	3.4	9.8	3.2	2.1	5.2	3.3	
Petroleum products	2.3	4.0	4.8	8.5	8.1	7.2	5.2	11.8	9.7	
Chemicals	2.9	5.6	8.4	4.5	11.8	6.1	3.8	3.8	4.2	
Textiles	9.1	23.0	26.0	11.6	12.5	26.2	8.9	5.7	5.8	
Machinery	3.9	6.9	7.8	8.3	8.0	12.0	7.4	7.2	6.4	
Transport equipment	3.5	12.0	18.7	10.1	16.5	13.6	11.3	9.0	6.6	
Other manufactured goods	11.5	24.6	28.1	16.5	45.7	24.7	15.4	9.5	16.6	
NORTH BORNEO (Malayan dollar)														
Food	1.51	1.46	1.89	2.54	2.33	...	2.24	2.52	2.35	2.53	
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	...	0.48	0.44	0.51	0.48	...	0.39	0.33	0.29	0.41	
Chemicals	...	0.24	0.32	0.41	0.44	...	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.50	
Textiles	0.38	0.46	0.53	0.89	0.55	...	0.54	0.50	0.45	0.46	
Machinery	0.70	0.70	0.57	0.68	0.89	...	0.75	0.77	0.88	1.08	
Transport equipment	0.16	0.25	0.24	0.51	0.45	...	0.37	0.43	0.72	0.48	
Other manufactured goods	...	1.17	1.59	2.01	2.02	...	1.86	1.84	1.92	2.05	
PAKISTAN (rupee)^c														
Mineral oils	8.3	8.3	9.5	8.3	7.4	7.0	7.4	7.4	5.9	4.7	9.9	9.0	12.5	
Cotton piecegoods	1.2	2.5	2.2	4.4	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.1	—	0.1	0.3	0.1	—	
Cotton twist and yarn	4.0	4.0	0.9	1.1	0.8	0.4	1.0	0.7	0.4	—	0.4	0.1	0.1	
Iron and steel manufactures	4.9	5.6	8.3	15.5	18.8	19.7	20.8	25.3	18.4	15.2	20.0	23.2	16.1	
Machinery	10.0	22.9	20.8	26.3	26.5	25.4	24.8	28.5	19.2	25.8	28.0	34.9	32.0	
Transport equipment	2.1	3.7	4.1	7.7	9.5	10.2	13.2	13.2	12.7	9.5	5.3	8.1	5.6	
PHILIPPINES (peso)^d														
Food	12.8	13.2	17.1	14.7	18.1	19.6	19.7	19.8	14.7	19.8	24.2	13.2	...	
Cereals and cereal preparations	3.6	4.3	6.2	4.4	6.3	8.7	8.0	7.5	6.6	10.4	10.2	8.1	...	
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	8.1	9.0	9.0	8.7	9.6	10.2	9.8	10.2	10.1	9.1	11.3	8.1	...	
Chemicals	6.4	6.4	7.3	6.5	9.5	8.1	9.7	8.0	5.6	7.0	11.8	7.4	...	
Textiles	12.5	13.7	14.2	9.9	13.1	9.5	13.1	11.9	9.5	6.8	9.7	5.3	...	
Machinery	9.0	10.3	12.4	16.1	18.0	16.0	16.6	19.1	17.2	13.3	14.5	17.4	...	
Transport equipment	3.6	4.2	5.0	4.8	5.6	4.8	4.7	5.2	5.0	4.2	4.7	2.9	...	
Other manufactured goods	19.1	19.8	21.7	20.1	24.9	19.9	21.4	22.9	19.2	18.2	19.2	12.9	...	
SARAWAK (Malayan dollar)														
Food	3.64	3.85	4.32	4.36	4.57	4.04	4.80	3.58		4.49		
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	22.44	22.40	24.93	26.80	27.38	25.87	28.04	25.53		26.20		
Chemicals	0.53	0.70	0.82	0.79	0.80	0.83	0.88	0.74		0.92		
Textiles	...	0.57	0.61	0.54	0.47	0.42	0.37	0.42		0.43		
Machinery	1.08	1.19	1.21	1.20	1.20	1.03	1.26	0.87		1.19		
Transport equipment	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.45	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.39		0.33		
Other manufactured goods	...	2.10	2.37	2.38	2.13	2.00	2.17	1.89		2.11		

EXTERNAL TRADE

8. VALUE OF IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITY GROUPS (Cont'd)

Monthly averages or calendar months

Millions

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
SINGAPORE (Malayan dollar)^a														
Food	55.8	55.4
Cereals and cereal preparations	13.4	12.3
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	113.2	110.9
Crude rubber	91.4	87.1
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	59.1	65.2
Textiles	18.0	17.6
Machinery	12.6	14.0
Transport equipment	8.0	9.5
Other manufactured goods	35.3	39.2
THAILAND (baht)														
Food	52.5	53.3	51.5	55.2	57.8	60.6	58.2	52.4	60.2	64.9	64.8	49.8	43.1	
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	39.3	47.5	57.0	64.6	77.3	75.0	84.3	67.0	93.2	68.1	71.8	67.4	49.3	
Chemicals	28.2	43.9	48.1	54.5	62.8	62.6	60.1	53.3	69.1	61.0	66.8	72.6	57.8	
Textiles	93.4	105.0	113.4	120.3	113.7	100.1	114.5	111.5	97.7	93.3	98.1	106.4	97.5	
Machinery	67.1	71.1	65.3	73.8	85.2	84.3	67.4	89.5	91.1	75.2	81.3	81.0	69.8	
Transport equipment	46.7	44.6	48.7	53.1	73.7	58.2	62.6	64.5	59.2	58.5	50.7	46.8	38.2	
Other manufactured goods	151.0	168.7	191.1	173.8	189.7	176.8	161.6	207.8	190.0	149.7	159.5	178.9	164.6	
VIET-NAM (piastre)^f														
Food	111.1	122.0	89.6	82.2	75.9	69.5	68.8	54.2	71.0	71.0	67.0	44.3	66.5	
Petroleum and products	32.0	41.0	33.7	35.0	44.6	46.8	54.8	35.1	45.4	45.5	60.5	31.0	30.2	
Textiles	231.4	190.1	111.2	123.5	127.3	107.5	144.0	119.3	119.0	119.0	108.2	68.9	82.1	
Machinery	71.7	76.2	65.4	49.2	83.9	63.0	88.7	53.5	63.1	63.1	67.2	40.4	61.6	
Transport equipment	47.2	49.3	52.3	32.6	58.3	53.4	84.0	68.2	64.1	64.1	37.2	20.7	46.2	

GENERAL NOTE: See table 6.

a. 1953 and 1954 figures for Ceylon. 1953 to 1956 figures for India, reclassified by ECAFE secretariat, may not conform exactly to the new classification beginning from 1955 and 1957 respectively.

b. Including trade with Singapore.

c. Figures prior to 1956, relating to private account only. From 1956 onwards figures including government account.

d. Imports valued f.o.b.

e. Including trade with the Federation of Malaya.

f. See footnote h in table 6.

g. Averages of Jul-Dec.

9. VALUE OF EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES AND/OR COMMODITY GROUPS

Monthly averages or calendar months

Millions

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
BURMA (kyat)														
Rice and products	70.7	79.4	68.1	72.3	66.7	55.4	39.4	50.7	73.0	54.1	33.0
Natural rubber	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.7	3.1	...	1.4	3.0	3.0	1.4
Teak	2.4	2.0	1.8	2.8	5.6	...	5.8	5.4	4.4	4.1
Raw cotton	5.1	4.2	3.2	4.3	2.1	...	0.8	1.4	1.6	2.1
Base metals and ores	4.6	3.8	4.9	5.2	3.9	...	4.0	3.2	2.2	1.3
CAMBODIA (riel)														
Rice	38.5	69.5	9.3	20.6	55.8	64.6	32.1	112.8	81.8	39.8	24.0	10.5
Maize	8.0	16.9	12.5	15.9	14.8	18.7	17.4	8.6	11.0	18.0	37.1	14.1
Natural rubber	25.8	34.3	51.1	42.2	47.7	51.2	57.5	16.0 ^c	58.3 ^c	62.6	67.8	75.8
CEYLON (rupee)														
Tea	68.8	93.6	99.5	87.0	85.1	94.2	64.8	92.2	70.6	115.8	97.9	76.8	75.5	
Coconut and products	20.5	18.2	19.0	18.0	13.3	13.6	14.3	11.0	7.0	18.2	18.2	18.1	17.1	
Natural rubber	28.1	23.8	29.2	24.4	25.0	21.5	27.2	26.1	12.6	19.0	25.1	26.9	20.6	
CHINA (Taiwan, new Taiwan dollar)														
Rice	17.4	9.4	37.3	34.4	37.0	54.4	51.6	92.7	61.3	—	63.7	—	104.5	
Fruits, fresh, dried and preserved	8.1	10.7	12.3	18.4	16.2	26.3	20.1	19.4	29.5	35.7	20.6	24.6	29.0	
Tea	8.8	12.1	7.0	10.2	11.8	13.1	14.4	6.1	9.4	20.4	12.7	19.5	12.1	
Sugar	111.2	70.2	79.6	127.6	191.0	166.8	109.0	300.4	121.4	151.0	94.3	345.8	388.4	
FEDERATION OF MALAYA^a														
(Malayan dollar)														
Rubber	74.7	75.3	132.0	114.8	108.7	99.8	111.3	97.9	85.8	97.1	118.2	118.4	122.7	
Iron ore	1.7	1.8	2.7	4.3	5.5	5.2	4.1	2.0	6.6	7.8	4.5	3.1	2.0	
Vegetable oils	7.2	7.2	7.2	8.3	7.7	7.3	7.3	6.4	7.5	8.1	7.3	5.4	4.2	
Tin	18.4	18.4	19.3	28.4	26.6	19.7	26.4	23.7	18.4	17.7	18.9	21.9	23.1	
INDIA (rupee)^b														
Food	118.7	144.8	131.2	157.6	149.3	160.3	161.5	128.3	105.9	192.6	213.4	147.0
Tea	85.9	109.4	94.3	118.5	102.8	113.8	127.4	89.9	68.2	141.7	158.2	90.1
Spices	14.5	12.0	8.8	7.7	7.0	7.4	5.6	9.5	5.3	6.9	7.9	7.6
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	86.3	73.2	98.2	84.2	103.8	85.1	79.8	87.8	83.6	92.7	76.3	98.6
Hides and skins, undressed	4.9	5.7	5.6	5.1	5.8	6.0	4.1	5.5	6.4	5.2	6.9	8.4
Cotton raw and waste	16.7	15.4	28.9	20.9	15.6	17.7	6.6	11.2	23.2	21.5	16.4	19.1
Vegetable oils	7.9	7.4	31.2	17.4	9.5	6.2	4.0	7.7	6.8	7.0	4.6	3.1
Chemicals	4.4	4.7	4.1	4.5	4.6	3.7	4.8	4.0	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.3
Leather and manufactures	21.2	18.2	19.0	18.7	18.1	15.3	15.5	15.6	14.2	16.4	15.5	17.2
Cotton yarn and fabrics	53.1	59.7	53.0	51.9	57.2	43.9	47.5	49.4	37.0	40.3	50.0	45.3
Jute yarn and fabrics	92.0	101.2	102.9	94.6	49.6	49.6	40.8	49.7	38.8	60.9	49.2	58.8
Other manufactured goods	30.9	29.3	31.3	30.9	109.7	81.1	192.8	89.2	68.2	91.0	70.9	60.0

EXTERNAL TRADE

9. VALUE OF EXPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES AND/OR COMMODITY GROUPS (Cont'd)

Monthly averages or calendar months

Millions

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
INDONESIA (rupiah)														
Tea	22.5	37.9	29.7	28.1	28.4	23.6	28.1	24.1	23.6	24.5	22.1	16.2
Copra	61.8	55.1	40.4	42.8	40.5	19.9	53.8	10.7	5.8	13.7	32.8	18.3
Natural rubber	259.1	257.6	410.0	335.7	331.9	248.2	277.9	179.4	188.5	286.1	339.0	228.4
Tin ore	77.0	58.4	56.9	60.5	46.4	35.5	57.0	40.7	33.5	31.0	33.2	20.0
Petroleum and products	194.4	215.8	205.0	213.3	278.9	268.2	323.5	227.4	284.3	271.0	291.7	38.3
JAPAN (thousand million yen)														
Food	3.72	3.92	3.98	5.32	5.36	6.92	6.44	5.37	5.46	6.79	10.06	5.89	7.15	...
Fish and fish preparations	1.82	2.23	2.27	3.62	3.66	5.13	4.40	3.52	3.90	5.11	7.99	3.49	5.44	...
Crude materials, inedible except fuels	2.09	2.50	2.94	2.86	2.79	2.27	3.08	2.11	2.11	2.03	2.89	1.60	2.17	...
Textile fibres, raw	1.42	1.54	1.74	1.65	1.74	1.13	1.95	1.03	0.92	0.93	1.62	0.83	1.03	...
Chemicals	1.87	2.37	2.82	3.21	3.79	4.13	2.96	5.01	4.21	3.59	3.79	4.51	6.07	...
Textiles	11.27	16.50	17.55	20.81	24.44	21.17	27.72	21.65	21.05	19.18	22.79	13.82	21.24	...
Base metals and manufactures	5.62	7.51	11.61	10.24	9.70	11.15	11.53	10.36	11.23	10.09	12.94	8.84	11.22	...
Machinery	2.14	3.86	3.83	5.07	6.21	7.08	7.42	5.85	6.19	7.30	9.00	4.80	7.82	...
Transport equipment	3.52	2.20	3.57	9.56	12.75	11.91	10.64	16.11	10.75	10.04	10.76	7.19	21.24	...
Other manufactured goods	6.82	9.22	12.97	16.76	20.12	20.10	20.90	16.63	19.65	21.81	22.31	13.76	20.88	...
KOREA, southern (hwan)														
Food	52.0	67.4	42.7	58.5	152.4	158.9	185.8	69.1	109.5	52.7	404.3	104.0
Crude materials, inedible except fuels	235.0	426.6	566.5	841.5	585.5	590.0	468.3	420.7	577.3	622.7	739.3	533.0
Chemicals	16.2	31.5	47.0	35.8	23.8	0.8	7.6	0.3	0.1	1.7	1.0	3.0
Manufactured goods	17.8	26.5	64.7	108.4	169.2	164.8	148.1	136.4	180.9	189.0	153.0	32.0
LAOS (kip)														
Wood and lumber	1.00	0.28	0.13	0.58	0.29	0.38	0.11	1.62	0.23
Tin ore	0.75	1.34	1.50	1.60	1.52	0.90	1.80	1.20	2.48
Gums and resins	0.59	0.74	0.63	0.49	0.85	0.40	0.93	0.34	0.30
Plants for use in medicine and perfumery	0.09	0.24	0.13	0.58	0.04	1.22	0.26	—	0.84
NORTH BORNEO (Malayan dollar)														
Copra	0.73	1.15	1.18	1.94	2.00	...	1.92	2.24	2.62	2.99
Rubber	1.95	2.03	3.84	3.36	3.10	...	3.01	2.65	2.35	2.96
Timber	1.03	1.46	1.81	2.18	2.63	...	2.95	2.59	3.22	3.32
PAKISTAN (rupee)^c														
Tea	2.9	3.9	2.9	4.5	2.0	2.7	3.3	1.3	1.1	4.1	4.4	1.1	0.4	...
Raw jute	47.6	45.4	58.0	62.6	65.2	70.0	89.5	130.2	34.1	32.4	83.2	76.0	52.6	...
Raw cotton	52.7	29.1	33.6	30.3	27.6	19.9	19.1	19.1	24.0	22.5	14.0	13.5	18.0	...
Raw wool	4.3	3.5	5.6	5.9	8.6	4.0	7.2	3.9	2.6	4.8	4.9	5.8	5.0	...
Hides and skins	3.3	2.8	2.6	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.2	2.5	3.3	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.4	...
PHILIPPINES (peso)														
Coconut and coconut preparations	26.3	27.4	25.4	29.3	28.8	30.0	27.7	23.9	27.0	35.0	34.0	23.3
Sugar and related products	17.0	18.4	18.6	17.6	14.9	19.5	6.7	21.0	28.2	16.2	12.6	21.3
Fibres and manufactures	7.2	4.9	5.1	6.5	7.1	4.9	6.2	4.9	4.5	5.3	4.9	4.9
Minerals and metals	5.9	5.9	6.7	9.2	8.7	6.2	7.8	4.3	4.9	6.7	9.0	6.4
Logs, lumber and timber	4.8	5.9	6.9	8.1	7.5	11.6	6.5	7.7	11.4	13.2	14.2	8.9
SARAWAK (Malayan dollar)														
Pepper	4.12	3.64	2.64	2.05	1.44	1.26	1.91	0.87	1.66
Rubber	2.64	2.87	6.64	5.86	6.20	5.11	5.90	4.17	6.06
Timber, sawn and logs	1.16	1.16	1.83	1.59	1.63	1.63	1.67	1.64	1.63
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	24.42	24.46	26.74	28.85	30.51	27.83	30.65	26.08	29.58
SINGAPORE (Malayan dollar)^d														
Rubber	10.4	98.1
Mineral fuels	41.0	42.2
Vegetable oils	4.0	4.9
Tin	11.6	11.1
THAILAND (baht)^e														
Rice	312.2	257.2	261.1	238.4	301.9	248.0	258.5	368.1	257.1	224.4	142.3	232.3
Natural rubber	62.6	92.4	150.2	127.2	117.2	110.6	135.8	113.5	101.6	115.8	111.3	251.6
Teak	11.1	17.6	22.0	25.5	21.8	19.9	20.2	16.9	19.1	19.9	23.8	18.4
Tin ore and concentrates	25.0	31.1	36.7	42.3	44.3	21.2	55.2	17.6	20.9	23.0	23.0	33.5
VIET-NAM (piastre)^f														
Rice and products	52.5	64.2	26.2	1.1	59.3	40.6	41.0	58.6	100.0	1.4	2.5	1.6	46.0	...
Natural rubber	70.5	68.7	122.7	107.0	140.8	103.5	193.4	107.2	63.3	93.3	150.3	68.9	98.3	...

GENERAL NOTE: See table 6.

a. Including trade with Singapore.

b. Figures for 1953 to 1956, reclassified by ECAFE Secretariat, may not conform exactly to the new classification from 1957.

c. Figures prior to 1956, relating to private account only. From 1956 onwards figures including government account.

d. Including trade with the Federation of Malaya.

e. Baht value is obtained by converting foreign currencies at free market buying rate.

f. See footnote h in table 6.

g. Averages of Jul-Dec.

EXTERNAL TRADE

10. QUANTITY OF EXPORTS OF MAJOR COMMODITIES

Monthly averages or calendar months

Thousand tons

	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
								IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
RICE															
Burma	109.4	86.9	129.6	141.5	162.1	155.7	122.4	98.6	119.2	163.9	118.2	88.1	44.7
Cambodia	17.5	11.5	24.7	8.4	5.8	19.2	21.2	11.0	35.4	27.7	12.9	8.5	5.1
China (Taiwan)	8.8	4.9	3.0	14.2	9.1	10.1	14.9	14.2	25.4	16.8	—	17.5	—	19.7	...
Thailand	118.8	113.3	83.5	104.0	105.5	131.4	88.8	103.5	142.9	76.4	83.3	52.7	90.0	89.0	...
Viet-Nam	12.8	8.6	14.6	6.8	0.4	15.7	9.8	9.3	13.4	17.9	0.4	0.7	0.4	12.8	...
SUGAR															
China (Taiwan)	38.3	72.9	43.5	48.8	50.0	62.4	68.1	32.4	119.1	47.8	62.9	42.4	105.8	120.2	...
India	16.4	7.0	8.5	7.0	7.0	8.3	10.6	8.9
Indonesia	0.1	7.8	17.7	14.7	14.1	12.2	7.4	25.5	5.5	—	19.4	4.5	—
Philippines	66.1	64.3	72.4	77.2	71.9	59.3	80.8	26.8	88.4	110.1	67.2	57.6	92.0
TEA															
Ceylon	11.9	12.8	13.6	13.6	13.2	13.3	14.3	10.1	14.2	11.4	17.2	14.3	13.5	12.8	...
China (Taiwan)	0.8	0.9	1.3	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	0.7	...
India	15.5	18.8	16.8	13.6	19.5	16.5	18.9	21.1	16.2	12.0	21.4	25.4	15.9
Indonesia	2.7	2.4	3.4	2.4	2.9	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.2
Japan	0.8	1.1	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.6	1.3	0.8	0.3	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.5	...
Pakistan	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.7	0.1
HIDES & SKINS															
India (net exports, tons)	1,288	589	630	366	276	469	355	363	310	397	260	477
Pakistan (thousand pieces)	719	898	811	749	878	856	887	784	635	795	1,121	998	869	588	...
COPRA* & COCONUT OIL															
Ceylon	11.2	9.1	8.3	11.8	10.3	6.4	5.2	7.2	4.9	1.3	6.9	7.8	8.6	7.3	...
Federation of Malaya (coconut oil)	3.6	4.0	3.7	4.8	6.0	4.7	3.4	4.4	3.6	3.6	3.8	2.7	1.0	0.9	...
Indonesia (copra)	18.3	16.3	15.8	12.5	13.8	15.4	6.2	21.6	3.3	1.2	3.7	9.3	3.2
N. Borneo	0.6	0.7	1.4	1.9	3.2	3.4	3.7	3.2	3.2	3.6	3.5	3.7
Philippines	41.9	36.6	45.5	48.4	59.8	57.6	50.0	51.3	42.7	45.1	57.9	54.3	33.4
Singapore (coconut oil)	2.0	1.1	3.0	2.9	2.7	3.7	2.3	4.8	2.7	1.9	2.4	2.0	1.4	1.2	...
PALM OIL															
Federation of Malaya	1.2	1.9	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.9	3.8	3.8	3.2	3.4	3.7	5.0	4.5	3.2	...
Indonesia	10.4	11.3	11.7	10.5	10.4	10.8	11.0	13.0	7.1	9.5	13.7	14.0	8.3
Singapore	2.7	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.4	1.9	1.9	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.2	2.7	2.4	1.8	...
GROUND NUTS* & OIL															
India	5.6	1.7	2.5	14.8	2.8	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.0	6.6
NATURAL RUBBER															
Brunei	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Burma	1.2	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.5	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Cambodia	1.4	1.5	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.7	2.4	1.9	2.3	2.9	4.3
Ceylon	7.6	8.2	7.6	8.2	7.3	8.0	7.7	7.7	9.7	3.9	8.9	8.1	6.5	8.5	...
Federation of Malaya	28.3	27.5	35.3	37.9	36.6	38.9	39.0	45.0	39.3	36.9	37.1	42.8	42.8	46.0	...
Indonesia	61.8	57.1	61.7	61.1	56.6	56.4	50.5	51.0	35.7	40.6	61.5	64.2	41.8	46.7	...
N. Borneo	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.0	...
Sarawak	2.7	2.0	1.9	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.4	2.7	3.0	3.7	3.6	2.8	2.2	...
Singapore	20.1	20.7	13.1	15.6	15.7	16.1	17.2	23.8	17.5	11.0	20.3	19.9	24.4	18.0	...
Thailand	8.3	8.1	9.9	11.0	11.3	11.3	11.6	13.5	12.6	11.7	12.2	10.1	21.9	13.6	...
Viet-Nam	5.3	5.0	4.6	5.2	5.3	6.1	5.7	7.0	6.0	3.8	6.2	6.9	6.7	6.0	...
COTTON, RAW															
India	4.4	3.8	2.3	7.9	5.9	3.4	6.1	1.5	3.0	9.0	7.4	5.7	8.0
Iran ^b	0.6	2.1	3.0	3.7	3.2	3.8	...	2.2 ^c	7.8	2.2	0.8
Pakistan	20.4	23.6	11.8	14.0	10.9	9.6	8.1	7.1	7.3	9.2	9.4	6.4	6.0	8.0	...
COTTON YARN (tons)															
Federation of Malaya and Singapore	119	113	54	9	44	11	43	23	14	2	97	60	3
Hong Kong	1,900	1,190	1,172	1,228	1,183	1,262	1,166	1,124	1,020	1,229	1,236	1,429	896	914	...
Japan	1,117	801	1,117	991	1,032	1,217	936	906	1,275	959	864	645	460	1,270	...
COTTON PIECE GOODS (million sq. metres)															
Federation of Malaya and Singapore	9.6	8.0	2.7	5.0	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.0	5.3	3.6	3.6	4.3	3.8
Hong Kong	10.1	9.3	11.3	11.5	9.8	13.7	15.4	13.8	18.6	21.1	18.2	23.5	13.1	15.1	...
India (million metres)	45.7	50.0	65.6	56.9	56.7	67.1	47.4	54.6	74.0	41.5	43.7	49.4	47.3
Japan	52.0	63.7	89.0	79.3	87.9	102.3	86.8	112.9	92.3	85.2	77.3	92.3	59.3	90.5	...
JUTE															
Pakistan (raw)	70.0	81.7	74.3	81.8	71.5	65.4	75.5	90.1	132.8	41.0	35.5	92.6	81.9	57.4	...
India (bag and cloth)	60.0	60.3	67.8	79.6	67.9	65.9	58.3	65.1	54.6	47.0	70.3	61.0	61.1
HEMP, RAW															
Philippines	9.1	9.3	8.2	9.3	10.2	9.6	8.4	8.4	7.7	7.5	8.2	10.5	7.5
TIN CONCENTRATES (tons)															
Burma	118	83	52	79	71	72	112	113	114	79	126	131	56	134	...
Indonesia	2,929	2,771	2,874	2,689	2,638	2,318	1,651	2,513	1,826	1,627	1,531	1,620
Thailand	825	863	806	935	1,052	1,130	548	1,301	471	537	608	572	785	456	...
TIN METAL (tons)															
Federation of Malaya	3,140	2,955	3,134	3,204	4,399	4,252	3,212	4,399	3,952	2,964	2,862	3,070	3,418	3,603	...
Singapore	2,286	2,274	2,816	2,821	1,806	1,763	667	1,232	1,106	773	632	157	107	124	...
PETROLEUM & PRODUCTS															
Brunei (crude oil)	423	406	398	433	469	455	...	446	423	408	437
Federation of Malaya and Singapore	204	225	235	268	239	206	172	196	207	191	147	145	199
Indonesia	617	815	827	808	877	1,301	1,122	1,320	957	1,179	1,115	1,238	163

GENERAL NOTE: For Federation of Malaya and Singapore: Trade between Singapore and Federation of Malaya is excluded.
a. In terms of oil equivalent.

b. Annual data: 12 months ending 21 July of year stated.
c. Average of Jul-Dec.

EXTERNAL TRADE

11. INDEX NUMBERS OF QUANTUM, UNIT VALUE AND TERMS OF TRADE

1953=100^a

	1951	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
								IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
A. Quantum															
BURMA															
Imports	69†	104	123	104	88	132	...	126	111	58	70
Exports	113†	115	130	145	163	150	...	98	112	149	118
CEYLON															
Imports: ^b General . . .	94	96	99	97	106	112	113	94	105	79	129	141	120	117	...
Exports: ^b General . . .	93	97	103	109	104	99	108	86	108	77	130	119	98	94	...
Tea	91	94	108	108	104	111	123	82	118	88	155	129	104	102	...
Rubber	107	97	100	106	101	139	100	112	128	60	88	124	115	91	...
All coconut products .	94	109	96	118	113	82	81	96	68	53	105	97	82	79	...
Imports															
(Central Bank index) .	99	99	93	96	105	111	112	97	105	79	124	137	117
Consumer goods . . .	95	98	89	95	106	107	115	96	107	76	132	144	110
Capital goods . . .	109	104	103	104	102	125	102	96	100	90	101	116	142
CHINA (Taiwan)															
Imports (ordinary and ICA)	...	81	105	98	94	102	110	115	116	87	117	123
Crude materials	61	107	103	101	122	110	106	114	87	130	111
Chemicals	136	144	126	127	102	194	50	167	207	144	260
Machinery & transport equipment	57	83	82	81	117	122	186	121	109	94	163
Exports	67	69	86	83	97	118	72	173	99	109	91
Food	65	68	85	81	96	113	69	178	93	97	84
FEDERATION OF MALAYA and SINGAPORE^c															
Imports	131	116	107	128	140	139	139	128	149	137	129	140
Exports	128	109	110	118	127	130	130	138	137	130	125	139
INDIA[†]															
Imports	108	118	125	147	168	...	143	141	130	115
Exports	100	105	115	110	119	...	118	111	87	120
JAPAN^d															
Imports: General . . .	67	74	104	109	138	172	142	141	140	140	144	144	142	151	...
Foods	77	93	117	117	107	102	108	105	102	114	114	101	80	114	...
Raw materials . . .	68	71	97	106	144	162	130	128	129	131	129	131	144	144	...
Mineral fuels . . .	51	65	100	106	133	190	177	192	173	163	177	194	173	160	...
Chemicals	49	57	93	146	202	223	220	180	202	202	222	240
Machinery	42	54	113	93	126	219	232	165	241	226	241	250
Exports: General . . .	87	92	133	174	208	232	240	246	239	227	227	269	184	286	...
Foods	51	78	93	105	136	136	170	162	146	136	163	244	155	205	...
Chemicals	45	55	126	162	207	260	335	214	391	336	291	311
Manufactured goods .	89	94	140	186	222	250	255	265	255	245	242	279	195	308	...
Textiles	100	86	149	179	204	239	215	269	217	211	199	238
Metals	120	169	148	226	165	145	207	180	173	203	191	263
Machinery	54	64	112	157	290	346	306	313	379	282	280	298
PHILIPPINES															
Imports ^e	100	90	111	125	123	137	121	131	127	115	108	135	97
Exports	96	107	111	121	138	127	140	108	121	141	144	151	120
THAILAND															
Exports	112	100	87	108	112	125	99	121	125	101	94	76
VIET-NAM^h															
Imports	75	103	113	90	77	95	82	94	72	89	80	86	52	73	...
Exports	153	123	113	132	85	155	122	174	118	141	91	137	56	116	...

EXTERNAL TRADE

11. INDEX NUMBERS OF QUANTUM, UNIT VALUE AND TERMS OF TRADE (Cont'd)
1953=100^a

	1951	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
								IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
B. Unit Value															
BURMA															
Imports	129†	115	93	89	82	91	...	97	90	106	101
Exports	74†	94	77	62	62	60	...	59	57	60	55
CEYLON															
Imports: ^b General	102	110	88	89	99	96	83	97	88	90	86	86	87	83	...
Exports: ^b General	126	98	112	117	109	104	102	101	101	104	99	102	102	102	...
Tea	106	94	126	134	122	113	111	112	113	117	108	110	108	107	...
Rubber	165	114	88	101	98	93	81	87	75	77	78	84	85	83	...
All coconut products	134	83	94	79	79	85	98	85	89	93	93	99	105	113	...
Imports (Central Bank index)	101	108	92	86	90	95	87	94	90	89	88	89	92
Consumer goods	99	107	91	84	85	89	81	88	83	83	82	85	90
Capital goods	107	113	95	97	107	114	105	113	111	108	103	100	97
CHINA (Taiwan)															
Imports (ordinary and I.C.A.)	...	111	108	111	106	110	106	107	106	105	105	108
Exports	...	113	105	110	105	116	100	122	103	105	93	98
FEDERATION OF MALAYA and SINGAPORE ^c															
Imports	120	108	90	92	91	96	91	95	90	94	89	90
Exports	172	125	94	120	110	105	96	100	92	92	94	103
INDIA†															
Imports	...	109	97	97	99	107	...	107	101	102	110
Exports	...	109	107	98	102	102	...	107	97	99	103
INDONESIA															
Imports	116	110	91	91	88	87	93	86	92	85	100	96
Exports	160	113	96	109	102	98	90	100	95	85	88	92
JAPAN ^d															
Imports	124	114	96	94	97	103	89	103	96	92	84	83	84	84	...
Exports	122	108	96	91	94	97	94	97	93	94	95	93	89	90	...
KOREA, ^e southern (1957=100)															
Imports	100	92	99	98	92	90	88	88	86	...
Exports	100	82	91	87	79	81	83	85	86	...
PAKISTAN ^f															
Imports	116	102	98	105	110	124	...	129	134	136	140
Exports	194	142	107	104	98	105	96	105	105	90	95	93
PHILIPPINES															
Imports ^g	106	105	96	96	97	100	102	102	106	101	103	100	100
Exports	104	82	89	81	83	84	87	85	85	88	89	87	95
THAILAND															
Exports:															
Effective price in baht	117	104	97	122	124	124	133	127	129	128	135	139
Price in dollars (IMF index)	104	102	93	88	81	80	85	84	84	83	87	90
VIET-NAM ^h															
Imports	75	81	101	95	90	99	93	103	99	92	88	91	91	87	...
Exports	90	88	94	99	92	97	85	103	97	84	76	81	85	84	...

C. Terms of trade

Percentage of unit value index of exports to unit value index of imports

BURMA	57†	81	83	70	76	66	...	60	63	56	54
CEYLON	124	89	127	132	110	109	123	104	115	116	115	120	118	123	...
CHINA (Taiwan)	...	102	97	99	99	105	94	114	97	100	89	91
FEDERATION OF MALAYA and SINGAPORE	143	116	104	130	121	109	105	105	102	98	106	114
INDIA†	...	100	110	103	104†	95	...	100	96	97	94
INDONESIA	138	103	105	120	116	112	96	116	102	100	88
JAPAN	98	94	100	96	97	94	106	95	97	103	113	112	106	108	...
KOREA, southern	100	89	92	88	87	91	94	96	100	...
PAKISTAN	167	139	109	99	89	85	...	81	78	66	68
PHILIPPINES	98	78	93	85	85	84	85	83	80	86	86	87	95
VIET-NAM	120	109	93	104	102	98	91	100	98	91	86	89	93	97	...

a. Original base: Burma, Apr 1936-Mar 1941 for the period prior to 1953, 1952 since 1953; China (Taiwan), 1952; Ceylon, 1948; India, Apr 1952/Mar 1953; Indonesia, 1950; Japan, 1950; southern Korea, 1957; Malaya, 1938 for period prior to 1953, 1952 since 1953; Pakistan, Apr 1948/Mar 1949; Philippines, 1955; Viet-Nam, 1949.

b. All trade indexes since 1950 except the annual import price index have been computed on a fixed base (1948) weights method. The annual import price index has been computed by using moving current weights on 1948 base.

c. Figures from 1953, though linked to previous figures, have different treatment in imports and exports of petroleum products.

d. Indexes compiled by Ministry of Finance. The commodity groups are abridged titles of selected SITC sections and divisions.

e. Index in terms of U.S. dollars.

f. Imports excluding land trade. Index in terms of U.S. dollars.

g. Based on f.o.b. import prices.

h. See footnote h to table 6.

i. Calendar year from 1956.

PRICE

12. INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES

1953=100^a

	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
BURMA														
All agricultural produce	103	100	96	99	112	113	122	111	113	113	114	
Cereals	107	101	107	103	104	107	108	101	104	110	114	
Non-food agricultural produce	112	114	107	103	125	137	138	139	143	139	129	
CHINA (Taipei)														
General index	92	102	117	132	141	143	142	142	143	141	147	151	152	
Food	78	105	114	123	135	142	141	142	139	137	149	155	156	
Apparel	107	94	110	106	105	107	104	106	108	106	109	114	115	
Metals and electrical materials ^b	104	102	158	190	197	189	194	193	193	188	182	183	184	
Building materials	94	105	115	153	163	148	152	145	151	149	150	155	164	
Manufactured products	91	104	120	143	162	158	159	155	157	158	162	162	...	
Industrial materials	95	100	116	138	163	163	160	159	159	160	174	188	...	
INDIA (Apr-Dec 1953=100)														
General index	94	87	97	103	105	108	100	103	110	108	106	107	
Food articles	90	78	91	98	103	98	94	100	110	108	105	106	
Industrial raw materials	94	88	103	107	104	105	102	104	108	104	104	105	
Manufactured articles	102	101	106	109	110	110	109	109	110	110	110	110	
Intermediate products	99	99	112	110	111	108	108	111	114	112	112	112	
Finished products	102	101	105	109	109	110	109	109	110	110	109	109	
INDONESIA (Djakarta)														
(imported goods)														
All articles	94	109	145	135	160	247	184	205	227	254	301	
Provisions	84	110	144	146	178	244	204	227	228	240	283	
Textile goods	89	110	169	118	137	248	167	196	223	262	312	
Chemicals	90	109	151	137	141	208	162	174	194	215	248	
Metals	105	98	115	135	169	234	180	189	213	237	295	
IRAN (Teheran)														
General index	83	118	115	123	123	119	120	120	118	119	119	121	121	
Domestic products	88	124	117	124	131	133	131	131	130	135	136	141	144	
Imported products	86	107	105	96	88	82	81	81	82	83	84	83	83	
Exported products ^c	76	117	116	136	134	125	129	130	124	122	120	121	121	
JAPAN														
General index	100	99	98	102	105	98	103	100	98	97	97	97	98	
Edible farm products	93	112	112	109	112	117	117	118	117	117	117	116	116	
Textiles	101	92	87	88	82	75	79	76	77	76	72	72	75	
Chemicals	108	93	90	94	95	88	92	90	89	86	85	85	85	
Metal and machinery	105	94	97	116	119	103	113	106	104	100	100	103	103	
Building materials	85	104	96	104	115	107	113	110	107	105	106	108	108	
Producer goods	100	96	95	103	107	98	104	100	99	96	95	96	97	
Consumer goods	100	103	101	100	102	99	103	100	98	98	99	99	99	
KOREA, southern (1955=100)														
General index	100	132	153	143	144	142	146	145	141	139	139	
Foods	100	141	168	145	142	142	152	150	135	129	130	
Metal products and machinery	100	130	162	159	162	157	155	159	164	166	167	
Building materials	100	121	135	144	135	135	143	143	155	150	150	
Textiles	100	122	127	126	129	129	126	124	126	124	120	
Producer goods	100	138	156	156	158	156	155	155	159	160	162	
Consumer goods	100	129	152	138	138	137	142	141	133	130	130	
PHILIPPINES (Manila)														
General index	101	95	92	95	99	103	102	103	102	103	102	103	103	
Food	107	97	95	96	102	105	106	107	106	106	101	99	99	
Crude materials	81	88	84	90	92	99	95	96	95	97	109	116	117	
Chemicals	103	95	88	88	93	96	94	96	97	95	97	100	100	
Manufactured goods	109	96	92	100	103	104	104	105	104	103	102	105	105	
Domestic products	100	94	92	94	98	101	101	102	101	101	101	102	101	
Exported products	82	88	81	84	88	98	91	94	94	97	107	112	112	
Imported products	105	97	92	100	106	110	106	110	110	110	111	114	114	
THAILAND (Bangkok)														
General index	107	98	114	117	118	123	116	118	122	124	126	112	116	
Agricultural produce ^d	120	98	136	130	130	143	129	134	136	146	153	131	133	
Foodstuff ^d	98	96	108	116	115	122	113	116	123	123	123	107	112	
Clothes	131	99	102	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	101	
Metal	135	97	126	139	141	108	128	116	107	103	105	107	113	
Construction materials	97	103	104	103	105	103	104	103	103	102	102	102	102	
VIET-NAM (Saigon-Cholon)														
General index	87	105	117	122	123	125	132	125	122	128	126	119	117	
Rice and paddy	90	83	99	113	106	119	125	114	111	126	124	97	96	
Raw materials	92	117	145	131	139	127	151	132	123	125	128	130	129	
Semi-finished products	87	120	123	131	138	129	142	134	129	130	125	124	126	
Manufactured products	86	120	124	121	111	117	118	118	118	117	115	118	119	
Local products	89	100	116	123	121	123	132	112	118	127	125	112	111	
Imported products	83	121	121	124	130	131	134	133	132	130	128	133	133	

a. Original base: Burma, 1938-40; China (Taiwan), Jan-Jun 1937 prior to 1959, 1956 since 1959 except indexes of manufactured products and industrial materials for which the base is 1951; India, Apr 1952/Mar 1953; Indonesia, 1938; Japan, 1952; southern Korea, and Philippines, 1955; Thailand, Apr 1938/Mar 1939; Viet-Nam,

1949.

b. Beginning 1959, metals and manufactures thereof.

c. Excluding petroleum.

d. Agricultural produce including paddy, rice meal, copra, rubber, etc.; foodstuff including milled rice, pork, banana, etc.

13. PRICE QUOTATIONS OF MAJOR EXPORT COMMODITIES

PRICE

Commodity and country	Unit	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
									IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
RICE																
Burma	£ per L. ton	52.5	60.0	49.0	41.1	35.6	34.2	37.0	33.0	37.0	37.0	37.0	37.0	.	34.5	
China(Taiwan)	NT\$ per m. ton	2,125	3,527	3,133	2,634	3,776	3,644	3,643	3,643	3,643	3,643	.	3,643	.	5,313	
Thailand	£ per L. ton	56.7	63.4	57.3	50.5	48.9	49.8	53.1	51.7	51.8	53.4	54.5	52.5	46.8	47.5	
SUGAR																
China(Taiwan)	US\$ per ton	151.1	98.2	104.9	104.6	104.3	139.3	98.4	119.0	102.0	97.5	94.2	99.8	86.6	...	
India	Rs. per maund.	30.4	28.4	31.1	28.1	27.9	30.8	32.5	32.2	34.8	35.2	36.0	35.7	35.7	...	
Indonesia	Rp. per 100kg.	286	285	308	306	302	350	418	403	375	418	440	440	440	440	
Philippines	Peso per picul	14.3	15.2	14.9	13.8	14.0	14.8	15.3	14.6	15.0	15.4	15.4	15.4	14.8	14.4	
TEA																
Ceylon	Rs. per lb.	2.30	2.46	3.11	3.30	3.00	2.78	2.75	2.77	2.78	2.89	2.67	2.71	2.65	2.75	
China(Taiwan)	NT\$ per kg.	8.71	9.64	11.25	11.49	11.96	10.08	13.20	11.17	11.37	12.69	13.44	13.02	20.03	18.36	
India ^c	Rs. per lb.	1.84	2.00	3.18	3.05	2.58	2.63	2.52	2.51	2.27	2.56	3.09	2.35	2.19	2.16	
Indonesia	Rp. per 100kg.	912	1,037	1,469	1,459	1,072	1,097	1,116	1,105	1,100	1,134	1,138	1,081	
PEPPER																
Cambodia	Ri. per 63.42 kg.	5,004	6,238	4,663	3,507	4,350	4,771	3,465	4,833	3,700	3,537	3,550	3,075	2,600	2,800	
India	Rs. per maund	337.7	285.9	162.4	131.6	110.9	77.7	71.7	80.5	69.2	68.3	90.0	71.2	79.3	...	
Indonesia	Rp. per 100kg.	3,031	2,583	1,478	745	551	469	457	427	398	502	526	417	
Sarawak	M\$ per picul	447.9	313.7	159.6	109.6	70.2	69.5	66.9	69.4 ^a	—	63.6 ^c	—	70.0 ^c	
Singapore	M\$ per picul	507.4	395.3	204.8	135.6	94.7	72.8	69.8	65.4	64.1	70.9	75.7	68.3	66.0	72.5	
HIDES																
Pakistan	Rs. per 28 lbs.	24.42	21.61	25.54	31.72	29.49	29.08	29.24	31.85	33.17	29.03	28.00	26.75	26.00	27.31	
SKINS																
India	Rs. per 100 pcs.	266.8	336.0	320.0	287.6	300.4	353.1	336.9	362.5	337.5	338.3	321.1	350.8	375.0	...	
Pakistan	Rs. per 100 pcs.	...	178.7	208.2	211.9	254.6	287.4	252.5	290.2	283.6	242.1	242.8	241.7	248.8	260.0	
GROUNDNUTS																
India	Rs. per maund	22.94	29.11	21.36	15.94	24.42	25.34	25.15	25.20	22.18	23.78	28.21	26.42	24.99	...	
COPRA																
Ceylon	Rs. per candy	203.8	267.2	246.8	209.5	212.2	239.8	264.8	235.8	251.4	260.7	259.0	272.7	294.0	305.6	
Federation of																
Malaya	M\$ per picul	28.82	35.30	30.68	26.38	25.70	26.85	35.13	29.42	31.50	33.17	34.50	41.33	43.50	43.50	
Indonesia	Rp. per 100kg.	169	219	194	193	178	156	179	150	149	153	186	227	
Philippines	peso per 100kg.	24.63	36.62	30.76	27.12	26.02	28.43	37.70	31.67	34.96	35.02	35.83	44.99	51.06	51.62	
Singapore	M\$ per picul	29.09	37.59	32.55	28.14	27.45	27.34	33.89	27.63	30.87	32.94	32.81	38.96	41.31	42.38	
RUBBER, NATURAL																
Burma	K. per lb.	1.10 ^a	1.10	0.81	1.29	1.58	1.31	...	1.16	1.19	
Cambodia	Ri. per kg.	13.98	18.75	18.26	16.45	16.45	16.34	16.07	15.58	16.37	17.43	18.90	...	
Ceylon	Rs. per lb.	1.76	1.54	1.36	1.56	1.50	1.43	1.24	1.34	1.24	1.20	1.20	1.29	1.31	1.29	
Indonesia	Rp. per 100kg.	853	565	545	888	821	746	641	669	636	604	640	685	
Singapore	M Cents per lb.	96.07	67.44	67.30	114.16	96.76	88.75	80.25	81.15	77.65	74.84	81.19	87.03	86.10	86.02	
Thailand	Baht per kg.	10.14	7.30	8.17	13.59	11.25	10.87	10.67	11.59	9.76	10.00	10.20	12.01	12.34	...	
TIMBER																
Burma	K. per cu. ton	976	929	876	921	923	888	...	825	
Federation of																
Malaya	M\$ per 50 cu. ft.	150.3	148.2	149.4	156.6	158.2	144.6	143.3	145.8	149.0	148.8	136.6	140.6	127.4	127.8	
North Borneo	M\$ per 50 cu. ft.	133.9	118.3	82.9	77.9	77.5	66.1	...	58.8	63.0	65.7	63.8	
Philippines	Peso per															
	1,000 bd. ft.	116	109	117	114	112	105	102	103	103	102	102	100	100	...	
Thailand	Baht per cu. m.	1,933	2,436	3,023	3,614	4,098	4,090	3,875	3,460	4,109	4,236	4,017	4,238	4,358	...	
WOOL, RAW																
Pakistan	Rs. per lb.	1.71	2.09	2.25	2.15	2.70	2.77	2.06	2.39	2.47	1.83	1.88	2.06	2.01	2.16	
COTTON, RAW																
Burma	K. per lb.	1.75 ^a	1.08	1.34	1.33	1.00	1.14	...	1.16	
India	Rs. per 784 lbs.	716.0	710.0	734.0	635.8	786.7	766.7	732.0	691.4	755.8	737.0	728.3	694.8	725.2	...	
Pakistan	Rs. per bale	629.7	405.2	443.5	443.6	503.7	511.1	453.6	491.3	497.7	481.6	431.9	403.0	409.4	411.5	

PRICE

13. PRICE QUOTATIONS OF MAJOR EXPORT COMMODITIES (Cont'd)

Commodity and country	Unit	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
									IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
JUTE, RAW																
India	<i>Rs. per 400 lbs.</i>	173	132	148	172	173	207	192	212	205	198	190	175	184	185	
Pakistan	<i>Rs. per 400 lbs.</i>	134	106	135	150	187	214	188	198	193	200	188	172	
United Kingdom	<i>£ per L. ton</i>	113	96	102	98	103	114	110	114	112	114	108	106	112	110	
HEMP, RAW																
Philippines*	<i>Peso per picul</i>	64.0	38.4	28.8	31.0	37.4	46.8	39.2	48.3	40.6	30.9	41.3	44.0	46.0	...	
GROUND NUT OIL																
India	<i>Rs. per quarter</i>	17.32	22.34	15.38	11.92	17.82	19.11	18.79	18.79	17.35	18.46	20.47	18.88	17.75	...	
PALM OIL																
Indonesia	<i>Rp. per 100kg.</i>	228	214	204	220	233	232	212	222	226	218	201	196	
COCONUT OIL																
Ceylon	<i>Rs. per L. ton</i>	1,247	1,519	2,454	1,156	1,168	1,256	1,396	1,224	1,340	1,390	1,369	1,454	1,578	...	
Philippines	<i>Peso per kg.</i>	0.46	0.69	0.57	0.48	0.45	0.47	0.66	0.53	0.60	0.61	0.63	0.82	0.68	0.86	
Singapore	<i>M\$ per picul</i>	48	59	55	44	44	46	54	48	50	51	52	63	66	67	
RAYON YARN																
Japan	<i>Yen per lb.</i>	245	229	209	173	172	171	151	159	155	151	150	148	146	145	
COTTON PIECE GOODS																
India	<i>Rs. per lb.</i>	1.88	1.89	1.88	1.80	1.94	2.04	1.81	2.05	1.86	1.82	1.79	1.77	1.77	...	
Japan	<i>Yen per yd.</i>	63	60	57	50	54	48	42	44	42	44	43	43	49	51	
JUTE MANUFACTURES																
India (bag)	<i>Rs. per 100 bags</i>	138.0	98.8	111.8	115.6	111.2	114.6	98.6	114.0	101.7	99.4	98.0	95.5	94.0	...	
India (hessian)	<i>Rs. per 100 yd.</i>	55.6	46.1	47.2	45.0	43.0	44.3	43.0	43.4	41.2	42.5	44.3	44.0	43.5	41.5	
TIN																
Indonesia	<i>Rp. per m. ton</i>	19,220	19,377	14,215	14,986	16,078	16,011	15,649	16,082	16,271	15,751	15,178	15,932	
Singapore	<i>M\$ per picul</i>	480.1	363.9	353.6	365.5	387.0	373.2	369.3	354.6	363.4	365.8	368.1	380.1	385.7	399.4	
Thailand	<i>Baht per kg.</i>	15.4	8.7	26.9	28.2	28.8	28.9	26.4	26.8	27.0	21.9	27.2	28.3	31.1	...	
PETROLEUM, CRUDE																
Indonesia	<i>Rp. per m. ton</i>	74	76	160	160	163	163	181	160	164	182	182	192	
Sarawak	<i>M\$ per m. ton</i>	62	64	65	63	61	64	65	65 ^a	65	65	66	64	

SPECIFICATIONS:

RICE:

Burma—Average of export contract prices f.o.b. white rice, No. 1 small mills special ngasein.
 China (Taiwan)—Unit value of export of rice and paddy.
 Thailand—Export price f.o.b. Bangkok, white rice 5% broken; prior to 1955 export contract price f.o.b.

SUGAR:

China (Taiwan)—Monthly average price of all kinds of sugar f.o.b. Taiwan ports.
 India—Wholesale prices, D. 28 Kanpur.
 Indonesia—Domestic wholesale prices of white sugar, Djakarta.
 Philippines—Wholesale prices of centrifugal sugar, Manila.

TEA:

Ceylon—Average prices for all grades f.o.b.
 China (Taiwan)—Unit value of export of black tea. For 1951, average of Jan-Jun.
 India—Export price at Calcutta auctions, leaf, all types.
 Indonesia—Export prices f.o.b. for B.O.P., O.P., P.S. and B.P.

PEPPER:

Cambodia—Wholesale prices, black ex-store.
 India—Wholesale prices, ungarbled (alleppey) Calcutta.
 Indonesia—Export prices, f.o.b. black Lampung.
 Sarawak—Unit value of exports of black pepper.
 Singapore—Wholesale prices, black Lampung.

HIDES:

Pakistan—Average wholesale prices of Karachi unframed arsinicated mixed 12/40 lbs. (buffalo), Karachi.

SKINS:

India—Wholesale prices of raw goat skin, average quality, Calcutta.
 Pakistan—Average wholesale prices of sheep skin, Papra (de-wooled all primes), Karachi.

GROUNDNUTS:

India—Wholesale prices of ground nuts, machine shelled, Cuddalore.

COPRA:

Ceylon—f.o.b. prices for all grades.
 Federation of Malaya—Wholesale prices, sundried.
 Indonesia—Export prices f.o.b. mixed. Prior to August 1951 "f.m.s. and mixed".
 Philippines—Wholesale prices, resacada, Manila.
 Singapore—Wholesale prices, sundried.

RUBBER, NATURAL:

Burma—Unit value of exports.
 Cambodia—Unit value of exports.
 Ceylon—f.o.b. prices of all grade of rubber excluding latex.
 Indonesia—Export prices f.o.b. R.S.S. 1 and Crepe 1.
 Singapore—Buyers' midday prices, f.o.b. Singapore No. 1 RSS in bales. Since 1952 average of daily prices.
 Thailand—Unit value of exports of rubber smoked sheet. Annual figures relate to whole kingdom, monthly & quarterly figures relate to Port of Bangkok only.

TIMBER:

Burma—Unit value of teak exports.
 Federation of Malaya—Unit value of net exports of timber.
 North Borneo—Unit value of sawn logs for 1951-1954; sawn logs and veneer logs, non-coniferous from 1955 to date.
 Philippines—Unit value of exports of logs and lumber.
 Thailand—Unit value of exports of teak board. Annual figures relate to whole kingdom, monthly and quarterly figures relate to Port of Bangkok only.

WOOL, RAW:

Pakistan—Unit value of exports.

COTTON, RAW:

Burma—Unit value of exports.
 India—Wholesale prices, Jarilla M.G.F., Bombay.
 Pakistan—Unit value of exports.

JUTE, RAW:

India—Domestic price at Calcutta, raw lightnings.
 Pakistan—Domestic/export f.o.b. Chittagong, raw, baled, export firsts.
 United Kingdom—Domestic/import price c. and f. Dundee, Pakistan mill firsts; prior to June 1951, c.i.f.

HEMP, RAW:

Philippines—Domestic/export price at Manila, Manila Hemp, Grade G.

GROUND-NUT OIL:

India—Wholesale prices, naked, Bombay.

PALM OIL:

Indonesia—Export prices f.o.b.

COCONUT OIL:

Ceylon—f.o.b. prices for all grades.
 Philippines—Wholesale prices, Manila.
 Singapore—f.o.b. Singapore.

RAYON YARN:

Japan—Export prices f.o.b. viscose, 120 denier hank, 1st grade.

COTTON PIECE GOODS:

India—Wholesale prices of grey standard shirting 35" X 38 yds. Bombay.

Japan—Export prices f.o.b., heavy shirting s/2003 grey 38".

JUTE MANUFACTURES:

India—Export prices of bags, B-twills 2½ lbs. 44 X 26½" f.n.s. Calcutta.

India—Domestic/export prices of hessian cloth 10½ oz. 40" Calcutta.

TIN:

Indonesia—Unit value of exports of tin and tin ore.
 Singapore—Export prices ex-works.

Thailand—Unit value of exports of tin ore and tin in concentrates. Annual figures relate to whole Kingdom, monthly and quarterly figures relate to Port of Bangkok only.

PETROLEUM, CRUDE:

Indonesia—Unit value of exports of crude petroleum.

Sarawak—Unit value of exports of crude petroleum.

a. Average of July-December.

14. INDEX NUMBERS OF PRICES RECEIVED AND PAID BY FARMERS 1953=100^a

PRICE

	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
CHINA (Taiwan)														
Prices received by farmers (R) .	74	92	102	110	122	122	124	125	121	119	122	
Prices paid by farmers (P) . . .	73	93	101	111	118	120	120	122	122	118	119	
Cultivation cost	73	93	106	113	120	124	123	126	126	122	123	
Domestic expenditure	73	92	100	109	117	118	119	120	120	116	117	
Ratio (R) ÷ (P)	102	99	100	99	103	101	103	102	99	101	103	
INDIA (Punjab)														
Prices received by farmers (R) .	94	94	78	97	104	107	101	96	97	115	122	
Prices paid by farmers (P) . . .	102	98	86	96	104	108	103	102	104	112	117	
Cultivation cost	105	92	79	91	95	105	94	95	98	109	118	
Domestic expenditure	101	102	91	99	110	111	108	106	107	113	116	
Ratio (R) ÷ (P)	92	96	90	101	100	99	98	95	93	102	104	
INDIA (West Bengal, 1954=100)														
Prices received by farmers (R)	100	102	118	135	...	140	125	137	
Prices paid by farmers (P)	100	98	106	113	...	118	113	118	
Cultivation cost	100	98	103	105	...	105	105	109	
Domestic expenditure	100	97	108	118	...	125	118	123	
Ratio (R) ÷ (P)	100	105	111	119	...	119	111	116	
JAPAN ^b (Apr 1953-Mar 1954=100)														
Prices received by farmers (R) .	85½	98½	95½	98	99	97	99	98	96	97	97	95	96	
Prices paid by farmers (P) . . .	98½	103½	101½	102	105	103	105	105	104	103	102	102	102	
Cultivation cost	99½	102½	98½	98	102	100	103	102	102	99	98	97	97	
Domestic expenditure	97½	103½	103½	103	106	105	107	106	105	105	105	105	106	
Ratio (R) ÷ (P)	87½	96½	94½	97	94	94	94	93	93	94	95	93	94	

a. Original base: China 1952, India, Punjab, Sep 1938/Aug 1939; West Bengal, 1939; Japan, Apr 1951/Mar 1952.

b. Index numbers of commodity prices in 473 towns or villages. Annual figures prior to 1956 relate to fiscal year April to March.

15. INDEX NUMBERS OF COST OF LIVING 1953=100^a

	1952	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
							<i>A. All items</i>							
AFGHANISTAN: ^b Kabul (1954=100)	...	100	104	122	
BURMA: Rangoon	103	96	98	111	119	115	118	110	116	125	110	96	...	
CAMBODIA: Phnom-Penh	78	108	121	127	127	135	129	130	133	140	139	136	136	
CEYLON: Colombo	98	100	99	99	101	103	103	104	103	102	104	103	102	
CHINA: Taipei	84	102	112	123	133	134	134	135	133	134	136½	136	137	
HONG KONG	99	98	95	97	98	96	96	95	95	97	98	103	106	
INDIA (interim index)	97	95	90	99	104	109	106	104	106	113	114	107	111	
IRAN	94	118	122	130	139	140	139	139	138	139	144	150	154	
JAPAN (urban)	94	106	105	106	109	108	109	108	108	109	109	109	108	
KOREA: Seoul	66	137	231	284	350	339	321	327	342	343	343	339	343	
LAOS: Vientiane	74	123	125	141	174	...	181	171	182	207	
MALAYA, Federation of	103	94	91	92	96	95	96	96	95	94	94	94	93	
PAKISTAN: Karachi	90	98	94	97	106	110	110	111	112	114	103	100	101	
Narayanganj	101	84	85	99	104	110	106	107	107	120	107	104	104	
PHILIPPINES: Manila	104	99	98	100	102	105	105	104	105	106	107	105	104	
SINGAPORE	101	93	91	92	94	92	93	93	92	91	92	
THAILAND: Bangkok	91	100	105	111	118	125	115	119	128	129	121	117	119	
VIET-NAM: Saigon	79	113	124	139	133	130	130	128	127	132	131	133	136	

B. Food

BURMA: Rangoon	104	97	96	106	119	115	119	109	117	128	107	90	...
CAMBODIA: Phnom-Penh	76	103	119	130	129	140	131	134	138	146	146	141	141
CEYLON: Colombo	94	100	99	97	99	100	101	102	100	98	99	99	97
CHINA: Taipei	78	102	108	126	137	138	140	140	135	138	142½	141	142
HONG KONG	95	95	90	95	95	93	93	91	91	95	96	105	108
INDIA (interim index)	94	93	85	97	103	109	105	102	105	114	115	106	109
INDONESIA: Djakarta	94	106	141	161	177	258	217	254	226	264	286	298	307
IRAN	92	114	114	121	126	120	123	122	121	118	120	125	128
JAPAN (urban)	94	108	105	105	108	106	107	105	105	107	107	106	106
KOREA: Seoul	77	116	206	282	339	310	278	289	324	324	301	289	295
LAOS: Vientiane	70	122	118	122	157	...	166	151	167	208
MALAYA, Federation of	103	90	87	88	93	91	94	93	92	90	91	91	90
PAKISTAN: Karachi	93	98	95	100	113	117	117	119	120	123	108	105	105
Narayanganj	103	79	80	97	102	105	105	104	103	108	106	102	100
PHILIPPINES: Manila	106	99	98	101	105	111	112	110	110	112	113	108	107
SINGAPORE	101	91	88	89	91	87	90	90	87	86	86
THAILAND: Bangkok	91	98	103	108	117	126	112	118	130	131	121	113	117
VIET-NAM: Saigon	80	107	121	140	129	125	124	123	121	129	127	127	131

GENERAL NOTES: All figures refer to working class expenditures except for the following countries: China (Taiwan), public servants; Hong Kong, clerical and technical workers; Indonesia, government employees; Japan, urban population; southern Korea, salary workers and wage earners; Laos, middle class; Singapore, low income clerks and labourers; Thailand, low salaried workers and civil servants.

a. Original base: Burma, 1941; Cambodia, 1949; Ceylon, Nov. 1942 for 1951, 1953 for subsequent years; China (Taiwan), Jan-Jun

1937 prior to 1959, 1956 since 1959; Hong Kong, Mar 1947; India, 1949; Indonesia July 1938; Japan, 1951 for period prior to 1955, 1955 for subsequent years; southern Korea, 1955; Laos, Dec 1948; Federation of Malaya, Jan 1949; Pakistan, Apr 1948/Mar 1949; Philippines, 1955; Singapore, 1939; Thailand, Apr 1938/Mar 1939; Viet-Nam, 1949.

b. Year beginning 21 March.

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES

16. EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES

Base for index numbers, 1953^a

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV		Jan	Feb
CEYLON														
Index of wages														
Tea and rubber estate workers ^b	100	102	106	107	108	110	109	110	110	109	110	109	110	
Government workers (Colombo) ^c	100	100	104	106	109	125	119	125	125	125	125	125	125	
Index of real wages														
Tea and rubber estate workers ^b	100	103	107	108	107	107	106	106	107	107	106	106	108	
Government workers (Colombo) ^c	100	101	106	107	107	121	114	120	121	122	120	121	122	
CHINA (Taiwan)														
Employment ^d (thousand)														
Mining	57	53	55	66	74	72	72	72	73	72	72	
Manufacturing	238	258	258	260	261	261	261	261	261	261	261	
Transport	55	64	66	68	71	71	69	71	71	71	71	
Index of earnings ^e														
Mining	100	105	131	174	227	242	244	247	249	237	236	
Manufacturing	100	111	125	141	155	165	159	165	160	162	171	
Index of real earnings ^e														
Mining	100	110	124	150	184	194	196	197	198	191	190	
Manufacturing	100	117	119	122	125	132	127	132	127	130	137	
FED. OF MALAYA^f														
Employment (thousand)														
Estate ^g	...	297	309	309	307	314	
Rubber	...	268	278	280	277	282	
Tin mining	...	35	40	40	38	26	
Government	171	171	189	187	
INDIA														
Employment ^h (thousand)														
Factories under Factory Act	2,528	2,590	2,690	2,882	2,832	
Cotton mills	744	741	758	807	812	770	798	782	748	768	782	770	...	
Coal mines ⁱ	338	332	341	333	350	364	360	367	362	359	368	
Central government ^j														
Office workers	213	221	251	281	300	313	300	303	307	311	313	314	314	
Manual workers	403	412	396	388	389	401	389	391	396	398	401	402	403	
Wages or earnings (rupees)														
Cotton mills ^k (Bombay, monthly)	96.0	96.3	94.8	98.8	104.2	111.8	107.1	108.3	109.4	115.0	114.5	112.9	...	
Coal mines ^m (Jahria, weekly)	13.2	14.2	14.2	17.4	20.4	22.0	20.4	21.6	22.3	21.9	22.1	
JAPAN														
Employment ⁿ (million)														
All industries	39.5	40.0	42.3	42.1	43.2	43.4	43.9	41.2	44.6	44.0	43.9	40.6	40.7	
Agriculture, forestry & hunting	17.2	16.8	17.2	16.8	16.3	15.7	17.1	13.6	17.1	16.5	15.6	11.9	12.0	
Mining	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	
Manufacturing	6.8	7.0	7.2	7.6	8.1	8.6	8.5	8.6	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.8	
Construction	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.4	
Commerce	5.8	6.4	6.7	7.0	7.3	7.6	7.3	7.3	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.3	
Transportation and communication and other public utilities	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.3	
Services (non-government)	3.7	3.8	4.3	4.6	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.2	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.3	
Index of earnings ^p														
Mining	100	101	108	118	137	140	162	115	117	164	165	129	120	
Manufacturing	100	105	109	120	124	127	146	108	119	130	151	113	113	
Index of real earnings ^p														
Mining	100	95	103	112	125	130	149	107	108	151	152	119	111	
Manufacturing	100	99	104	113	114	117	134	100	110	120	139	104	104	
Daily money wages of agricultural labour, male (yen)	257	285	301	308	323	337	337	308	352	347	341	322	315	
KOREA, southern														
Wages or earnings ^q (thousand hwan)														
Mining	31.6	35.7	34.9	34.7	36.0	35.2	36.9	36.2	36.7	
Manufacturing	22.3	24.1	23.3	22.9	23.4	24.3	25.7	26.1	25.6	
PHILIPPINES														
Index of employment ^r														
Mining	100	77	81	81	77	72	72	70	71	72	75	
Manufacturing	100	106	106	107	113	113	113	115	112	111	115	
Index of wages ^s (Manila)														
Skilled	100	101	101	101	101	104	101	104	103	105	104	105	...	
Unskilled	100	99	102	103	102	103	102	102	103	103	104	104	...	
Index of real wages ^t (Manila)														
Skilled	100	105	106	104	101	101	99	102	101	101	101	103	...	
Unskilled	100	103	107	106	103	100	99	100	100	99	100	103	...	
THAILAND														
Employment in mining ^h (thousand)	16.1	14.7	15.6	16.6	17.4	14.9	17.5	16.6	14.8	14.3	14.1	14.0	14.0	

a. Original bases for wages or earnings index: Ceylon, 1939; China (Taiwan), June 1949; Japan, 1955; Philippines, 1955.

b. Daily rates of minimum wages (basic wages plus special allowance).

c. Monthly wage rates for unskilled male workers in government employment.

d. Staff and permanent workers at end of period.

e. Daily average of wages and allowances including payment in kind.

f. June for 1954, August for 1955, July for 1956 to 1958.

g. Comprising rubber, oil palm, coconut, tea and pineapple.

h. Daily averages.

i. Average daily employment in all coal mines governed by the Indian Mines Act. Monthly figures are slightly short of total coverage.

j. Central Government establishments excluding railways. Office workers comprise administrative, executive and clerical staff; manual workers comprise skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Figures relate to end of period.

k. Monthly minimum basic wages plus dearness allowance.

m. Average weekly earnings (basic wages plus dearness allowance and other payments) of underground miners and loaders in coal mines.

n. From 1953, average for the week ending on the last day of the month, except for December when the week prior to holiday seasons was chosen.

p. Average monthly cash earnings per regular workers.

q. Total monthly average earnings of regular employees based on the payroll returns from about 400 constant sample establishments throughout the country engaged in mining and manufacturing (excluding tobacco and salt manufacturing).

r. Comprises all full and part-time employees of 600 cooperating establishments in the Philippines who were on the payroll, i.e., who worked during, or received pay for, the pay period ending nearest the 15th of the month. Excluding proprietors, self-employed persons, domestic servants and unpaid workers.

t. Daily average wage rates of all classes of workers.

17. CURRENCY AND BANKING

End of period

FINANCE

Country and item	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8				1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb
BURMA (million kyats)													
Money supply	753	842	1,116	1,343	1,106	1,311	1,106	1,276	1,283	1,298	1,311	1,388	...
Currency: net active	500	567	725	830	746	853	746	891	875	839	853	946	...
Deposit money	253	275	391	513	360	458	360	385	408	459	458	442	...
Private time deposits (Commercial banks)	52	77	122	103	100	118	100	102	108	117	118	120	116
Government deposits	498	297	248	248	282	281	282	360	274	293	281	290	...
Union Bank of Burma	464	183	130	117	77	50	77	133	48	55	50	47	...
Commercial Bank ^a	34	114	118	131	205	231	205	227	227	238	231	243	...
Bank clearings Δ	234	241	283	333	356	310	319	350	296	312	280	270	...
Foreign assets	1,058	643	540	652	446	576	446	449	548	613	576	581	574
Union Bank of Burma	991	555	415	535	392	490	392	383	473	538	490	507	500
Commercial banks	67	88	124	117	64	86	64	66	75	75	86	74	74
Claims on private sector (commercial banks)	161	212	216	250	343	270	343	359	304	273	270	288	303
Claims on government	213	543	941	1,020	1,002	1,185	1,002	1,225	1,109	1,141	1,185	1,287	1,398
Union Bank of Burma ^b	151	388	652	662	762	710	762	849	687	609	710	787	907
Commercial banks	62	155	289	358	240	475	240	376	422	532	475	500	491
Rates of interest (% per annum)													
Call money rate Δ	1.10	0.98	1.27	0.94	1.42	1.60	1.83	2.92	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Yield of long term gov't bonds ^c Δ	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
Exchange rate (selling)	4.775	4.808	4.778	4.808	4.775	4.785	4.775	4.760	4.775	4.780	4.785	4.770	4.770
CAMBODIA (million riels)													
Money supply	999	1,058	1,355	1,472	1,355	1,498	1,584	1,588	1,472	1,514	1,692
Currency: in circulation
Demand deposits in commercial banks	1,035	1,104	693	885	693	696	874	895	885	929	947
Private time deposits	37	15	84	76	84	111	111	100	76	98	90
Bank clearings Δ	125	273	446	412	481	520	547	564	489	513	514	602	453
Foreign assets	1,968	2,559	2,911	3,442	2,911	3,250	3,367	3,540	3,442	3,485	3,549
Banque Nationale du Cambodge	1,751	2,454	2,756	3,366	2,756	3,158	3,291	3,435	3,366	3,417	3,468
Commercial banks	217	105	155	76	155	92	76	105	76	68	81
Claims on private sector	329	563	812	776	812	905	840	791	776	808	776
Claims on government by Banque Nationale du Cambodge	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014
CEYLON (million rupees)													
Money supply	827	957	1,073	1,127	1,040	1,077	1,040	1,023	1,015	1,072	1,077	1,050	1,055
Currency: net active	335	342	384	401	435	530	435	438	475	501	530	493	500
Deposit money	492	615	688	726	605	547	605	585	540	571	547	557	555
Private time deposits	387	420	451	513 ^e	560 ^e	618	554	560 ^e	580 ^e	592 ^e	618	623	634
Government deposits	53	69	116	176	128	164	128	144	144	183	164	141	143
Central Bank of Ceylon	7	16	42	67	12	28	12	25	14	12	28	19	19
Commercial banks	46	53	74	109	116	136	116	119	130	171	136	122	123
Bank clearings Δ	671	684	758	735	730	661	633	651	573	769	652	772	626
Bank debits ^d Δ	1,148	1,107	1,060	1,063	1,111	970	911	966	882	1,082	951	1,216	928
Foreign assets	342	656	880	898	700	653	700	716	599	657	653	626	621
Central Bank of Ceylon	245	524	655	737	591	539	591	598	493	534	539	505	503
Commercial banks	97	132	225	161	109	114	109	118	105	122	114	120	118
Claims on the private sector (commercial banks)	207	247	256	344	399	436	399	392	417	436	436	444	460
Claims on government	788	622	601	682	767	918	767	754	871	868	918	930	928
Central Bank of Ceylon	227	27	18	11	88	261	88	81	209	228	261	265	271
Other banks	561	595	583	671	679	656	679	673	663	639	656	664	655
Rates of interest (% per annum)													
Call money rate Δ	0.96	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.08	1.25	1.33	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
Treasury bill rate Δ	1.91	1.59	0.79	0.68	0.88	1.54	1.14	1.41	1.51	1.59	1.67	1.78	1.78
Yield of long term gov't bonds ^e Δ	3.85	3.79	3.13	3.04	2.99	2.91	2.99	2.96	2.92	2.89	2.86	2.84	2.82
Exchange rate (selling)	4.762	4.795	4.772	4.800	4.765	4.760	4.765	4.754	4.755	4.755	4.760	4.752	4.752
CHINA (Taiwan, million new Taiwan dollars)													
Money supply	1,617	2,103	2,636	3,261	3,938	5,238	3,938	3,999	4,098	4,582	5,238	5,279	5,160
Currency: net active	1,072	1,340	1,604	1,883	2,228	2,927	2,228	2,205	2,250	2,679	2,927	2,974	2,936
Deposit money	545	763	1,032	1,378	1,710	2,310	1,710	1,794	1,848	1,903	2,310	2,306	2,224
Private time deposits	698	887	1,010	1,049	1,473	2,687	1,473	1,683	1,785	2,288	2,687	2,655	2,846
Government deposits	584	810	998	1,295	1,606	1,738	1,606	1,714	1,686	1,720	1,738	1,823	1,838
Bank of Taiwan	536	743	826	1,167	1,441	1,551	1,441	1,520	1,490	1,504	1,551	1,626	1,629
Other banks	48	67	172	128	164	188	164	194	196	217	188	197	209
Counterpart funds	637	631	1,405	1,485	1,678	1,623	1,678	1,799	1,606	1,760	1,623	1,658	1,853
Bank clearings Δ	1,740	1,720	2,887	3,857	5,121	5,410	6,068	5,369	5,787	4,914	5,568	5,963	5,179
Foreign assets (Bank of Taiwan: net)	412	134	504	528	649	1,708	649	791	1,353	1,279	1,708	1,461	1,479
Claims on private sector ^f	816	1,283	2,048	2,286	3,131	4,414	3,131	3,237	3,394	3,967	4,414	4,630	4,844
Bank of Taiwan	79	167	402	470	731	1,023	731	714	777	977	1,023	1,038	1,217
Other banks	737	1,116	1,646	1,816	2,400	3,391	2,400	2,523	2,617	2,991	3,391	3,592	3,627
Claims on government ^g	1,108	1,477	1,687	2,020	2,388	2,444	2,388	2,465	2,350	2,609	2,444	2,367	2,466
Bank of Taiwan	1,092	1,445	1,652	1,974	2,338	2,355	2,338	2,409	2,285	2,535	2,356	2,284	2,377
Other banks	16	32	35	46	50	89	50	57	65	74	88	84	90
Claims on official entities ^h	1,342	1,596	1,958	2,475	2,817	3,058	2,817	2,875	2,815	3,165	3,058	3,294	3,251
Bank of Taiwan	1,257	1,506	1,860	2,385	2,739	2,956	2,739	2,801	2,733	3,083	2,956	3,195	3,178
Commercial banks	85	90	98	90	78	102	78	74	82	82	102	99	74

FINANCE

17. CURRENCY AND BANKING (Cont'd)

End of period

Country and item	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
CHINA (Taiwan, million new Taiwan dollars) (Cont'd)														
Exchange rate														
Buying: Sugar, Rice, etc.	14.49	15.55	20.35	20.35	20.35	36.08	20.35	20.35	24.58	25.48	36.08	36.08	36.08	
Other Exports (private)	15.55	15.55	26.35	26.35	26.35		26.35	26.35	36.08	36.08				
Non-trade (private)	15.55	15.55	29.05	29.05	29.05		29.05	36.08	36.08					
Selling: Government Imports	15.65	18.78	24.78	24.78	24.78	36.38	24.78	24.78	24.78	24.78	36.38	36.38	36.38	
Non-trade	18.78	18.78	24.78	24.78	24.78		24.78	24.78	36.38	36.38				
FEDERATION OF MALAYA														
and SINGAPORE (million Malayan dollars)														
Money supply	1,086	1,068	1,267	1,268	1,230	1,240	1,230	1,210	1,184	1,190	1,240	1,235	1,265	
Currency: net active	646	711	861	892	889	895	889	880	865	861	895	896	924	
Deposit money	440	357	406	376	341	345	341	330	319	329	345	339	341	
Time deposits	221	243	338	317	302	352	302	318	322	338	352	355	360	
Bank debits ^b Δ	1,438	1,600	1,679	1,628	1,723	1,679	1,508	1,625	1,707	1,908	1,559	
Foreign assets	1,215	1,290	1,541	1,470	1,374	1,394	1,374	1,327	1,340	1,345	1,394	1,309	1,323	
Currency Board	827	892	965	992	1,004	1,010	1,004	1,010	985	980	1,010	1,029	1,040	
Other banks (net)	388	398	576	478	371	384	370	317	355	465	384	280	283	
Claims on private sector	179	217	244	292	330	349	330	389	370	377	349	359	371	
Claims on government	35	43	37	45	48	51	48	49	49	49	51	51	54	
Exchange rate (par rate)	3.06	3.06	3.06	3.06	3.06	3.06	3.05	3.04	3.06	3.06	3.06	3.05	3.05	
HONG KONG (million HK dollars)														
Money supply	802	728	727	732	755	772	755	755	754	756	772	—	789	
Currency notes: in circulation	802	728	727	732	755	772	755	755	754	756	772	—	789	
Bank clearings Δ	1,035	1,140	1,160	1,276	1,412	1,309	1,466	1,394	1,300	1,235	1,307	1,419	1,185	
INDIA (thousand million rupees)														
Money supply	17.09	18.32	20.47	21.79	22.76	23.50	22.76	23.89	23.80	23.15	23.50	23.91	24.37	
Currency: net active	11.66	12.25	13.86	14.85	15.27	16.06	15.27	16.07	15.99	15.35	16.06	16.45	16.79	
Deposit money	5.43	6.08	6.61	6.93	7.49	7.43	7.49	7.82	7.80	7.79	7.43	7.45	7.59	
Private time deposits	4.68	5.26	6.13	6.98	8.93	11.40	8.93	9.62	10.24	10.73	11.40	11.50	...	
Government deposits														
(Reserve Bank of India)	1.16	0.60	0.59	0.65	0.59	0.62	0.59	0.52	0.65	0.54	0.62	0.67	0.64	
Bank clearings Δ	5.49	5.58	6.52	7.03	7.41	7.96	7.29	8.23	7.48	7.96	8.19	8.94	8.28	
Foreign assets (Reserve Bank of India)	7.63	7.71	7.75	6.48	4.15	3.07	4.15	3.85	3.35	3.02	3.07	3.09	3.29	
Claims on private sector	5.47	6.16	7.04	8.84	10.14	10.38	10.16	11.06	10.88	10.22	10.38	
Commercial banks	5.28	5.95	6.78	8.48	9.59	9.64	9.61	10.48	10.20	9.51	9.64	
Cooperative banks	0.19	0.21	0.26	0.36	0.55	0.74	0.55	0.58	0.68	0.71	0.74	
Claims on government	11.78	12.11	14.05	16.93	21.88	26.33	21.88	23.64	24.68	25.33	26.33	
Reserve Bank of India	6.06	6.04	7.13	9.82	14.13	16.35	14.13	15.67	16.20	15.86	16.35	16.61	16.73	
Other banks	4.58	4.98	5.74	5.96	6.63	8.84	6.63	6.81	7.28	8.37	8.84	
Treasury currency	1.14	1.09	1.18	1.15	1.12	1.14	1.12	1.16	1.20	1.10	1.14	1.16	1.19	
Rates of interest (% per annum)														
Call money rate Δ	2.12	2.35	2.59	3.21	3.27	...	2.92	3.00	
Yield of long-term gov't bonds ¹ Δ	3.64	3.65	3.72	3.92	4.13	...	4.21	4.23	4.22	4.16	
Exchange rate (selling)	4.768	4.808	4.778	4.805	4.770	4.780	4.770	4.753	4.775	4.770	4.780	4.765	4.763	
INDONESIA (thousand million rupiah)														
Money supply	7.49	11.12	12.23	13.39	18.91	29.37	18.91	19.62	21.65	23.93	29.37	28.74	...	
Currency: net active	5.22	7.47	8.65	9.37	14.09	19.87	14.09	13.97	15.42	16.46	19.87	19.32	...	
Deposit money	2.27	3.64	3.59	4.02	4.82	9.49	4.82	5.65	6.23	7.47	9.49	9.42	...	
Private time deposits	0.27	0.27	0.33	0.29	0.29	0.34	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.33	0.34	
Foreign assets (net)	2.02	1.73	2.74	1.66	1.26	...	1.26	0.62	1.72	1.90	2.48	2.34	...	
Bank Indonesia (net)	1.30	1.15	1.95	0.90	0.58	2.15	0.58	0.29	1.43	1.55	2.15	2.06	...	
Gross foreign assets	2.40	2.89	3.50	2.89	2.55	2.48	2.55	2.15	2.01	1.98	2.48	2.30	...	
Foreign liabilities ¹	1.10	1.74	1.55	1.99	1.97	0.33	1.97	1.86	0.58	0.43	0.33	0.24	...	
Other banks	0.72	0.58	0.79	0.76	0.68	...	0.68	0.33	0.29	0.35	0.33	0.28	...	
Claims on private sector	2.40	2.83	4.02	5.05	4.47	6.56	4.47	4.75	5.58	6.92	6.56	
Bank Indonesia	0.44	0.46	0.86	1.00	0.74	1.77	0.74	1.26	1.19	2.03	1.77	
Other banks	1.96	2.37	3.16	4.05	3.73	4.79	3.73	3.49	4.39	4.89	4.79	
Claims on government	5.92	9.26	9.30	11.46	20.77	...	20.77	22.88	24.16	26.41	
Bank Indonesia	5.40	8.61	8.50	10.58	19.15	...	19.15	21.29	22.58	24.31	
Other banks	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.67	...	0.67	0.61	0.56	1.05	
Treasury currency	0.50	0.63	0.78	0.84	0.95	...	0.95	0.98	1.02	1.05	
Exchange rate:														
Principal export rate	11.36	11.36	11.36	11.36-13.57	22.7	30.3	22.7	29.3	30.3	30.3	30.3	30.3	30.3	
Principal import rate	11.44	11.44	11.48-22.95	11.48-22.95	28.4-42.6	37.9-56.8	28.4-42.6	36.6-54.9	37.9-56.8	37.9-56.8	37.9-56.8	37.9-56.8	37.9-56.8	
Other import rate	22.89	15.26-22.89	34.42-57.38	28.68-57.38	56.8-78.1	75.8-104.2	56.8-78.1	73.2-100.6	75.8-104.2	75.8-104.2	75.8-104.2	75.8-104.2	75.8-104.2	

17. CURRENCY AND BANKING (Cont'd)

End of period

FINANCE

Country and item	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9		
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb		
IRAN (billion rials)															
Money supply	18.17	18.52	20.22	23.59	27.70	36.33	27.70	31.17	30.86	34.03	36.33	35.06	34.63		
Currency: net active	16.51	16.84	17.71	20.78	24.26	27.79	24.26	25.98	25.76	27.79	27.79	28.78	28.36		
Deposit money	1.66	1.68	2.51	2.81	3.44	7.00	3.44	5.19	5.10	6.24	7.00	6.28	6.27		
Private time deposits	3.26	3.68	4.12	5.31	5.79	...	5.79	6.26	7.14	7.51	7.30	8.61	8.48		
Government deposits	3.49	3.97	4.08	4.57	6.07	8.08	6.07	6.10	6.51	7.35	8.08	8.91	7.98		
Bank debits Δ	10.88	13.98	15.33	16.80	18.20	20.71	17.67	21.35	18.17	18.18	25.14		
Foreign assets* (National bank)	7.12	6.76	7.11	8.44	18.57	19.13	18.57	20.94	19.66	20.49	19.13	21.29	18.94		
Claims on private sector	6.46	8.06	9.71	10.81	13.98	22.61	13.98	16.12	17.68	19.78	22.61	23.71	24.63		
National Bank	3.47	4.49	5.72	7.45	8.37	12.73	8.37	10.12	10.46	11.43	12.73	13.32	13.62		
Commercial banks	2.99	3.57	3.99	3.36	5.61	9.88	5.61	6.00	7.22	8.35	9.88	10.39	11.01		
Claims on government (National bank)	11.00	11.24	11.08	11.94	12.59	14.14	12.59	12.86	13.52	14.39	14.14	14.64	13.41		
Claims on official entities (National bank)	5.02	5.82	6.24	6.88	9.09	12.27	9.09	8.68	9.41	9.73	12.27	10.13	11.62		
Exchange rate: selling	90.50	84.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50	76.50		
JAPAN (thousand million yen)															
Money supply	2,013	2,331	2,714	2,824	3,185	2,824	2,547	2,555	2,655	3,185		
Currency: net active	523	626	720	750	794	749	592	623	595	794		
Deposit money	1,490	1,705	1,994	2,070	...	2,075	1,954	1,929	2,060		
Time deposits (other banks)	2,534	3,064	3,837	4,767	5,867	4,767	5,026	5,247	5,547	5,867		
Government deposits	171	179	210	221	251	221	413	245	250	251		
Bank of Japan	58	67	61	66	46	54	46	236	37	50	54		
Other banks	104	118	144	175	197	175	177	208	200	197		
Bank clearings Δ	2,080	2,430	2,750	3,342	4,264	4,745	4,806	4,463	4,552	4,832	5,132	4,202	4,371		
Foreign assets	302	447	457	272	396	273	298	322	321	396		
Bank of Japan	19	31	170	153	6	91	6	9	6	37	91		
Foreign Exchange Fund	297	342	289	355	282	305	283	312	331	278	305		
Other banks	9	12	51	4	...	4	5	3	6		
Claims on private sector	4,164	4,684	5,917	7,253	8,501	7,253	7,471	7,735	8,107	8,501		
Claims on government	264	450	465	471	675	471	485	264	357	675		
Rates of interest (% per annum)															
Call money rate (Tokyo) Δ	7.82	7.84	7.36	6.57	10.94	9.69	10.95	10.95	10.22	9.37	8.22	7.67	8.58		
Yield of long-term gov't bonds ^m Δ	6.68	7.01	6.33	6.34	6.33	6.32	6.33	6.32	6.32	6.32	6.32		
Exchange rate (par rate)	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0	360.0		
KOREA, southern (thousand million hwan)															
Money supply	33.6	61.9	99.6	136.1	158.4	213.5	158.4	161.4	165.0	182.4	213.5	226.5	237.9		
Currency: in circulation	22.4	40.1	58.8	73.4	86.2	111.1	86.2	74.3	72.9	88.4	111.1	108.0	111.4		
Deposit money	11.2	21.8	40.8	62.8	72.2	102.4	72.2	87.0	92.1	94.1	102.4	118.5	126.5		
Uncleared checks and bills	2.0	4.2	6.0	15.2	13.2	20.9	13.2	14.2	15.9	16.7	20.9	18.5	14.7		
Time deposits ⁿ	3.8	5.0	10.0	16.9	17.7	24.0	17.7	19.6	20.2	21.9	24.0	21.7	23.4		
Bank clearings Δ	21.4	51.8	107.4	207.7	201.2	226.6	209.3	188.9	223.9	225.6	267.9	250.4	249.5		
Government deposits	15.9	17.6	33.4	68.0	133.0	125.9	133.0	132.5	130.4	126.1	125.9	136.4	118.0		
Counterpart funds	0.2	16.1	14.2	83.0	115.9	104.4	115.9	135.9	135.4	122.1	104.4	108.1	103.3		
Foreign assets (Bank of Korea)	12.6	8.4	14.2	15.7	23.7	39.6	23.7	27.2	25.8	30.5	39.6	40.3	39.8		
Gross foreign assets	19.6	19.4	47.4	48.6	57.0	72.4	57.0	60.0	58.4	63.4	72.4	73.1	72.7		
Foreign liabilities ^p	4.4	8.5	23.4	23.1	23.5	23.1	23.5	23.0	22.8	23.0	23.1	23.0	23.1		
Revaluation proceeds	2.6	2.5	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8		
Claims on private sector	20.8	24.0	42.6	76.6	113.4	162.7	113.4	115.4	115.9 ^r	139.5	162.7	168.7	175.0		
Bank of Korea	5.5	2.0	5.5	5.8	5.9	5.4	5.9	5.8	5.8	5.7	5.4	5.4	5.4		
Other banks	15.3	22.0	37.1	70.8	107.5	157.3	107.5	109.6	110.0	133.8	157.3	163.3	169.6		
Claims on government	24.7	68.0	111.4	213.4	304.9	308.3	304.9	311.6	318.8	312.0	308.3	329.5	310.2		
Bank of Korea	24.1	66.9	109.5	209.7	299.9	303.4	299.9	306.3	313.7	306.9	303.4	324.6	305.3		
Other banks	0.6	1.1	1.9	3.7	5.0	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.9		
Claims on official entities	4.7	0.9	3.5	5.4	9.6	17.5	9.6	9.6	9.5	13.7	17.5	17.7	17.6		
Bank of Korea	1.8	0.5	2.7	4.0	8.0	16.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	12.0	16.0	16.0	16.0		
Commercial banks	2.9	0.4	0.8	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.6		
Exchange rate (official)	180	180	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500		
PAKISTAN (million rupees)															
Money supply	3,568	3,856	4,546	4,933	5,238	5,512	5,238	5,304	5,367	5,292	5,512	5,454	5,471		
Currency in circulation	2,372	2,575	2,990	3,464	3,582	3,742	3,582	3,622	3,627	3,460	3,742	3,683	3,680		
Deposit money	1,196	1,281	1,556	1,469	1,655	1,770	1,655	1,682	1,740	1,832	1,770	1,772	1,792		
Time deposits	644	808	889	968	1,082	1,179	1,082	1,124	1,190	1,225	1,179	1,179	1,190		
Bank clearings ^q Δ	536	555	593	696	761	789	821	822	761	758	816	974	803		
Government deposits	216	173	152	432	764	822	764	758	817	677	822	875	874		
Foreign assets (State Bank of Pakistan) ^r	935	1,038	1,648	1,659	1,268	1,228	1,268	1,389	1,231	1,035	1,228	1,234	1,234		
Claims on private sector (scheduled banks)	802	984	1,183	1,256	1,294	1,314	1,294	1,327	1,177	1,249	1,314	1,265	1,264		
Claims on government	2,280	2,571	2,501	3,056	3,683	3,998	3,683	3,664	3,900	3,895	3,998	3,979	3,989		
State Bank of Pakistan	1,247	1,404	1,205	1,663	2,125	2,329	2,125	2,064	2,232	2,230	2,329	2,291	2,291		
Other banks	820	937	1,036	1,110	1,260	1,367	1,260	1,296	1,362	1,371	1,367	1,384	...		
Treasury currency	213	230	260	283	298	302	298	304	305	294	302	303	311		
Claims on provincial governments	98	145	122	117	228	256	228	266	219	172	256	234	238		
State Bank of Pakistan	8	53	12	2	119	122	119	155	110	51	122	100	104		
Scheduled banks	91	92	110	115	109	134	109	111	109	121	134	134	134		
Rates of interest (% per annum)															
Call money rate Δ	1.01	1.30	1.45	2.04	2.03	...	1.99	2.67	1.05	0.62	...	2.55	2.38		
Yield of long-term government banks ^s Δ	3.06	3.14	3.15	3.15	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.21	3.22	3.22		
Exchange rate (selling)	3.320	3.340	4.782	4.805	4.778	4.785	4.778	4.760	4.767	4.778	4.785	4.772	4.772		

FINANCE

17. CURRENCY AND BANKING (Cont'd)

End of period

Country and item	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1957	1 9 5 8					1 9 5 9	
							IV	I	II	III	IV	Jan	Feb	
PHILIPPINES (million pesos)														
Money supply	1,224	1,227	1,336	1,499	1,598	1,738	1,598	1,611	1,638	1,655	1,738	1,756	1,786	
Currency: net active	666	677	670	719	782	818	782	765	747	786	818	799	805	
Deposit money	558	550	666	780	817	919	817	846	891	869	919	958	981	
Private time deposits	461	526	586	658	803	868	803	832	850	858	888	866	894	
Bank clearings Δ	520	550	614	739	876	915	876	936	914	917	895	1,030	922	
Bank debits ^u Δ	743	815	921	1,145	1,335	...	1,354	
Government deposits	150	132	196	281	169	225	169	188	280	198	225	233	...	
Central Bank of the Philippines	55	32	63	112	56	154	56	85	192	115	154	164	...	
Philippine National Bank	95	100	133	168	113	71	113	102	93	83	71	68	65	
Foreign assets (net)	593	545	418	450	201	182	201	219	216	235	182	198	192	
Central Bank	481	415	310	322	62	75	62	83	83	96	75	68	67	
Other banks	112	130	108	118	139	107	139	136	133	139	107	131	125	
Claims on private sector (other banks)	848	939	1,106	1,254	1,513	1,588	1,513	1,468	1,439	1,491	1,588	1,607	1,621	
Claims on government	439	417	577	707	780	907	780	815	901	817	907	898	920	
Central Bank of the Philippines	344	304	349	381	632	762	632	654	752	671	762	755	770	
Other banks	95	113	228	326	147	144	147	161	148	146	144	143	150	
Claims on official entities	124	160	226	268	376	462	376	421	512	463	462	466	476	
Central Bank of the Philippines ^v	52	115	185	198	315	393	315	351	378	401	393	392	392	
Other banks	71	45	41	68	60	69	60	70	134	62	69	74	84	
Exchange rate (selling)	2.358-2.015	2.358-2.015	2.358-2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	2.015	
THAILAND (million baht)														
Money supply	5,660	6,245	7,195 ^f	7,700	8,041	8,092	8,041	8,343	7,878	8,055	8,092	
Currency: net active	4,016	4,548	5,176	5,419	5,577	5,496	5,577	5,769	5,373	5,325	5,496	
Deposit money	1,644	1,697	2,019	2,281	2,464	2,596	2,464	2,574	2,504	2,730	2,596	
Time deposits	518	652	824	1,048	1,223	1,459	1,223	1,238	1,321	1,365	1,459	1,462	...	
Government deposits	1,221	974	1,110	1,244	1,362	...	1,362	1,395	1,427	1,345	
Bank of Thailand	975	693	763	1,132	1,120	...	1,120	1,161	1,189	1,113	
Deposit money banks	246	281	347	112	242	...	242	234	238	232	
Bank clearings Δ	2,366	2,230	2,598	2,816	3,095	3,451	3,115	3,479	3,500	3,410	3,414	3,928	3,525	
Foreign assets	1,159	193	2,643	2,922	3,269	3,193	3,269	3,412	3,255	3,270 ^f	3,193	3,259	3,282	
Bank of Thailand	3,782	3,426	4,585	4,840	5,172	5,096	5,172	5,315	5,158	5,173	5,096	5,162	5,186	
Exchange Fund	—	—	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	1,260	
Profits on exchange	2,623	3,233	3,202	3,178	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163	3,163	
Claims on private sector	1,978	2,281	3,000	3,440	4,084	4,711	4,084	4,386	4,484	4,591	4,711	4,838	...	
Claims on government	5,221	6,520	5,724	6,147	6,277	6,636	6,280	...	6,163	6,248	6,636	3,797	...	
Bank of Thailand	4,965	6,340	5,452	5,854	5,934	6,242	5,936	5,964	5,785	5,903	6,242	6,329	6,260	
Deposit money banks	256	180	272	293	343	394	344	...	378	345	394	368	...	
Treasury bill rate (% per annum) ^Δ	2.25	2.27	2.26	2.28	2.27	2.91	2.27	2.76	2.99	2.98	2.98	2.98	2.99	
Exchange rate (selling)	21.16	20.88	20.91	20.66	20.90	21.10	20.90	20.85	20.97	21.09	21.10	21.10	21.16	
VIET-NAM (southern, thousand million piastre)														
Money supply	12.32	12.35 ^f	11.60 ^f	...	11.60 ^f	
Currency: net active	6.78	8.26 ^f	7.56 ^f	...	7.56 ^f	8.04 ^f	
Deposit money	5.55	4.09	4.05	...	4.05	
Time deposits	0.59	1.36	0.95	1.19	0.95	1.19	1.20	1.20	1.19	1.36	1.42	
Bank clearings Δ	3.13	2.86	3.20	3.21	3.52	3.16	3.50	3.33	2.85	3.80	...	
Foreign assets ^f	4.29	4.64	5.12	5.89	5.12	4.68	5.79	5.91	5.89	5.54	5.45	
Banque Nationale du Viet-Nam	1.05	4.36	4.61	4.82	5.57	4.82	4.44	5.54	5.64	5.57	5.24	5.24	
Other banks (net) ^f	0.07	0.03	0.30	0.32	0.30	0.24	0.25	0.27	0.32	0.29	0.21	
Claims on private sector ^f	1.62	1.81	3.22	3.01	3.22	3.30	3.21	2.99	3.01	3.18	3.25	
Claims on government	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	
Banque Nationale du Viet-Nam	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	10.68	
Exchange rate:	
Official rate ^f	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	35.00	
Controlled free rate	—	—	—	—	73.00	73.50	73.00	72.00	70.50	73.50	73.50	73.50	73.50	

GENERAL NOTE: Net active currency: Total currency outstanding less holdings in all banks including the central bank and in government treasuries. Currency in circulation: Total currency outstanding less holdings in all banks including the central bank. Deposit money: Private deposits in all banks, subject to cheque or withdrawable on demand, excluding inter-bank liabilities. Government deposits: Including government currency holdings. Bank clearings: Total value of cheques and other collection items cleared through clearing houses. Claims on private sector: Claims by the banking system arising from the rendering of loans and advances, discounting of bills, the holding of securities in private companies, etc. Claims on government: Holdings of government bonds, treasury bills and government guaranteed securities by the banking system, plus circulation of treasury currency. Rates of interest: Rates prevailing in the capital city, except for India, where Bombay rates are used. Call money rate is inter-bank rate on money at call. Exchange rates are shown in unit of national currency per US dollar.

Δ Monthly averages or calendar months.

a. Deposits of State Boards in State Commercial Bank (excluding the State Agricultural Bank).

b. Including a constant amount of 99 million kyats, which is the value of a promissory note issued as cover for the currency issue.

c. 5 year treasury bonds.

d. Debts to demand deposits of private sector.

e. 3% national development loan 1965-1970 to earliest redemption date.

f. Including bank's holdings of stocks and debentures.

g. Including the counterpart of post office demand deposits.

h. Cheques sent out for local clearing and debits to current deposit accounts.

i. Running yield of 3% consols 1986 to earliest redemption date.

j. Payments agreement liabilities, mainly to Japan and the Netherlands.

k. Foreign assets were revalued in May 1957. The revaluation proceeds (7 billion rials) are held by the National Bank and are to be used for long term development.

m. Weighted yield (simple rate of interest) to latest redemption date of medium dated government bonds issued during the period stated.

n. Including deposits of local government and government institutions in commercial banks and non-governmental foreign currency deposits in Bank of Korea.

p. Clearing accounts with Japan.

q. The number of clearing houses was increased in 1952 and 1953.

r. Including outstanding assets receivable from the Reserve Bank of India under the partition agreements; excluding foreign assets of Banking Department.

t. Yield to maturity of 3% bonds 1968.

u. Total debits to checking account of private sector, except for 1948 when debits to government deposits are included.

v. Including a constant amount of 107 million pesos from 1952, representing the difference between foreign assets transferred from the Treasury and its note and coin issue, for which the Bank assumed liability.

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